
Las Cortes Constituyentes:
The End of Francoism, 1977
SPAIN
Partido Carlista
CONSTITUCION
Contra nadie. A favor de todos.
Una Constitución Democrática
EL CENTRO ES LA DEMOCRACIA
PTE
Empecemos a cambiar las cosas dando el Sí a la Constitución
MUNUC 36
Model United Nations at the University of Chicago

Table of Contents

Chair Letter

Dear Delegates,

It is my pleasure to welcome you all to Spain, the land of *fútbol*, bullfighting, and *Don Quixote.* The year is 1977, and you have all just been elected, in the first democratic election in decades, as members of *Las Cortes Constituyentes,* where your job is to draft a new constitution and chart out Spain's hopefully-democratic future. Afterwards, we will see how your constitution stands up to the various challenges of the late 1970s.

My name is Julian Tucker, and I will be chairing this committee as King Juan Carlos I, although whether the king remains the chair for all of committee is up to you. I am extremely excited for you all to be joining Jack and me in creating a new constitution for Spain and guiding the nation through whatever crises it may face. A native of sunny Los Angeles, California, I am in my third year at the University of Chicago, double-majoring in History and Political Science. In my first year, I was an Assistant Chair for MUNUC 34's *Peru-Bolivia Confederation, 1836* and last year, I was the Crisis Director for the *Cabinet of Florvil Hyppolite: Haiti, 1889.* Additionally, I am also a Crisis Director for the Joint Crisis Committee at ChoMUN, the University of Chicago's collegiate Model UN conference. Outside of MUN, I enjoy playing the cello, trying new restaurants, and watching my beloved Baltimore Ravens and Chelsea FC (both of whom have taken years off of my life).

What I want to see from you all in this committee is active and enthusiastic participation, as it is you who will ultimately shape the direction of committee. As a Hybrid committee, we will be dealing with both GA-style sessions (for the first two sessions) and crisis sessions (the final three sessions). This will allow you to experience the best of everything MUNUC has to offer. However, I understand that Hybrids may be one of the less intuitive types of committee. Therefore, please do not hesitate to reach out to me if you have any questions or concerns, either during conference or before.

Finally, although this committee is taking place in a deeply socially conservative society, this does not give you free license to engage in offensive or intolerant behavior, and we expect you to use common-sense 21st Century values throughout the entirety of conference. Ultimately, the most important thing is for you all to learn, develop your public speaking skills, and have fun!

Good luck and best wishes,

Julian Tucker

Chair, Las Cortes Constituyentes: Spain 1977

jltucker@uchicago.edu

Crisis Director Letter

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to MUNUC 36! My name is Jack Foley, and I will be your Crisis Director for this upcoming conference. I am a current second-year at the College from New Jersey majoring in History and Romance Languages and Literatures. This is my second year participating in MUNUC; last year I was an Assistant Chair (AC) for Bolivia: Unity in Strength, and I am excited to be participating in MUNUC again. When I am not spending my time in MUN, you can find me playing viola in the University Symphony Orchestra, playing piano, exploring Chicago, and tirelessly explaining why New Jersey is the best state.

I hope that in the upcoming year you all will engage critically with the history of Spain and their transition to democracy. There are a lot of complexities in this history, so I anticipate that you all will work hard on researching both the era and your personal assignments. My goal is that everyone learns about the difficulties of nation-building after years of a repressive dictatorship and learns how to build the basis for a functioning democracy. We also will be dealing with some difficult topics related to religion, national and ethnic identity, immigration, etc., so it is expected that each delegate will treat these topics with respect and maturity as we move through the sessions. With that being said, we also hope you have fun and gain something from your time in MUNUC!

I hope you have a great time preparing for MUNUC 36, and please don't hesitate to reach out if you have any questions or concerns about the committee!

Best of luck,

Jack Foley

Crisis Director, Las Cortes Constituyentes: Spain 1977

jpfoley@uchicago.edu

Sensitivity Statement

Dear Delegates,

While we hope that conference is filled with fruitful and open debate, along with a healthy dose of scheming and chicanery, in order to make MUNUC a welcoming and inclusive environment for all delegates, we must make you aware of some limits. As was noted in the Chair and CD letters, 1977's Spain is a substantially religious and socially conservative nation. However, Spain's social conservatism does not permit delegates to engage in sexist, racist, homophobic, or other forms of discriminatory rhetoric in debates. Furthermore, as Spain has a variety of ethno-linguistic minorities (such as the Basque, the Catalans, and the Romani people), we will not accept any hateful rhetoric or speech targeting these minority groups. Moreover, no specific groups of people can be used as a scapegoat for a failure of a governmental policy, even if such scapegoating has been a common occurrence throughout Spanish history.

Similarly, in backroom, delegates cannot target specific minority groups with demagogic language in order to try to gain public support. Returning to the issue of ethno-linguistic minorities, while delegates can certainly make regional independence (say for Catalonia or the Basque Country) a key element of their backroom arcs and can advocate for their independence in frontroom, they cannot use terrorism or target civilians in order to further those goals.

Ultimately, it is our goal, as your Chair and Crisis Director, to make every delegate feel comfortable and welcome to express their opinions, improve their public speaking skills, and have fun! We understand that the lines between what is acceptable and what is not can often be blurry, and we pledge to work with you if there is any confusion regarding what can and cannot be done in both frontroom and backroom.

Sincerely,

Julian + Jack

Committee Structure And Mechanics

As you are probably aware, *Las Cortes Constituyentes 1977* is a hybrid committee, which means it involves both General Assembly sessions and Traditional Crisis sessions, hopefully giving you the best of both worlds. As we understand that you may only be familiar with one type of session, or neither type, we hope that you find the following section helpful in preparing for conference.

General Assembly (GA)

The first two sessions at conference (the Thursday evening and Friday afternoon sessions) will take place in the GA format. The goal for delegates during these two sessions is to debate, draft, and ratify a new constitution for Spain, in order to replace the *de facto* constitution of Francoist Spain, the Basic Laws of the Realm. The first session takes place in the summer of 1977, shortly after the election on June 15, in which the Constituent *Cortes* was elected. Delegates will represent different provinces (although unfortunately not every province will be represented in our *Cortes*) from across Spain and will also have a party affiliation (we will provide details about the parties elected in the 1977 election in a separate section; please see the Statement of the Problem section). However, as no party has an absolute majority in the *Cortes*, there will inevitably need to be cross-party cooperation in order to pass a functional constitution. It is important to remember that the people of Spain have put their faith in you while you work on charting a new path for the country.

You will have to address a wide array of issues as you draft and debate the new constitution. First, while the first two sessions will be presided over by the head-of-state, King Juan Carlos I, you will have to decide whether he should remain on the throne or whether he should be replaced by some alternative. You also must determine the exact roles and procedures for electing and/or appointing the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary, and the powers (or lack thereof) of these bodies. Of course, you have the ability to add on, or subtract from, the three primary governmental bodies. Additionally, you will have to determine the extent to which Spain is either centralized or decentralized, what rights should be explicitly protected by the new constitution, and what the role of various institutions in the new Spanish state should be. And we must mention the fact that Spain is still using the Franco-era flag, so we hope that some of you have a passion for graphic design!

We cannot overstate how important these GA sessions, and the constitution you come up with,

are for the traditional crisis sessions. The new constitution will have a lasting impact on everything ranging from the economy to the strength of civil society and social attitudes. The constitution will inevitably be received differently in different regions of the country and by different social classes and groups, so it will be difficult to strike a balance between the many actors within Spain. Although you will not be able to execute any backroom arcs during the first two sessions, you can—and in fact are encouraged to—try to shape the new constitution to your advantage and to help fulfill whatever your agenda may be. It may be worthwhile to try to create intentional weaknesses for you to exploit, or to strengthen institutions that you hope to take control of. Of course, as everyone has their own agenda, both public and private, compromise is crucial.

Crisis

The last three sections of the committee will be in a crisis format, which includes mechanics such as the increased involvement of the backroom and the use of directives instead of resolutions. The purpose of these last three sessions is to stress-test the Constitution you will have created during the General Assembly portion of the committee. It will be fast-paced, but this will allow you to make quick decisions to match the swift nature of the crises that form within a new nation.

The frontroom of a committee is the part many of you are familiar with when it comes to MUN, which includes debate, formation of blocs, drafting of resolutions (or of directives, in this case). Much of this remains the same. This committee is small, so it is expected that each delegate will contribute to both the moderated and unmoderated caucuses during the crisis portion. The one small, yet noticeable, change in crisis versus GA format, as previously mentioned, is the use of directives instead of resolutions. The main distinction between these two types of documents is that directives are typically shorter texts and are smaller in scope; they are designed to resolve the many issues that pop up in crisis, thus they do not have to be as long as resolutions in GA. As a result of being shorter documents, it is imperative that the directives have concise and careful wording and remain focused on the problems they set out to resolve.

As for the backroom, this is the mechanism that makes crisis, and therefore hybrid, so exciting. Throughout the entire committee, starting in GA and ramping up during crisis, you will be allowed to send notes to backroom to further your personal arc within the committee. You will be provided with notepads on the first day of committee to write down your notes. During the GA portion, you will be allowed to send one long-form note to backroom per committee session and will receive one back in return at the beginning of the next session. Once crisis starts,

you will be allowed to send a greater quantity of notes, which can be more concise, at designated times that will be announced at the beginning of the committee. The purpose of backroom is to further your personal arc, or your personal storyline, throughout the conference. It is important that when you begin to write your notes, you provide a good basis for your plan: provide explanations for resources, detail your reasoning behind your actions, and supply a comprehensive plan of what you want to do. Do not skip over details—that is how many arcs fail. Be creative, have fun with it. But most importantly, do not rush your plan. Patience is a virtue, so make sure your plan is timed well, and do not be too grandiose. Please enjoy yourselves when you are scheming your arcs!

We look forward to seeing you take advantage of all the resources and mechanisms at your disposal. Be creative, and do not hesitate to reach out if you have any questions about how the committee will be run!

Geography

Natural Features

Spain is located on the Iberian peninsula, which it shares with Portugal, in Europe's southwest. To the northeast, Spain is bordered by France and the tiny principality of Andorra, and, to the west, Spain is bordered by Portugal. Additionally, Spain has two small enclaves in North Africa bordered by Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla. Being on the Iberian peninsula, Spain borders multiple bodies of water. To the south and east is the Mediterranean Sea, and to the north is the Bay of Biscay. Further, Spain also has miles of Atlantic coastline to the south, around the Province of Cadiz and the *Costa de la Luz,* and to the northwest, with the region of Galicia.

Although Spain is best known by foreigners for its sunny beaches, it is actually a fairly mountainous nation. There are four main mountain systems to be aware of. Spain's border with France and Andorra is almost entirely covered by the Pyrenees Mountain Range, which stretches from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean, a distance of around 430 kilometers. To the west of the Pyrenees, extending from Galicia to the Basque Country–parallel to the Biscay coastline–are the Cantabrian Mountains, which stretch for about 300 kilometers. The Iberian System runs diagonally from the Valencian Community northwest for about 500 kilometers where it almost intersects with the Cantabrian Mountains. The Iberian System is where many of Spain's most important rivers, including the Ebro, Douro, and Taugus, have their headwaters. Finally, in Spain's south, from western Andalucia to Murcia, are the Baetic Mountains, which are geologically connected to Morocco's Rif Mountains on the other side of the Strait of Gibraltar.[1]

[2]

Cities

Historically a heavily rural country, Spain has seen increasing urbanization, particularly since the 1950s. Here are a few important cities to

[1] Delano Smith, Catherine, and Vicente Rodriguez. "Spain- Land ." Encyclopædia Britannica, August 29, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Spain#ref70257.

[2] Commons, Wikimedia. File:Spain topography.png. February 10, 2006. Wikimedia . https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Spain_topography.png.

remember. Spain's capital and largest city is Madrid. Situated on the Manzanares River in the vast central plateau of the interior, Madrid is located almost in the exact center of the Iberian peninsula. Prior to the Spanish court's arrival in the 16th century, Madrid was a sleepy and insignificant town, with few obvious advantages in geography. However, Madrid has slowly transformed into a hub for finance, transportation, and industry, which has attracted large numbers of rural migrants over the past few decades.[3]

Located on the Mediterranean coast is Barcelona, Spain's second largest city and the beating heart of Catalonia. Situated about 150 kilometers south of the border with France, Barcelona spent much of its history confined to its medieval-era walls. However, the 19th century saw the emergence of a strong Catalan textile industry, centered in and around Barcelona, which led to significant population growth. As Barcelona-based textile firms made Catalonia Spain's wealthiest region, the city of Barcelona was forced to expand way beyond its historic boundaries, annexing surrounding towns and incorporating them into the urban fabric. Since the 19th century, Barcelona gradually became a hotbed of both Catalan nationalism and Spanish republicanism. In the Civil War, Barcelona was the last stronghold for the forces of republicanism, and the city's fall to Franco's Nationalist army marked the defeat of the Second Spanish Republic. Although Franco was widely seen as being hostile to Catalonia and Barcelona, especially when compared to Madrid, Barcelona has remained wealthy over the past few decades, gradually shifting away from its dependence on textiles to other industries and services.[4]

Located a few kilometers inland from the Bay of Biscay on Spain's northern coast is the Basque Country's largest city, Bilbao. Bilbao has long been home to a fairly prosperous port, acting as a bridge between Iberian Spain and the Spanish Netherlands before Dutch independence in 1581 and becoming an important center for trade with Spanish America in the 18th century. While much of Spain stagnated and declined with the slow collapse of the Spanish empire in the 19th century, Bilbao continued to flourish with the rapid growth of iron foundries, steel mills, and shipbuilding. Additionally, with the growth of industry in the late-19th century, Bilbao became Spain's major financial center, further adding to its prosperity. However, while much of Spain boomed under the latter half of the Franco era, Bilbao has not seen the same growth. For one, Franco brutally suppressed the Basque language and any expressions of Basque identity more generally. Furthermore, since the 1960s, Bilbao

[3] Rodriguez, Vicente, Timothy John Connell , and Blake Ehrlich. "Madrid." Encyclopædia Britannica, August 22, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Madrid.

[4] Rodriguez, Vicente, and Timothy John Connell. "Barcelona." Encyclopædia Britannica, August 27, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Barcelona.

has seen the decline of the steel and shipbuilding industries.[5]

Other important Spanish cities include: Valencia, located on the east coast of the Iberian peninsula; Málaga, a city in the southernmost region of Andalusia that has seen massive expansion thanks to rising tourism; and Sevilla, Andalusia's largest city.

6

Climate and Weather

Although Spain has become almost synonymous with sunshine, especially thanks to the growth of tourism on the Mediterranean coast, Spain actually contains a wide variety of climates, thanks to its location on a peninsula and its many mountain ranges. Spain's mountainous terrain means that while two regions may be very close geographically, they may often have distinct climates. However, some general patterns can be seen in the Spanish climate. Northern Spain, stretching from Galicia to northern Catalonia, has a maritime or temperate-humid climate, characterized by heavy annual rainfall. The rest of the country, and the Iberian peninsula more generally, has what could generally be described as a Mediterranean climate. Unsurprisingly, Spain's coastal regions tend to have less year-round temperature variation, while its inland regions feature cold winters and extremely hot summers.

Natural Resources

The bulk of Spain's natural resources can be found in agriculture, with the country boasting middling mineral wealth. Spain is a major producer of wine, grain, vegetables, fruit, and livestock. Viticulture is concentrated in several regions scattered throughout the country, from La Rioja in the north to Jerez de la Frontera in Andalucia. Livestock production and grain growth is based in Spain's interior regions, particularly Castile & Leon and Castilla-La Mancha.

However, agricultural wealth can only get a country so far. So, what of Spain's other natural resources? With a coastline of over 8,000 kilometers, Spain has long had one of Europe's largest fishing industries, with the biggest fishing ports located in the Galician cities of Vigo and A Coruña. About one-third of Spain is covered by forests and woodland, thanks to large

[5] Encyclopaedia Britannica, The Editors Of, ed. "Bilbao." Encyclopædia Britannica, July 12, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Bilbao.
[6] Commons, Wikimedia. File:Ccaa-spain.png. July 25, 2016. Wikimedia. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ccaa-spain.png.

reforestation efforts beginning in the 1940s. Spain's mineral wealth is very much a mixed bag. Spain has essentially no oil reserves, making its economy extremely vulnerable to international price shocks. Spain has historically had significant coal reserves, based mostly in the Cantabrian Mountains, which are also home to smaller reserves of other minerals such iron, copper, lead, zinc, and even uranium. However, the mineral reserves of the Cantabrian Mountains have been steadily depleted over time, and Spain will eventually need to transition away from coal towards other forms of energy as the 20th century comes to a close.

History Of The Problem

[7]

The First Republic (1873-1874)

Spain's first tussle with democracy occurred on February 10, 1873, when King Amadeo I abdicated the throne, and a republic was proclaimed the next day by a group of radicals, republicans, and democrats who eventually drafted the Constitution under the Constituent *Cortes*. The republican leaders wanted the establishment of a federal republic, while the radicals wanted a unitary republic; the radicals themselves lost the conflict, being driven from power.

[7] Padró, Tomás. Alegoría de la Primera República Española. 1873. Picryl. https://picryl.com/media/alegoria-de-la-primera-republica-espanola-por-tomas-padro-8b7dba.

The early Republic faced much instability early on (from Catalan uprisings, to anti-federalist coups), and calls for revolution could be heard within just the single year of their government. Much infighting ensued in the government, and the *Cortes* met again, only to be quickly dissolved in favor of turning power over to General Francisco Serrano to form a coalition government. Finally, another military rebellion put an end to the First Republic in December of 1874. The government collapsed, resulting in the restoration of the monarchy and the installation of Alfonso XII on the throne of Spain on December 29, 1874, thus ending Spain's short lived and chaotic first attempt at a republic.[8]

The Bourbon Restoration (1874-1923)

Relative Stability (1875-1898)

The first two decades following the restoration of the monarchy were defined by broad political stability. Spanish politics were dominated by two parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, both of which supported a constitutional monarchy. Power mostly alternated between the Conservative leader, Antonio Canovas del Castillo (who served as prime minister for six separate stints between 1875 and 1897) and the Liberal leader, Praxedes Mateo Sagasta (who served as prime minister for seven different stints between 1871 and 1902). However, the regular rotation of power, known as the *turno pacifico,* was not a sign of a vibrant democracy. Rather, the King, with the support of the two parties, would pre-select the winner of parliamentary elections. The King would then offer various favors to the political bosses, or *caciques,* who controlled the votes in their local parliamentary districts.[9] Although the *turno pacifico* created a governing class that was almost completely detached from the general public, it bred stability, something that Spain had sorely lacked during the chaotic year of the First Republic.

Political stability was maintained and bolstered by solid, if unspectacular, economic growth. Catalonia, with its textile mills producing both cotton and woolen fabrics, remained the industrial center of a largely agrarian economy. However, during the 1870s, a second industrial center began to emerge in the Basque Country. The Basque Country, in particular the province of Vizcaya, saw a rapid expansion of iron mining fueled by an influx of British capital. As the late-19th century progressed, two further industries, metallurgy and shipbuilding, sprung up in the Basque Country, as did Spain's first large commercial banks, which were set up to support Basque industry. The rest of the country remained overwhelmingly agrarian. Madrid

[8] Gooding, Nigel. "First Spanish Republic," 2022. http://www.nigelgooding.co.uk/Exhibits/NigelGooding/Spanish%20Republic/Frame01.htm.

[9] Delano Smith, Catherine, and Vicente Rodriguez. "Spain- The Restored Monarchy, 1875-1923 ." Encyclopædia Britannica, August 29, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Spain#ref70257.

remained a city dominated by politics, civil administration, and finance rather than industry. Traditionally important towns of Castile, such as Toledo and Salamanaca, remained ecclesiastical and academic centers, dominated by large landowners from the nearby countryside. The prosperity of rural areas varied from region to region. Wine producing areas flourished in the 1880s thanks to an insect infestation which devastated the French wine industry. Meanwhile, the province of Galicia in the northwest remained extremely poor and saw mass emigration, particularly to Spain's increasingly prosperous former colony, Argentina.[10]

Why Spain saw such limited industrialization, especially compared to its European counterparts, is a question widely debated by economic historians. One clear cause of the lack of widespread industrialization is the middling nature of Spanish agriculture. Protected by high tariffs, Spanish agriculture saw very little innovation. This lack of an agricultural revolution meant that Spanish agriculture was still very labor-intensive. The labor-intensive nature of Spanish agriculture meant that, outside of certain regions, there was never an abundance of cheap labor that could work in budding industries and that the Spanish countryside did not have the purchasing power necessary to create a large market for consumer goods.[11]

[12]

The Disaster and the Rise of Pessimism and Radicalism

The stability of the restoration came to a sudden end in 1898, the year of 'the Disaster.' Spain lost the final remains of her colonial empire–Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines–to the United States in a war that lasted less than four months. Having been humiliated, Spain's constitutional monarchy found itself under attack from all angles. The Carlists, who saw the current Alfonsine monarchy as illegitimate, hoped to restore the descendants of Don Carlos to the throne and hoped to dismantle what they saw as an over-industrialized and overly-secular society. Republicans, who were by definition opposed to the monarchy, gained prominence by

[10] Carr, Raymond, and Raymond Carr. "The Economy 1875-1914." Essay. In *Modern Spain, 1875-1980*, 16-30. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Wigram, Edgar. 1906, Northern Spain, pp. 062-063, León. Casa del Ayuntamiento. 1906. Picryl. https://picryl.com/media/1906-northern-spain-pp-062-063-leon-casa-del-ayuntamiento-6379f6.

attacking the corruption of *caciquismo*, and republicanism soon became popular among urban intellectuals and the working class of Barcelona. Additional criticism of the constitutional monarchy came from anarchists, socialists (although the labor movement was weaker in Spain than in other European nations, seen in the fact that as of 1907, Spain was the only major European country without a working-class parliamentarian), and regionalists.[13]

How did the governing class react to the sudden critiques of the constitutional monarchy? Both the Conservatives and Liberals sought to reform local government and tear out the roots of *caciquismo* in order to make the political system more democratic. The Conservatives, believing that the broad populace was culturally and socially conservative, hoped that increasing political participation would benefit their political prospects. On the other hand, the Liberals sought to rally the public by attacking certain privileges of the Catholic Church. Yet, increased democratization benefitted neither the Conservatives nor the Liberals. In the 1903 general election, the republicans scored surprising victories in some of Spain's largest cities, including Madrid, Barcelona, and Valencia. Furthermore, the loss of Spain's final colonial possessions in 1898 robbed the state of financial resources, limiting investment in crucial infrastructure and preventing Spain from establishing any kind of welfare state. Thanks to infighting and economic stagnation, the Conservatives and Liberals were never able to restore the stability of pre-1898 Spain.

After 1917, Spain's political situation became even more unstable. Brief prosperity brought by Spain's decision to remain neutral during WWI quickly collapsed with the end of the war, leading to increased unrest among the working class. Between 1918 and 1923, Spain saw a dramatic surge in the activity and militancy of the labor movement. The two main groups in the labor movement were the socialist UGT (*Unión General de Trabajadores)* and the anarchist CNT *(Confederación Nacional del Trabajo)*. It was the CNT that benefited from the surge in labor activity, and Spain saw an increase in the number of strikes, which were becoming more and more revolutionary. A grand total of ten governments were formed and collapsed between 1918 and 1923, largely due to their inability to deal with increased urban unrest and violence. The army, which had largely stayed out of the political arena after the restoration, was relied upon by the civilian government to suppress the activities of the anarchist CNT. The propertied classes of Spain, including the urban bourgeoisie and rural landowners, became increasingly frightened by the radicalism of the CNT.

[13] Carr, Raymond, and Raymond Carr. "Regenerationism and the Critics of the Regime." Essay. In *Modern Spain, 1875-1980*, 47-70. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001.

It was not only the urban bourgeoisie and the rural gentry, however, who were frustrated by the failures of successive Liberal and Conservative governments to deal with working class unrest. King Alfonso XIII, regarding his ministers as political cowards, began to have public anti-parliamentary outbursts, arguing for royal reform 'with or without the constitution' and insisting that a temporary dictatorship was permissible and even desirable during 'moments of extreme gravity.' Alfonso's words did not go unnoticed. The Spanish military had come to resent the civilian government, exasperated by the lack of support they were receiving in the war that was being fought in Morocco.[14] Dissatisfaction with the constitutional monarchy and its inability to provide stability had reached an all time high. Could the system hold?

Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1931)

Now we enter into one of two important ages of dictatorship in modern Spanish history: the regime of General Miguel Primo de Rivera. Primo de Rivera, formally a military leader, carried out a coup d'etat on September 13, 1923, and without much opposition, established himself as the leader of a new Spanish regime–one that drew its legitimacy primarily from the military. The general Spanish public was mostly indifferent to the current political system, and the current government claimed to have civil power over the military, but, in reality, Spain had a weak central government and a public that was still considerably poor and illiterate, despite some economic growth over the past century. This all laid the groundwork for a successful military coup and the assumption of power by Primo de Rivera.[15]

Primo de Rivera gained control over Spain through a *pronunciamiento* in which he nullified the Constitution of 1876, which we know had previously established the liberal monarchy up until this point. His rise to power was also supported by then King Alfonso XIII, who felt that his own power in government was restrained by that same constitution; through the entirety of the dictatorship, he almost consistently approved of Primo de Rivera's use of decrees in a legislative manner, a habit which would then be adopted by Francisco Franco.[16] Primo de Rivera also established a Military Directory, chiefly meaning that the government was primarily controlled by the military, and Primo de Rivera established his line of control through the military.[17]

[14] Carr, Raymond, and Raymond Carr. "The Crisis of the Parliamentary Monarchy 1917-1923." Essay. In *Modern Spain, 1875-1980*, 47-70. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001.

[15] Paniagua, Javier. "De La Dictadura a La Guerra Civil (1923-1939)." Aula-Historia Social, no. 2 (1998): 19–20. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40343296.

[16] Ben-Ami, Shlomo. "The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera: A Political Reassessment." Journal of Contemporary History 12, no. 1 (January 1977): 65. https://www.jstor.org/stable/260237.

[17] Paniagua, 20.

18

Ideology

A key to understanding Primo de Rivera's place in the history of this committee is to understand his ideology, one that was key in influencing Franco's own policies.

At his core, Primo de Rivera was a man who believed in simple ideas; others might even call it just an over-simplistic political philosophy. Predominantly, as a military leader, he championed both peace and order as fundamental to his regime, one which gained him support from Catalan industrialists at first, who feared any possible anarchism from the threat of many workers-rights organizations at the time.[19] Another strain of his ideology was one of nationalism–the restoration of Spain, of saving it from its decaying status and unifying it once again. It was also well known that Primo de Rivera was very close to Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, drawing much of his inspiration in the early years from Mussolini himself.[20]

The ideologies of Primo de Rivera can best be understood through the creation of the *Unión Patriótica* (UP: Patriotic Union), his own political party, a state-generated and controlled political party. It proclaimed: "Spain, One, Great, and Indivisible;" "Spain above all;" and their motto: "Fatherland, Religion, and Monarchy." It was created to encourage members to join to profess their loyalty to both the monarchy and, more importantly, Spain itself. Once again, this state-led propaganda paved the way for the nationalist rhetoric used by Franco. In addition, the UP tried to create *Juntas Ciudadanas* (Civic Juntas), regional organizations under the UP to promote "order, justice, morality, and progress," which essentially means their purpose was to try to incentivize public involvement and civic duty with his regime. In the long run, the UP failed to be a state-run party that could legitimize the military regime, but, as we have seen, it set the base of much of the nationalist rhetoric to be used just a few years after its own demise.[21]

Another key element to Primo de Rivera's ideology was a strain of fervent anti-communism. This fear of a communist order takes its origin from his rhetoric of the necessity of peace and order, which he uses as the antithesis of the

[18] Fotograf, Ukjent, Ricardo Martín (1882–1936), Ingebjørg Birkeland, and Alejandro Søreng-Wold   (Universitetet i Bergen). "Miguel Primo de Rivera." Store norske leksikon. Accessed August 31, 2023. https://snl.no/Miguel_Primo_de_Rivera.

[19] Ben-Ami, 66.

[20] Ibid, 65.

[21] Ibid, 67-68.

supposed disorder and violence of anarchism and communism. He saw communism as diametric to the order of Christian society, of which he stood as a bulwark, protecting the Christian West from the claws of communism. Primo de Rivera's regime brought a fear of communism into the mainstream and also therefore used it as a means of justifying an authoritarian regime. The normalization of anti-communism is another example of a central tenet of Franco's regime, where Franco also saw himself as the "sentinel of the west."[22]

In an attempt to further legitimize his regime, Primo de Rivera held a national plebiscite to show that the people of Spain were emphatic in their support of him. This would be great if the results were not bogus and entirely fabricated, just like Franco. National parades were also held in his honor, and photos of him were distributed to the public, generating a quasi-cult of personality surrounding Primo de Rivera. Nonetheless, these practices did not help nearly as much as he would have liked.[23]

War in Morocco

One of the few achievements of Primo de Rivera was his involvement in the pacification of the ongoing war in Morocco at the time. Spain was entrenched in a war against the Riffians, a group of Morrocans headed by Abd-el-Krim. At first, he was against the expansion of the war and wanted to abandon the territory completely, as was popular belief after a crushing Spanish defeat at the Battle of Annual in 1921. After some major military triumphs of Abd-el-Krim, Primo de Rivera decided to contact France to form a possible military alliance against the Riffians. After the Riffians launched attacks against the French, the two powers came to an agreement to stop the advance and successes of the Riffians. The two powers succeeded after the Alhucemas landing, a military offensive that effectively ended the war in Morocco.[24]

Anti-Catalanism

Although Primo de Rivera's initial coup was aided by the support of Catalan industrialists in 1923, this did not block him from adopting an anti-Catalan policy. He prohibited the use of Catalan in official documents, schools, or religious contexts, establishing a direct attack of the dictatorship against Catalan public and civic life. This aggression caused a large reaction in the public sphere, especially when the national government banned the Catalan choral society Orfeó Català and had a confrontation with the College of Lawyers, who refused to publicize their information in Spanish instead of Catalan. This tension came to a head when Francesc Macià, a Catalan nationalist living in Paris, endeavored to incite an armed revolt as retaliation against the policies of the national government, which ultimately failed. Nonetheless, these

[22] Ibid, 68-69.
[23] Ibid, 69.
[24] Paniagua, 21-22.

tensions of Catalan autonomy against the national government do not end in this period.[25]

Economy

As it relates to the economy, Primo de Rivera enacted some policies that are of note for our purposes. He approved protectionist policies for industry in the Basque Country and Catalonia, the largest two economic centers in the country. In addition, he opted for the construction of more public works, especially roads, to connect the country, in a policy of economic nationalism. Certain sectors of the economy—namely oil, tobacco, and communications—were monopolized, rejecting control by regional and municipal companies.[26]

End of the Regime

Starting in 1927, Primo de Rivera's regime began to lose its political support. Many prominent figures, along with students, started to push for a change in regime and a return to the previous political system. With the crash of the stock market in 1929 and the devaluation of the peseta, Primo de Rivera accrued with every passing day more opposition. Some generals in 1930 and 1931 attempted to return to the normalcy of the previous constitution of before 1923, but they failed in doing so, as many figures started to abandon support for the King. A combined effort of republicans and Socialists in 1931 tried to change a new provisional government into a republic. It did not succeed at first, with two leaders being shot by firing squad, but, after a set of elections conceded that 41 out of 50 territories voted for a republic, the regime of Primo de Rivera ended.[27]

Second Republic (1931-1939)

[28]

What all members of the provisional government of 1931, formed after the abdication of King Alfonso XIII, could agree on was that Spanish society needed serious reform in order to bring the county up to date with the rest of Europe. However, while the leaders of the Second

[25] Ibid, 22.
[26] Ibid, 23.
[27] Ibid, 25.
[28] Allegory of the Second Spanish Republic . Creazilla. Accessed August 31, 2023. https://creazilla.com/nodes/3147754-allegory-of-the-second-spanish-republic-illustration.

Republic would consistently struggle to achieve their goals, although certain reforms were more successful than others, the mere prospect of reforms galvanized a conservative opposition that would grow more radical as the Second Republic stretched on.

In order to understand why the attempted reforms of the Second Republic had such mixed rates of success, it is important to remember the global economic climate of the 1930s. While Spain, being less industrialized and more economically isolated than its European neighbors, suffered a less dramatic economic collapse than other European countries, by 1934, Spanish exports had fallen by 75 percent, industrial production had flatlined, and there was significant unemployment, particularly in the countryside.[29] With the budget of the Second Republic's successive governments (there were eighteen in only five years) so severely constrained, the government's ability to carry out reforms would be influenced by the price tag of said reforms.

Economic and Agrarian Reforms

The early governments of the Second Republic were dominated by left-leaning parties, as Spanish republicanism had historically received its strongest support among industrial workers, who unsurprisingly pushed for increased labor rights and other economic reforms. The Provisional government quickly issued a series of pro-labor reforms, such as an eight-hour work day, paid sick leave, and paid vacation. Additionally, the government maintained the mixed committees that had been set up to adjudicate labor disputes by the Primo de Rivera dictatorship but dramatically increased the power of workers' representatives.[30] Yet, once in government, Socialist and other left-leaning politicians began to balk at what they saw as 'excessive' wage demands, especially during a time of economic crisis, driving something of a wedge between left-leaning republicans and their base of urban workers.

While the labor reforms of the Second Republic were a mixed bag, the agrarian reforms pursued were an abject failure. 1930s Spain was still a predominantly agrarian society, and land-ownership tended to be highly concentrated, thus creating a large bloc of landless tenant farmers, who often lived in abject poverty. The rise of the FNTT (*Federación Nacional de Trabajadores de la Tierra)*, a socialist union of agricultural workers, made sure that the question of agrarian reform could not be put off. Indeed, in 1932, the *Cortes* passed a landmark agrarian law, creating the Institute of Agrarian Reform which could purchase land and redistribute said land to the landless peasantry. In short, the

[29] Carr, Raymond, and Raymond Carr. "The Second Republic 1931-1936." Essay. In *Modern Spain, 1875-1980*, 117–19. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001.

[30] Carr, 121.

Agrarian Law of 1932 "seriously threatened the strongest economic class in Spain... and awakened the hopes of the impoverished peasantry."[31] However, while the Agrarian Law provided the government with the authority to purchase land and redistribute said land to the peasantry, the government's lack of funds meant that in the end, the total amount of land redistributed by the Institute of Agrarian Reform was equivalent to one large estate. The government simply did not have the funds to buy up large swaths of the Spanish countryside for redistribution. Furthermore, many economically liberal republicans, who often hailed from the urban bourgeoisie, felt little attachment to the landless rural poor and would not countenance the seizure and redistribution of land without just compensation. Nevertheless, despite the limited direct impact of the Agrarian Law, the mere prospect of redistribution sparked fear among rural landowners and the Spanish right more generally, who seized on the fact that the Agrarian Law could be used to threaten the property of around 70,000 small landowners, particularly in the region of Castile.[32]

The Status of the Catholic Church

After being elected in June of 1931, the Constituent *Cortes* met to both draw up a new constitution and hopefully begin the radical reforms that republican leaders believed were long overdue. One of the most obvious issues that the provisional government and the *Cortes* sought to tackle was the role of the Catholic Church. Anti-clericalism had long been a key pillar of Spanish republican ideology, and the leaders of the new republic quickly took aim at the historic privileges of the Church. Article 26 of the new constitution, and subsequent legislation, mandated the official separation of Church and State, expelled the Jesuit order, and, most significantly, stripped religious orders of their control over education. Furthermore, divorce was legalized, secular cemeteries were established, and the crucifix was removed from schools and other public buildings.[33] It is easy to understand why, with limited state resources, the government would prioritize secularizing reforms. After all, legalizing divorce is much cheaper than redistributing farmland. Yet, it was the dramatic push towards a secular state, more than any of the other reforms, that would galvanize the Spanish right, whose animating principle became the defense of a 'persecuted church.'

The Formation and Rise of CEDA

In the early years of the Second Republic, the Spanish right had been sidelined, with its main representation being limited to small agrarian parties and regionalist parties mostly from the Basque Country and the extremely conservative region of Navarre. In the election of 1931, the

[31] Malefakis, Edward. *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970.
[32] Carr, 126.
[33] Carr, 122-124.

bulk of the right-wing vote had gone to the Radical Republican Party (PRR) of Alejandro Lerroux. However, as we mentioned earlier, the various reform attempts in the early years of the Second Republic, particularly the attacks on the privileges of the Catholic Church, galvanized the deeply Catholic Spanish right into action. Under the leadership of José María Gil Robles, the Spanish right made a series of crucial tactical and ideological changes. While much of the Spanish right's supporters and leaders believed the Second Republic to be inherently illegitimate, best exemplified by a botched attempt at a right-wing military coup in August of 1932, Gil Robles professed the doctrine of 'accidentalism.' Accidentalism was a fundamentally pragmatic ideology, holding that questions of the Second Republic's legitimacy were immaterial as long as Catholic interests were protected. Gil Robles argued that "the cowardice of the right has allowed those who come from the cesspools of iniquity to take control of the fatherland." Accordingly, "the right... had no other means of gaining power than by using the established regime, introducing themselves into it and making it their own."[34]

Gil Robles put his rhetoric into action in anticipation of the 1933 elections with the formation of the *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas,* or CEDA. Made up of a variety of smaller non-republican right-wing parties, the CEDA was the first time the conservative Catholic right had created a modern mass party. Financed by wealthy monarchists, industrialists, and large landowners, the CEDA was able to capitalize on the divides between various factions of the left, as well as the new electoral system, to emerge as the largest party in the election of November 1933.

Republican Divides

The various parties and factions that had been instrumental in the creation of the Second Republic were bitterly divided by 1933. The most right-leaning of the republican parties, Alejandro Lerroux's PRR, had left the government of Manuel Azaña in 1931, leaving Azaña and his left-wing republican AR party reliant on the socialist PSOE party. Meanwhile, the failure of many of the Azaña government's reforms meant that a large faction of the Spanish left's base, particularly anarchists, grew increasingly disenchanted with the Second Republic. Throughout 1932 and 1933, clashes between the government and anarchists, led by the *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo*, grew increasingly frequent and violent. Left-wing disenchantment with the Second Republic and Azaña's government grew to the point that in the summer of 1933, Francisco Largo Caballero, the leader of PSOE–Spain's biggest socialist party–and the Minister of Labor, declared that

[34] Carr, 127-128.

"to accomplish socialist aims in a bourgeois democracy is impossible."[35]

The divisions among the republican left were to be amplified by the new electoral system of the Spanish Second Republic. In order to limit the power of local bosses that had flourished under the restored Bourbon monarchy and to encourage the formation of parties with mass appeal, the *Cortes* had eliminated single-member constituencies in favor of large multi-member constituencies where individuals voted for party lists. This system favored the broadest possible coalitions at the expense of smaller parties that fought alone, unless those parties had support highly concentrated in a few regions. Thus, when November of 1933 came around, there were four large factions jockeying for power: the CEDA (anti-republican right), the PRR (right-leaning republicans), the republican left, and PSOE. The results of the 1933 election were a disaster for the left and a triumph for the right, especially CEDA. In first place was CEDA, with 115 seats. In second place was the PRR with 102 seats. Meanwhile, PSOE's seat count was essentially halved, falling from 115 seats in 1931 to 59 seats. Finally, the republican left fared the worst, avoiding extinction by winning a measly five seats.[36]

The Two Black Years and the Popular Front

Given the results of the November 1933 election, it is unsurprising that Spain's socialists and the republican left found themselves shut out of government. Instead, a coalition dominated by the CEDA and the PRR took over, with Alejandro Lerroux being named Prime Minister and Gil Robles, along with two other CEDA parliamentarians, named a minister. At a time when fascist leaders were on the rise across the continent, Gil Robles' declaration that he was an anti-Marxist set off alarm bells across the Spanish left. After all, to the Socialists of Spain, an 'anti-Marxist front' was seen as a cover for a fascist front. Furthermore, although Gil Robles had worked within the democratic institutions set up by the Second Republic, the CEDA included a wide array of explicitly anti-democratic groups. Although Gil Robles had expelled some of the most extreme monarchists from the CEDA, and the party was mostly made up of aristocratic, reactionary, yet also somewhat run-of-the-mill conservatives, the alliance retained a great deal of monarchist factions, including the Carlists and the Alfonsists.[37]

It is also worth noting that 1933 saw the emergence of the Falangist movement. While many of Gil Robles' political opponents suspected that the leader of the CEDA was a closet fascist, the Falange was an explicitly fascist organization, seeking to rally the working classes

[35] Carr, 127.
[36] Carr, 129.
[37] Carr, 128.

in opposition to democracy, communism, 'foreign liberalism,' and more. Initially led by José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the son of the late dictator, the Falange's importance in the eventual collapse of the Second Republic should not be overstated. The Falangists were ridden with internal feuds and divisions, had no representation in the *Cortes* (they were shunned by the CEDA), had strained relations with the wealthy monarchists who funded the CEDA, and had limited contacts within the officer corps. However, the Falangist militias and gangs undoubtedly did a great deal to contribute to the generally tense and violent atmosphere that was increasingly coming to define the Second Republic.[38]

After the CEDA's inclusion in Lerroux's government was confirmed, the PSOE, the CNT, and the Communist Party (PCE) began to put in place plans for an armed revolution under the banner of the Workers' Alliance. In October of 1934, the three CEDA ministers were finally confirmed to their positions, and revolts broke out in Catalonia and the northern mining region of Asturias. Despite having been planned for upwards of nine months, the revolution of October 1934 was a fiasco, with the Catalonian revolt lasting a mere ten hours before it was smothered by government forces. In Asturias, the revolution was more successful, with miners seizing the provincial capital of Oviedo and setting up 'revolutionary committees' to govern the towns under their control. Ultimately, however, the revolution in Asturias was repressed by the Spanish Army after two weeks of fighting.[39]

After defeating the October 1934 revolts, Lerroux, with the support of the CEDA, retained power. Rather than ushering in fascism, the Lerroux-CEDA government proved to be quite unimaginative, dominated by rigid and upper-class conservatives whose agenda consisted mostly of trying to undo the meager reforms of the previous government. After a corruption scandal involving bribery, blackmail, and rigged games of roulette, Lerroux's government collapsed, and Spain headed to what would turn out to be its last democratic election in decades.

Spain's left had been badly damaged by its inability to unite for the 1933 elections. In preparation for future elections, the leaders of Spain's main socialist, marxist, and left-wing republican parties united in 1935 to form the Popular Front. After a closely fought election, featuring increasingly frequent episodes of political violence, in the spring of 1936, the Popular Front emerged victorious. However, the election results revealed a nation divided into nearly two equal parts. Would the Popular Front be able to unite Spain?

[38] Carr, 132-133.

[39] Carr, 130-131.

Civil War (1936-39)

The Spanish Civil War started, officially, on July 17, 1936 with a military coup that attempted to end the Second Republic and institute a military regime as the legitimate government in Spain. This period marks one of the bloodiest and most violent spans of years in modern Spanish history. To give the atrocity some scale, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial estimates that around 500,000 people were killed in the war, with about 200,000 people as a result of systematic killing. The Nationalists rounded up around 500,000 people in 60 concentration camps, and executed about 100,000 during the war itself and another 50,000 after it ended in 1939.[40] It is a bloody and important history, so please pay attention closely to the following story and treat it with respect.

Causes

The Second Republic in Spain undoubtedly was the catalyst of a large amount of change in Spanish society. However, these rapid changes led to a series of culture wars in Spain—tensions between urban and rural, secular and religious, authoritarianism and liberalism, traditional gender roles and the "new woman." There were extremely uneven levels of development throughout the country, and these tensions were the focal point of the success of the Nationalists in their rebellion.

Spain also, as we have previously seen, had lost its empire in the late-19th century in the Spanish-American War. Many traditionalists and military figures throughout the country saw this as a loss of greatness, a loss of Spain's great imperial past. A strong feeling of nationalism grew among certain communities in the countries, and there was a general thought among these people that civilian leaders should not run the country because they already messed up in losing Spain's colonies.

Similarly, despite the religious reforms of the new Republic, a significantly large portion of Spain was still religious. Many rural areas still held a very traditional view of Catholicism, and many local priests still influenced the lives of many people. On the other hand, though, the Catholic Church felt that it was losing its grip and influence on society—among urban areas, the growing industrial masses did not take to religion as they had in the past, and many rural laborers in the south felt that the Church was a pillar of the exploitative landed elite who controlled their life. Accordingly, this set up a large conundrum for a Church who did not want to lose its power in a modernizing country and who had a large portion of citizens who still believed in the institution. As the general conservative public did not want the Republic meddling in the religious practices of the people, this set up a

[40] United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC. "Spanish Civil War." *United States Holocaust Memorial Museum*, encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/spanish-civil-war#:~:text=The%20Spanish%20Civil%20War%20proved. Accessed 31 Aug. 2023.

confrontation between the secularism of the Republic and the religiosity of many citizens.

The growth of industry in urban areas had precipitated a large change in urban life. A new lower and middle class, new professional and industrial workers, wanted a voice in Spanish politics. This gave rise to a variety of political organizations on the left who supported workers' rights, many of whom were radical in nature. Opposed to this change was a majority of Spaniards who lived in rural areas and did not identify with urban life–another culture war.

The new political parties, especially in urban areas in Catalonia, prompted a pervasive fear of a communist takeover after World War I. The military leaders involved in the coup saw themselves as protectors of Spain from a revolution that could end in disorder and anarchy. This view was especially clear after the elections in February of 1936 saw the victory of a new electoral coalition of progressive forces who were firm in their resolution to implement more of the program of the early Second Republic. The traditional elites were opposed to the large program of structural reforms of the Republic, seeing them as tipping the balance of power in society out of their favor.

Notwithstanding the many conservative forces at play, the Republic struggled to gain control of the country and implement its policies across the board, despite being legitimized through the electoral process. It could not keep up with the economic crises of the 1930s, as there was rising unemployment, and it did not yet have strong social welfare programs in place.[41]

Onset of the War

The Civil War began on the 17th of July, 1936. The colonial army in Morocco, led by a group of military leaders known as the *Africanistas*, led a coup in Spanish Morocco, which spread to the mainland through revolts among military forces across the country. The leaders of the coup justified it as necessary to prevent what they believed to be an imminent violent revolution of the left.[42] Although the coup did not entirely succeed, as not all military groups revolted, it did severely hinder the republican response because the revolt severed their chain of command, leaving them grossly uncoordinated.

The urban areas of the country remained mostly under republican control, with a notable outlier of Seville, as well as many parts of the rural south. The republicans also held the capital in addition to centers of industry—notably Catalonia and the Basque Country. Conversely, the rebel areas included rural small holdings in the center north and the northwest of the country.[43]

The *Africanistas* made landfall in July of 1936, making their way up to Madrid over the next

[41] Graham, Helen. *The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction*. OUP Oxford, 24 Mar. 2005, pp. 20–35.
[42] Ibid, 41.
[43] Ibid, 36.

couple of months, persecuting the pro-republican population of the south of Spain while leaving the landed aristocracy in peace. They wanted to annihilate all resistance in occupied zones and to unify Spain while creating cultural and political homogeneity, free of opposition ideologies.[44]

The coup triggered mass violence from many actors across the country, especially due to a lack of policing by the republicans as the chain of command fell apart. Those on the right, belonging primarily to the Falange or CEDA, killed republicans indiscriminately to "purify" Spain, so as to clean the country of those on the left who sought to destroy it. They killed anyone who was suspected to have socialist beliefs, including prominent figures such as Federico García Lorca, who was killed for his political beliefs and homosexuality, alongside urban workers, tenant farmers, and agricultural laborers. These "cleansing" killings were against all those who symbolized change in society, a direct result of the culture wars that preceded the Civil War.[45]

In October of 1936, General Francisco Franco's Nationalist forces made a detour towards the city of Toledo, directly south of Madrid, before heading towards the capital. They laid siege to the city, earning a very important symbolic victory for the Nationalist army. Toledo was the first Muslim city to be reconquered by Christian forces in the Middle Ages. It was the perfect symbolic victory to grant General Franco the title of *Generalísimo*, appointing him as both the supreme military and political commander of Nationalist Spain.[46]

Non-Intervention and International Aid

The Nationalist rebels quickly sought out international help, after facing likely defeat early on, finding partners in both fascist Germany and Italy. Both countries gave the rebels planes and tanks, along with personnel later in the war.[47]

The republicans, after seeing the aid given to the Nationalists, sought to procure their own aid from Britain and France. However, both Britain and France were skeptical of aiding the war effort; after all, Britain was following a policy of appeasement with Nazi Germany to avoid any war. The British were afraid that the Spanish conflict would lead to all out war on the European continent and had their own interests to protect themselves on three fronts–against the Germans, Italians, and Japanese.

Instead, the British opted to sign a Non-Intervention Pact with many other European countries, including France, Italy, and Germany. Despite signing the treaty, both Germany and Italy would still openly send aid to the Nationalists while the British and French would stick to the pact. In the end, this imbalance worked against the Republic and would hinder

[44] Ibid, 44.
[45] Ibid, 41-42.
[46] Ibid, 50-51.
[47] Ibid, 37.

their success throughout the entire war.[48] The British also wanted a quick rebel win for many reasons, some partly due to many of their investments in Spain which they did not want nationalized, so they barred the republican navy from fueling in their ports in Gibraltar or Tangier, which ended up further aiding the Nationalists.

The republicans eventually found an unlikely friend in the Soviet Union, who granted aid to the republicans in November of 1936. Stalin saw that the strategy of non-intervention was not working and feared German aggression on his own borders, so he decided to not abide by the pact and provided aid against the Nationalists. The Soviet assistance, especially their planes and trained pilots, allowed the Republic to hold up against the aerial attacks on Madrid and maintain control of the capital.[49]

Soviet assistance additionally sparked the establishment of the International Brigades, a set of military contingents composed of international volunteer soldiers of the left who came to Spain to fight in the war. Many of these soldiers were those in exile from other right-wing regimes throughout Europe and wanted to come to Spain to fight against fascism after being politically forced into diaspora from their home countries. They saw fighting in Spain as a way to fight against the larger economic and political system that had led to their own persecution and maltreatment and that of many others across the continent;[50] many republicans even saw their fight as the "last great cause" due to all the people who came from abroad to fight alongside them.[51] The Brigades themselves took their origin from the European communist movement, which was on the front line of anti-fascism and anti-non-interventionism. A lot of the manpower provided to the Brigades came from the Comintern—Communist International—which had close ties to the Soviet Union, allowing the USSR to funnel aid into republican controlled areas. The International Brigades were then fully integrated into the republican military during a restructuring in 1937.[52]

Early Republican Problems

The Republic had a difficult time in the early days of the war establishing its control across the territory it controlled. The Nationalist rebels proved to be fast moving towards Madrid, leaving the republican government scrambling to stave off defeat.

A few of the principal problems they confronted were the large body of antiquated weaponry due to the non-intervention, internal political tension due to the many parties that made up the liberal coalition, and an influx of refugees fleeing the south and settling in areas such as Barcelona and

[48] Ibid, 49.
[49] Ibid, 51-52.
[50] Ibid, 53.
[51] Ibid, 54-55.
[52] Ibid, 56-57.

Valencia. In addition, the Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ/PNV) gained authority in the north due to the absence of a strong republican presence and opposed attempts to lend industry or troops to the Republic; this deprived the republican forces of many key industrial resources they needed, especially after the Basque Country fell in the summer of 1937.[53]

As seen in the Basque Country, the absence of a present central power after the coup led to many regional areas' establishing councils themselves and led to the rise of regional governments, such as in Catalonia. The Republic attempted to reinstate their power in some of these areas, but one such case gone wrong, in Catalonia, led to what are known as the May Days.[54]

May Days

The May Days were a series of days in May of 1937 during which street fighting broke out in Barcelona, acting as an emblematic conflict of how to organize politics and society. Fighting broke out among protests from radicalized workers and urban poor in Barcelona, many of whom were part of the anarcho-syndicalist party CNT (*Confederación Nacional de Trabajo*/National Confederation of Labor), which had assumed many powers and responsibilities throughout the war. Both the national and regional powers sought to reimplement their control, and this is where the problems arose.

The CNT had established many safety nets for the urban poor and refugees in Barcelona, keeping them fed with provisions throughout the war, as many were unemployed. The republican government wanted to reintroduce market forces to the food supply in the city, effectively raising the prices of food, and the urban poor could not pay those prices, nor those of the black market or barter markets. These food supply problems were also exacerbated by a hostile political action by the Catalan government, which came into conflict with the radical traditions of the CNT.

These tensions led to the breakout of deadly chaos across the city. Left-wing political parties, unions, and militias established their own detention centers, which were then eradicated by the republican government. Many on the left criticized the illegal detention and killings by the government to maintain order, but nonetheless the government was able to reinstate a peace, which was crucial to justifying their legitimacy as a governmental power.

The results of the May Days were the imprisonment of many members of the CNT and other radical left parties in Barcelona, and the appointment of a new government under Juan Negrín; Negrín wanted to find a diplomatic end

[53] Ibid, 59-60.
[54] Ibid, 65.

to the conflict, one that would never come to fruition.[55]

Guernica, Aerial Bombings, and a War of Attrition

It is no secret that Franco engaged in a bloody war, but below we go more in depth regarding some of his policies that created great suffering.

Although Franco used many aerial bombings throughout the war–the first time they had been used in European warfare to this scale before World War II–his attack on Guernica, a small town in the Basque Country, diverged from his typical policies. Guernica was the symbolic seat of Basque nationalism and was a town of no aircraft defenses, making it a perfect target. Franco gave his *explicit* consent for Germany and Italy to use their aerial forces to annihilate this town, handling it not as a military target but as one to specifically kill civilian morale and Basque tenacity; he wanted to obliterate any residing sentiments towards Basque nationalism or resistance, and this horrific attack accomplished just that.[56]

The rest of Franco's bombings created more resentment than fear among Spanish civilians, even though he hit almost every major population center. Critics claim that these bombings seemed like the wrong choice for Franco; he was attacking his own people! However, for him, he was simply 'purifying' the nation. To illustrate this point, one of Franco's generals, General Mola, spoke of razing the industry of Bilbao and Barcelona to purge Spain of its "poison."[57]

Franco, although being in a considerably advantageous position with regards to the war, aimed to prolong the conflict, intentionally turning the war into one of attrition. This policy goes hand-in-hand with his desire for complete annihilation of the opposition, so he is willing to incur more deaths on his side to continue his crusade against the republicans.

However, both Hitler and Mussolini were annoyed by this deliberate deceleration and prolongation of the war, which kept many of their resources stuck in Spain. They both wanted to add more of their men onto Franco's staff to implement their own policies and operated some of their troops independently from Franco as a result.[58]

[59]

[55] Ibid, 65-68.
[56] Ibid, 72.
[57] Ibid, 73.
[58] Ibid, 77.
[59] Commons, Wikimedia. *File:Guernica reproduction on tiled wall, Guernica, Spain (PPL3-Altered) julesvernex2.jpg*. September 8, 2018. *Wikimedia Commons*.

Creation of the Francoist State

Franco selected his brother in law, Ramón Serrano Suñer, to be the chief political architect of his new state. As a side note, Suñer was chiefly responsible for the extradition of many republicans to Germany after the war to be interned in Nazi concentration camps. Suñer aided in merging the Falange and Carlist monarchists, a party who wanted to restore the Bourbon monarchy, to form the only political party that would last the entirety of dictatorship. This merger allowed Franco to access a larger number of troops, though it proved to be more troublesome after the war, as many in the Falange were ideologically opposed to combining with the Carlists.[60]

Additionally, Franco was starting to run into some opposition from the Catholic Church, especially the Vatican. The Vatican, who publicly opposed Nazi Germany, started to feel alienated from the Nationalists due to their ties to fascism. Internally, this did not stop Spain's Catholic hierarchy from allying itself with Franco due to their aversion towards many of the ideological leanings of the republicans, who were largely pro-secularism. Franco allowed the Church to extend its influence through many functions of the Francoist state, including areas such as education, censorship, and the management of prisons, reformatories, and correctional facilities.[61]

In an attempt to establish his legitimacy, Franco tried to add in traditional components of authority in his ceremonial events—fascist symbols alongside imperial and Catholic ones would adorn these occasions.

It does not hurt to reiterate this point, but as we have seen before, Franco did not believe that he should simply ban oppositional ideologies, such as parliamentary democracy and constitutional law; he needed to exterminate them. He wanted to break both the bodies and the minds of republicans they captured and restructure them mentally through judicial, civic, and economic repression. He wanted to create a state that believed inherently in the ideologies of authoritarian rule, of rule by peace and order, and he would stop at nothing to achieve this.[62]

The Role of Women in the War

Women in Spain, depending on their allegiance, led differing lives in the war effort.

On the republican side, very few women could fight in the war as soldiers. They could only think of enlisting women into the army as nurses, thus only in capacities considered to be mainstream.[63] Nevertheless, many women were recruited in the

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Guernica_reproduction_on_tiled_wall,_Guernica,_Spain_%28PPL3-Altered%29_julesvernex2.jpg.

[60] Ibid, 73-75.

[61] Ibid, 80.

[62] Ibid, 82.

[63] Ibid, 56.

industrial sphere, giving them more opportunities to work and obtain an education. This could have laid the foundation for the transformation of women's place in Spanish society, hence the "new woman," if the Nationalists had not put a stop to this.[64]

On the other side of this culture war were the Nationalists, who believed that women should fulfill their "traditional" role in society as caregivers. They did not include women in industry, only in the spheres of health and welfare. Many women joined the *Sección Feminista*, an influential women's group in post-war Spain that helped with social services and moral disciplining of republican families. They saw themselves as a patriotic organization to build a new order in Spain. Although the Francoists were reluctant to allow women a position outside their traditional role, the *Sección Feminista* provided women with a new public role in post-war society.[65]

Final Republican Troubles

The primary republican struggle, as it had been for sometime, was the Non-Intervention Pact, which forbade them to trade with foreign powers and froze their assets abroad. At the same time, Stalin could not send an adequate amount of arms and weaponry, even though he was sending more than he could handle at the time. The republicans had to turn to the black market to procure arms, finding an eventual dealer in Poland (who violated the pact), and were forced to obtain their arms at highly inflated prices.[66]

Simultaneously, the Italians and Germans were attacking republican ports, further restricting their access to supplies. The republican army suffered many losses to Franco's army over the course of 1937 and 1938; the war could have ended in 1938 with a siege on Barcelona, but Franco decided to turn south to Valencia before ending it.

The republicans also suffered many of the same problems—ideological disputes, conflicts with regional authorities, extreme hunger, and a refugee crisis. More importantly, they were facing an increasingly demoralized Spanish population–one who was fed up with the atrocities of war and constant violations on the part of republicans of their civil liberties to maintain the war effort.[67]

Defeat

As the situation looked increasingly worse for the republicans, Franco still maintained that he wanted an unconditional surrender, while Negrín, then prime minister, wanted the diplomatic coordination of the evacuation of those most at risk of political retribution.

Nonetheless, Madrid was surrendered in March of 1939 after a political impasse; many

[64] Ibid, 61.
[65] Ibid, 76.
[66] Ibid, 85-87.
[67] Ibid, 95-100.

republicans tried to escape but few succeeded. Of those who remained in Spain, many committed suicide, and the rest were herded into concentration camps. This marked the end of a long three bloody years, yet the horrors of Franco are yet to be over as we head into the early years of his dictatorship.[68]

Early Francoism (1939-Late 1950s)

Glimpses of the Future

In order to get a preview of how the first decades of Francoist Spain would unfold, we must look at the experience of the northern region of Navarre, one of the first areas to come under complete Nationalist control. Located between Aragon and the Basque Country, Navarre–best known for being home to Spain's bullfighting capital, Pamplona–was long considered one of the most conservative and Catholic regions in Spain. Navarre had long been home to significant Carlist sentiments, and, in the 1936 elections to the *Cortes*, which took place mere months before the country plunged into civil war, right-wing parties had won all seven of Navarre's seats. Having provided some of the most loyal troops to the Nationalist side and with a population that was overwhelmingly right-wing, Navarre was one of the first regions to come under complete Nationalist control after the outbreak of the civil war. As the war continued throughout the rest of Spain, including in the nearby Basque Country, Navarre provided a preview of what life under Franco would look like. It was in Navarre that legislation was first decreed prohibiting short sleeves in cafes, 'immodest dress,' and bathing-suit ads featuring women. Navarre was the first region to require that newspaper articles be written 'in the language of Don Quixote' and that libraries be cleared of 'marxist, or corrupting works.' It was Navarre's brand of puritanical Catholicism that would come to be a defining feature of Franco's Spain.[69]

Diplomatic Isolation and Economic Stagnation

Although Spain–having just finished a devastating civil war–never joined World War II on the Axis side, its loyalties, and the loyalty of its leader, were clear to all parties. Thus, with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy defeated, the victorious Allies viewed Spain, and its Iberian neighbor Portugal, with hostility and imposed an economic and diplomatic boycott on the two remaining fascist regimes in Europe.

The economic consequences of the civil war had been severe. In 1940, Higinio Paris Eguilaz, one of the chief economists for the new regime, summed up the state of Spain's economy, writing that "the national income, at constant prices, had fallen back to that of 1914, but since the

[68] Ibid, 102-104.

[69] Carr, Raymond, and Raymond Carr. "The Civil War 1936-1939." Essay. In *Modern Spain, 1875-1980*, 147. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001.

population had increased, the per capita income fell to nineteenth-century levels. That is, the Civil War had provoked an unprecedented economic recession."[70]

How did the regime hope to rebuild Spain's economy after the devastation of the civil war? Unlike much of the rest of Western Europe, it was clear that Spain would receive no aid from the United States' Marshall Plan. However, Spain's economic isolation was not necessarily an obstacle in the eyes of the regime's leaders. Franco and his ministers hoped to spark an economic recovery by using the model of fascist Italy, in which the state heavily regulated a quasi-capitalist economy that was cut off, as much as possible, from the global economy. So, as the world, and Europe in particular, began to open up in favor of more liberalized trade, Spain was heading down the path of autarky.[71] The economic policy of Francoist Spain would come to be defined by price controls, prohibitively high tariffs, and import substitution at all costs. Although the Spanish government had a history of pursuing protectionist measures, those measures were generally justified as being temporarily necessary to sustain a weak economy. In contrast, Francoist Spain presented its autarkic measures as being the permanent economic ideal suitable for the 'imperial military state' that Spain hoped to be once again.

Despite the Francoist enthusiasm for rural peasants as being 'the core of the race'–insulated from the radical ideas of urban workers–the regime understood that, at the end of the day, industrialization was essential. Once again modeling fascist Italy, Spain established the National Institute of Industry, or INI. The goal of the INI was to provide the infrastructure and capital necessary for industrial growth. While the INI did help Spain's industrial production recover to 1929 levels by 1948, further growth stalled under the weight of autarky. Any aspiring Spanish industrialist could only sell to the domestic market, which due to Spain's relative poverty and underdevelopment, had severely limited purchasing power. Furthermore, industry was incapable of importing necessary raw materials and capital goods because of the country's insistence on import substitution. The only Spanish market that grew after the imposition of autarky was the black market. Thus, the autarkic economic policies of Franco, rather than achieving rejuvenation and the revival of the 'imperial military state,' ensured that Spain's economy flatlined, falling further behind the rest of Western Europe, which was undergoing a post-war boom.[72]

Politics and Power

[70] Carr, Raymond, and Raymond Carr. "Francoism 1939-1975." Essay. In *Modern Spain, 1875-1980*, 155. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001.
[71] Carr, 156.
[72] Ibid.

It is important to understand some of the core details of the Francoist government. All of the secularization and democratization that took place under the Second Republic was eliminated. Universal suffrage was scrapped, as were virtually all individual rights, including freedom of political association. Franco became the head of state of what was legally a Catholic monarchy. He was to serve for 'as long as the lord gives me strength.' Rather than eliminating the *Cortes*, the body was reconstituted in 1942. Individual voters were no longer represented in parliament, rather the various state-sanctioned labor syndicates and corporate bodies were represented. It goes without saying that there was no right to a fair trial in Franco's Spain. 'Political crimes' were dealt with by various extrajudicial bodies, including military courts and the Tribunal of Public Order.[73]

Spain under the rule of Francisco Franco would best be described as a personalistic dictatorship. After all, as *caudillo,* Franco was set to rule for life, and he had complete power over all governmental appointments. Nevertheless, as is the case in even the most authoritarian regimes, there were a variety of factions that battled with each other for Franco's favor. As a general who had spent most of his career in the military, most of Franco's closest and most trusted advisors and lieutenants were other military men, from General Alonso Vega–who served as Minister of the Interior–and Admiral-General Luis Carrero Blanco–Franco's assumed heir apparent. Outside of Franco's closest allies, the Spanish military would remain a key political pillar of the Franco regime–with thirty of Franco's first ninety ministers coming from the army.[74]

In 1939, the most powerful of the various pro-Franco factions would have appeared, at least on the surface, to be the Falangists. Indeed, throughout Franco's regimes there would be Falangists in key positions in almost every ministry. Furthermore, the Falangists were successful in convincing Franco to establish national syndicates, in which workers and employers were to elect representatives who would manage economic decisions, all under the direction of the state. Yet, the Falangists never succeeded in pushing through their more radical economic and social vision for Spain. The Falangists would retain complete control over the syndicates throughout the entirety of Franco's reign, but the power of the syndicates became increasingly undermined by the spread of unofficial unions, which negotiated with employers outside of the syndicate.[75] Additionally, while Falangists hoped to inspire some sort of mass political mobilization similar to what took place in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, Francoist Spain increasingly relied on

[73] Carr, 165.

[74] Carr, 166.

[75] Carr, 166-167.

public apathy as the basis of its support and came to see public apathy as a political goal.[76]

While the Falangists were disappointed by the failure of the state to induce mass mobilization and saw their influence gradually decline, their rivals, the conservative monarchists, retained many of the key levers of power throughout the Franco era. Most importantly, conservatives maintained control of the Ministry of Finance, which prevented the Falangists from being able to establish any form of expansive social welfare. Furthermore, the increase in public apathy was a clear victory for the monarchists, who had no fondness for any form of mass participation in politics.[77] Of course, there had been and continued to be divides within the conservative monarchist camp. The traditional divide between Carlist and Alfonsine monarchists was slowly replaced by a divide between integral Francoists, who were willing to accept a restoration of the monarchy on Franco's terms and on Franco's conditions, and those who wished to see an immediate restoration of the classic monarchy. Throughout Franco's reign, there were various monarchist factions that tried to install their preferred king. Yet, these plots were consistently repressed. Finally, in 1969, Franco named Juan Carlos, the grandson of Alfonso XIII and a member of the House of Bourbon, the Prince of Spain. Juan Carlos, who swore loyalty to Franco and Francoism, would be declared King upon the *caudillo*'s death, which appeared to be drawing nearer.[78]

Late Francoism (Late 1950s-1974)

The period of Late Francoism is characterized by an end to complete isolationism and a series of reforms that set up the path for the transition to democracy.

Foreign Policy

The United Nations rejected Spain from joining their ranks in 1946 because of its lack of popular representation and Franco's relationship with Nazi Germany. Britain, France, and the United States then issued a Tripartite Declaration stating that they could not in good faith maintain relations with Spain while Franco was in power, effectively isolating Spain from the rest of the world.

However, the United States started to see a possible strategic ally in Spain only a few years after this declaration, so they teased the possibility of a military alliance between the two nations. The United States saw the severe anti-communism of Spain as a better choice than the rise of communism globally, especially in their neighbors, France and Italy. At the same time, Franco was desperate to find any allies in the international communities, so both sides started

[76] Carr, 165.
[77] Carr, 167.
[78] Ibid.

discussions over the possibility of reviving ties between the two nations.[79]

These discussions culminated in the Madrid Pact of 1953, which allowed the U.S. to open military bases in Spain. In return, Spain was able to end its isolation and gain some military defense from the U.S., a win-win for both sides. This action thus served as the catalyst for opening Spain up to the larger international community, as in 1955, Spain was accepted into the United Nations, reversing the decision made nearly a decade earlier.[80]

This decision proved to be critical in quickening Spain's transition to a more modern state, and paved the way for the economic reforms of the 1960s.

Economic Policy

Starting in 1957, Franco brought in many Opus Dei technocrats under a mission to modernize and revitalize Spain's economic system, which had been stalling for years. These technocrats set off to restructure the Spanish economy, not by completely eliminating state control, but in a way that introduced more economic liberalization and internalization, which proved to be effective, as Spain joined many international economic forums. This took form in less government control over the market, adding more competition and rejecting many of the monopolistic policies of the early years of the Franco regime.

These new initiatives resulted in an increased industrial output and a growing service economy, especially in tourism, while simultaneously diminishing the agricultural share of output. Spanish society shifted from that of a majority conservative, agrarian society to that of a largely middle-class country by the 1970s. The landowning elite therefore lost much of their power when a smaller share of the population were agricultural laborers.

Demographically, the rise of the middle class and the decreased agricultural sector led to a mass migration of workers to cities. The increased urbanization induced less support for many radical causes, which traditionally found a large base among the agricultural masses. On the same note, the traditional conservative society that served as the foundation of Franco's regime was also disappearing as urbanization ramped up due to the decrease in agrarian landowners.

These changes in Spanish society additionally prompted a rise in education among the general people. Illiteracy rapidly declined over the course of the dictatorship, decreasing from 25% in the 1930s to just even 5% in the 1970s. The rise in education does not end in the reduction of the

[79] Sandars, C. T. "New Allies in the Mediterranean." Oxford University Press EBooks, 9 Mar. 2000, pp. 239–284, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198296874.003.0008.

[80] Pacheco Pardo, Ramón. "Spanish Foreign Policy." The Oxford Handbook of Spanish Politics, 17 Feb. 2020, pp. 649–667, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198826934.013.39.

illiteracy rate; the economic changes also brought about increased enrollment in higher education. This resultantly created an increasingly educated middle class, one that would be much more receptive to a regime change after the death of Franco in 1975.

The Catholic Church also experienced great alteration over this period. It had been, up until this point, the foundation of Francoist authority, greatly legitimizing his rule not just throughout the Civil War but into the earlier years of the regime. Nevertheless, the Church as a whole underwent a liberalizing change, one largely spearheaded by the Second Vatican Council. Correspondingly, many bishops and priests across the country started to declare themselves in favor of the civil rights of the Spanish people and would not continue to uphold the atrocities of the Francoist regime.

Overall, a general malaise seemed to hit Franco's regime. He has lost much of his control with his two largest bases—the Catholic Church and landed elite—and stalled politically as fewer people refused to buy into his strain of authoritarianism.[81]

[81] Berman, Sheri. "The Transition to Democracy in Spain." Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe, 12 Apr. 2021, pp. 327–346, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197539347.003.0016.

82

ETA: Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, "Basque Homeland and Liberty"

A special note should be made about the creation of the ETA, the radical Basque nationalist group that would remain a major player in the political arena long after the transition to democracy.

The ETA was founded in 1959 by a group of students in the Basque Country who wanted to free their homeland from foreign aggression—i.e. Spanish aggression. They wished to engender a revolt of the Basque people to create their own separate homeland, a country not controlled by the fascist government, and one that they could self-govern.[83]

The guerrilla tactics utilized by the radical group included bank robberies, kidnappings, intimidation, sloganeering through public graffiti, political posturing through surrogate

[82] Archives, National. *President Gerald R. Ford and Generalissimo Francisco Franco Riding in a Ceremonial Parade in Madrid, Spain*. 1974. NARA & DVIDS PUBLIC DOMAIN ARCHIVE.

[83] Douglass, William A., and Joseba Zulaika. "On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process." Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 32, no. 2, 1990, p. 244, www.jstor.org/stable/178914.

political parties, etc. From 1968 to 1987, about 600 people would have died in ETA-related activities, earning them the title of one of the West's most violent terrorist organizations.[84] One of the most high profile assassinations by the ETA was that of Admiral Carrero Blanco, Franco's handpicked successor in 1973, causing internal chaos as to how a high ranking admiral could be killed on the streets of Madrid.[85]

Early Democracy (1975-1978)

El Caudillo Está Muerto

On October 1st, 1975 Francisco Franco, whose health issues were widely known, gave a speech warning of a "masonic, leftist, and communist conspiracy against Spain." This speech would prove to be the last time Franco was ever seen in public. On October 30th, Franco fell into a coma, and on November 20th, 1975–a few minutes after midnight–the dictator was dead. It was somewhat fitting that Franco was to be buried at the *Valle de los Caidos*, a complex in the countryside outside Madrid best known for its enormous and ostentatious stone cross and the thousands of political prisoners who were forced to build the monument.[86]

Two days after Franco's death, the monarchy was formally restored to Spain, with Juan Carlos, who had been essentially handpicked by Franco, becoming king at the age of thirty-seven. Towards the end of Franco's reign, pro-democracy opposition parties had begun organizing and agitating in the open. The opposition called for a 'democratic rupture' which involved the installation of a provisional government and the election of a Constituent *Cortes* to draw out all of Spain's future institutions. Nevertheless, despite the increased openness of pro-democracy parties and the presence of ministers in Franco's government who were seen as reformers, hardline Francoists still controlled many levers of power, including the *Cortes* and the military. Thus, pro-democracy leaders had little reason to assume that King Juan Carlos would be a catalyst for democratization.[87]

The (Brief) Arias Era

Indeed, the early signs from Juan Carlos' tenure as the new head-of-state were not promising in the eyes of the pro-democracy camp. Admiral Carrero Blanco, Franco's heir apparent, had been assassinated by an ETA car bomb in 1973, meaning that upon Franco's death, there was no obvious successor. From a list of three candidates drawn up by the Council of the Realm, an institution controlled by hardline Francoists, Juan Carlos selected Carlos Arias Navarro as prime minister. Arias quickly proved incapable of balancing the demands of the hard-core

[84] Ibid, 238.
[85] Ibid, 246.
[86] De la Cierva, Ricardo. *Agonia y Muerte de Franco: 1975*. Madrid, ES: ARC, 1996.
[87] Carr, Raymond, and Raymond Carr. "The Monarchy of Juan Carlos: the Transition to Democracy." Essay. In *Modern Spain, 1875-1980*, 173-174. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Francosists, including the notorious bunker faction, and the demands of the pro-democracy camp. In the end, Arias attempted to prevaricate by proposing a form of 'Spanish democracy' which was too liberalizing for the old-guard Francoists and insufficient in the eyes of the opposition. As clashes between pro-democracy protestors and the police escalated, Arias suffered a fatal political blow when the *Cortes* rejected his proposed reforms of the penal code which would have decriminalized overt party political activities. On July 1st, Arias resigned. Juan Carlos would have to select his second prime minister in less than a year.[88]

Democratization from Above

To replace Arias, King Juan Carlos selected forty-three year old Adolfo Suárez, the former Civil Governor of the province of Segovia and the former head of the state-owned broadcaster RTVE, as the new prime minister. Unlike Arias, Suárez wasted little time in pushing through liberalizing measures through Francoist institutions. In November of 1976, Suárez managed to convince the Francoist *Cortes* to pass the Law of Political Reform, which established a two-chamber *Cortes* elected by universal suffrage. With the help of the King, who serves as the commander-in-chief of the military, Suárez has been able to keep the army from rebelling, despite the anger of many high-ranking Francoist generals over Suárez's decision to legalize all political parties, including the Communist Party, and the continuation of ETA attacks. After negotiations between the opposition and Suárez's government, the first free elections in over forty years were held in June of 1977. With turnout at a sky-high 80 percent, signaling the enthusiasm of the Spanish public for the return of democracy, Suárez's UCD came in first with 34 percent of the vote. In second place, to the surprise of many observers, was the socialist PSOE with 28 percent. In a distant third was the communist PCE with 9 percent, and in fourth with 8 percent was the *Alianza Popular,* which is the party most closely associated with Francoism. (More details about the political parties can be found in the Statement of the Problem Section.[89]) But, the newly elected *Cortes* has been given an immense responsibility. It is their job to write Spain's new constitution, avoid the failures of the First and Second Republics, and ensure that democracy can be sustained.

Statement Of The Problem

Political Situation

Before the death of Franco, he named the future King, Juan Carlos I, his successor. Once Franco died, Juan Carlos I made clear his intentions to democratize Spain. At the time, Spain was ruled by what were known as the Fundamental Laws, a set of *de facto* constitutional laws that governed

[88] Carr, 174.

[89] Carr, 176.

Spanish Society. There were eight separate laws within the Fundamental Laws, all passed at different times, such as the Law of National Referendum or the Law of Succession of the Head of State, that dictated the form and function of the government underneath Franco.[90] Arnold Hottinger, a prominent Swiss journalist, describes the laws in the following manner:

> Spaniards like to quote Franco's phrase: "*todo está atado y bien atado*" (all is tied up and well tied up) when discussing his intention to create a lasting framework with the Fundamental Laws. These are not really a constitution but a series of laws promulgated at different times, which have constitutional ranking and have been put together under the above-quoted title. They are characterized more by uncertain formulations and far-reaching general concepts than by inner coherence and juridical clarity.[91]

Although the laws were definitive in nature, they remained unclear and had the ability to change, which Juan Carlos I exploited to promote the transition to democracy. Although all members of the regime had to take an oath to swear their allegiance to the Fundamental Laws, this also allowed them to use the Laws to transition to a democracy. The laws had to be changed by an approval of two-thirds of the *Cortes* (legislative body) and by a popular plebiscite. In December of 1976, the *Cortes* voted to approve the Law of Political Reform, a law that allowed for radical political change, guaranteeing the sovereignty of the Spanish people and allowing the creation of a new parliament, essentially permitting the creation of a new form of government not connected to Franco. This allowed for the creation of a new Constitution without a formal break from the previous regime so as to not delegitimize the new government, which is where we are at right now.[92]

In creating the Constitution, there are many topics that delegates will have to take under consideration in relation to the political structure of a new Spain, which can include, but are not limited to, the rights guaranteed by the government, the form of government, the relationship between powers in government, and the relationship between nongovernmental powers (the army, the Church, etc.) and the government.

As has been clearly stated, Franco's government was one characterized by repressive authority, one which violated many of the human rights that we

[90] "Dictadura Del General Franco. Las Cortes Españolas 1943-1977," Congreso de Diputados, March 2022, https://www.congreso.es/es/cem/cortesp.
[91] Hottinger, Arnold. "Spain One Year after Franco." *The World Today* 32 no. 12 (1976): 441. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40394898.
[92] Sánchez-Navarro, Angel José, and Michel Vale. "The Political Transition of the Francoist Cortes: Toward the Law for Political Reform (1975-1976)." *International Journal of Political Economy* 20 no. 2 (1990): 8. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40470537.

take for granted. Two of such rights are the freedom of the press and the freedom of expression, which have been growing since Franco's death, as many new periodicals have established themselves. The Francoist government was heavily anti-intellectual, so this led to many top academics and educational centers being censored by the state or religious figures, or both.[93] Others include freedom from unlawful search and seizure, freedom from arbitrary arrest, and freedom of assembly. In addition, who has the right to vote? When? These are all questions you should ask yourself before establishing the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Although Juan Carlos I has played a large role in the transition to democracy, his role in the new government is not guaranteed. There are debates over what form this new government should take. Should Spain continue to have a monarchy, as it has had for centuries, or should it turn to a new page and adopt a republican form of government? If Spain were to maintain the monarchy, to what extent does the monarch have a role in the new government? Are they merely a figurehead, or do they have some sort of tangible political role? Currently, the King appoints the new Prime Minister, both the mayors of Madrid and Barcelona, as well as 41 senators. How do the people of Spain decide who is to represent them and how?

Similarly, it is important to take into account the branches of government and the relationship between them. There are currently two houses of the *Cortes* (parliament): the Senate and the Congress of Deputies. What is the relationship between these two? How do they function together, and what prerogatives do they retain? What about the courts? What are they able to do in relation to the executive and legislative branches? As for the executive branch, many in power on the more conservative end will want to maintain the use of decree laws, which are the ability of an executive power to override a legislative decision by decree, typical of the Franco regime. Overall, it is important to consider the limits that you need to impose on any section of government. Many Spaniards are fearful of another authoritarian and autocratic government, so tread carefully as to not leave loopholes that can be exploited by those in power.

Finally, the relationship between the military and government is incredibly fragile. As described before, Franco established his authority with the use of the military, so the new Constitution should be careful to describe the role of the army in the new government and establish its authority with clear checks on its power. If not, the military might very well be an opposing power to the new government.

[93] Linz, Juan J. "Church and State in Spain from the Civil War to the Return of Democracy." *Daedalus* 120 no. 3 (1991): 165. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20025392.

As aforementioned, this is not an exhaustive list of political questions to consider, but it exists to steer you in the right direction throughout the committee.[94]

A Small Note on Political Parties

Many political parties have either organized themselves or have returned from exile after the initiation of the return to democracy. This committee will not interest itself with the creation of political parties, but you may want to consider how to constitutionally protect the rights of political organizations. Below are a list of the major political parties in Spain:

UCD: The Union of the Democratic Center (UCD: *Unión del Centro Democrático*) is a political party that was created by Adolfo Suárez on the eve of the 1977 elections as a centrist coalition, created primarily to transition Spain to a democracy. It is a collection of a plethora of centrist ideologies—primarily Christian democratic, social democratic, and liberal beliefs—aggregated to widen the electoral base of the party so that it could do well in the first elections, which it did, becoming the leading party of the new Spanish republic.[95] They largely make vague claims within their political programs, such as promises of fair distributions of wealth and the assurance of a strong democracy.[96] This political heterogeneity that has marked the UCD, an amalgamation of many center-left and center-right beliefs, has led to small fissures in the foundation of the party that could lead to large fractures within the party in the near future.[97]

PSOE: The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE: *Partido Socialista Obrero de España*) is a political party that was first established in Madrid in 1879, resigned to hiding amid political oppression under Francoist Spain. During the 1970s, it re-emerged from exile to become the leading political party on the left in Spanish politics. In 1976, as part of the party platform, they decided to apply the label "Marxist" to their ideology for two reasons: the first being to compete with the Communist Party of Spain, and the second being to establish their fierce opposition to the repression of capitalist society underneath Franco.[98] The base of their party is young students, those who are anti-capitalist, anti-monarchy, anti-U.S. bases, and thus pro-republicanism. Felipe Gonzaléz, the leader of the party, has attempted to beat back these radical

[94] Coverdale, John F. "Spain from Dictatorship to Democracy." *International Affairs* 53, no. 4 (October 1977): 626–28. https://doi.org/10.2307/2616232.
[95] Gunther, Richard, and Jonathan Hopkin. "A Crisis of Institutionalization: The Collapse of the UCD in Spain." *Political Parties*, March 7, 2002, 191–230. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199246742.003.0008.
[96] Roskin, Michael. "Spain Tries Democracy Again." *Political Science Quarterly* 93, no. 4 (1978): 634 https://doi.org/10.2307/2150107.
[97] Gunther and Hopkin.
[98] Kennedy, Paul. "The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party: Continuity, Innovation and Renewal." In *In Search of Social Democracy*, edited by John Callaghan, Nina Fishman, Ben Jackson, and Martin Mcivor, 95–99. Manchester University Press, 2009. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1wn0s45.10.

claims, but also knows his party needs the support of these young insurgents.[99] In the 1977 elections, they gained the second largest number of votes after the UCD.[100]

PCE: The Communist Party of Spain (PCE: *Partido Comunista de España*), despite as the name implies, is not the ultra-left party one would expect. They are generally for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy and the existence of U.S. bases in Spain; more importantly, though, their largest desire is to ensure the consolidation of democracy. They still retain certain elements of their Stalinist past, such as beliefs in the class struggle and imminent contradictions of modern life. Other than that, they ran on a moderate socialist platform because they did not want to get swept away in the youthful radicalism from other parties, such as the PSOE, thus shifting them rightwards with this strain of centrism. They won the third largest share of votes in the 1977 elections.[101]

AP: The People's Alliance (AP: *Alianza Popular*) is the leading party on the right following the transition to democracy. They largely promote a neo-Francoist platform; one can often hear pro-Franco chants such as "*Somos franquistas*" and "Franco, Franco" at their rallies. Despite their association with the former regime, they promote similar welfare policies as other leading parties, only with an undercurrent of Christian and nationalist themes. They largely opposed the reforms championed by Suárez, arguing that the left would lead Spain to chaos. This led them to win the fourth largest share of seats in the 1977 elections.[102]

Others: Spain's major parties include those mentioned above, but that does not include all parties that cropped up in the transition to democracy. Many regional nationalist parties have gained traction, such as the Democratic Pact for Catalonia (PDC: *Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya*) and the Basque National Party (EAJ/PNV: *Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea/Partido Nacionalista Vasco*), both of which gained some but minimal seats in the 1977 elections.[103] Other parties that failed to coalesce a strong electoral base include the Popular Socialists (PSP: *Partido Popular Socialista*), who thought that capitalism was not reformable, and the Christian Democrats, who were mostly absorbed into the UCD.[104] This does not present an exhaustive list of both the parties that were elected and those who tried to position themselves for election, but it provides the largest and most influential powers of the time.

[99] Roskin, 635.
[100] Kennedy.
[101] Roskin, 636-637.
[102] Ibid, 637.
[103] Coverdale, 623.
[104] Roskin, 638-639.

Ethnolinguistic Minorities and Regional Autonomy

105

For its long history, Spain has been home to many different ethnolinguistic groups; from the Basques, to the Catalans, to the Arabs and Galicians, Spanish history is populated by a variety of different ethnolinguistic groups that have laid claim to various rights to autonomy. Although many different micro-nationalist groups have existed underneath Spanish hegemony, the two largest ethnic groups pushing for autonomy have been the Basques and Catalans, which are the two we will focus on the most for the purpose of the committee.

Catalans, an ethnolinguistic group in northeastern Spain, have lived under varying degrees of autonomy beneath the Spanish government, gaining some of their greatest autonomy in the years leading up to the Spanish Civil War. Life under Franco was a very different story—much of Catalan life was severely restricted, including in areas such as culture, language, and politics. After the death of Franco, there have been renewed demands for both Catalan autonomy and/or independence. Some of these demands include, but are not limited to, demands for "party pluralism, free elections, government accountability, political rights and amnesty for political prisoners."[106]

Similar pushes for autonomy have also come from the Basque Country, a region in the north of Spain. They have a language that is entirely distinct from Castilian Spanish; in fact, it is a language isolate in Europe, meaning that there are no modern languages that are related to it in the way that Spanish is related to French or Italian. It has seen equal repression from the national government under Franco, being forbidden from being spoken in public. One notable difference of the Basque Country from Catalonia has been the terrorism inflicted upon Spain by the Basque terrorist group ETA (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*, literally "Basque Homeland and Liberty"). This group conducted violent attacks on any symbols of Spanish authority, eventually assassinating then-Prime Minister Carrero Blanco.[107]

The question over regional autonomy—and subsequent policies that result from this larger

[105] Shaw, Stephen. "Spanish Dialects in Spain," *Wikimedia Commons*, 29 Mar. 2008, commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Spanish_dialects_in_Spain-en.png.

[106] Carlos Flores Juberías. "The Autonomy of Catalonia." In Cambridge University Press EBooks, 228–57. *Cambridge University Press*, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139088206.008.

[107] Light, Matthew. "Fixing Franco's Folly: Regional Autonomy Heals Spain's Authoritarian Legacy." *Harvard International Review* 15, no. 3 (Spring 1993): 49. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42761124.

one—is also one related to the perceived threats of the national state and the strength of the central government. As Spain is now trying to establish itself as a democratic power, it needs to determine how it will approach the issues of regional sovereignty and autonomy. For the purpose of this committee, we will separate this subject into two subcategories: language policy and regional autonomy and federalism.

Language Policy

Under Franco's government, it was no secret that he outlawed public use of any minority language that was not Castilian Spanish. His language policy was that of Castilianization—the process of making all of Spain follow Castilian language and culture norms. This also prohibited any cultural practices of the micro-nationalist groups of Spain, such as dancing the *sardanas* in Catalonia.

As we enter into the democratic age, there are some major considerations that need to be taken with respect to how Spain will approach its language policies. What languages will be the national languages of Spain? Does Spain outright denote which languages are recognized, or does it keep vague language? Should Spain recognize regional or national bilingualism? This question is especially important because the policy of most of Western Europe up until this point has been one of regional monolingualism—the establishment of a single language as being a region's principal language instead of multiple languages having that title. Thus, should the national government make a decision on bilingualism or monolingualism, or should that be left to the many regions of Spain?

Knowing that there will be authorities who want to establish other languages as official languages, what should the language policies be? How should regional authorities approach education? Should regional schools be forced to teach in both languages? What about official documentation–should it be available in one language or both? What about signage? Should elected officials be obligated to speak the minority language of the region they are representing? Can employers expect job applicants to speak both languages? How can one protect against language discrimination?

There are many subtleties that one should contemplate with regards to the new state, so please take these questions as a starting point and try to informally draft your ideas about how Spain should approach these issues.[108]

Autonomy and Federalism

Another important consideration is the relationship between the regional and national Spanish governments, or whether Spain should establish itself as a unitary state or a federal one.

[108] Shabad, Goldie, and Richard Gunther. "Language, Nationalism, and Political Conflict in Spain." *Comparative Politics* 14, no. 4 (July 1982): 443–45. https://www.jstor.org/stable/421632.

Historically, special agreements between regional governments and the crown—*fueros*—allowed certain regions within Spain to retain some privileges and rights of their own, ones that the crown did not enjoy. As a result of industrialization, both the Basque Country and Catalonia have grown considerably economically, which has promoted the rise of nationalist groups who feel exploited and wronged by the central government in Madrid, which exists in a poorer area of the country.[109] Later on, Franco saw any recognition of regional autonomy as a direct threat to the strength of the Spanish Nation, so he revoked the special autonomy granted to Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia during the Second Republic.[110]

How should the Spanish government define itself—is it a federalist state, a unitary one, or does it exist in a grey area between those two labels? Should the government allow regional bodies to create their own self-determined regional governments? If these semi-autonomous bodies existed, what would their relationship be with the national state? Does every part of Spain exist in an autonomous region, or only select parts? How does one decide what constitutes an autonomous region, or what areas should be an autonomous region?

What rights should be guaranteed to an autonomous region, and what rights are they forbidden from possessing? Can they levy taxes? Form separate police forces or their own armed forces? Conduct public school instruction entirely in the minority language? Exercise control over their natural resources? Over trade with the region? Make agreements within themselves, or with outside foreign powers? Control the spread of goods and/or people in the country? Which of these powers would enhance Spain's wellbeing, and which would be detrimental to its health as a new democratic state?[111]

Religion and Society

The question of religion was a highly contentious one following the transition to democracy. As has been described, religion was heavily tied to the Francoist state, where the state derived its authority and legitimacy partly from allying itself with religious and clerical authorities. Spain was also heavily Catholic, so this Catholic hegemony permeated almost every aspect of Spanish society, which led, in part, to the confluence of religion and politics in Franco's regime. Further, the delicate predicament of religion is not solely a political issue in terms of the relationship of the state to the Church, but also a human rights issue, particularly with regards to the rights of the Spanish people to practice a religion and freely associate with organized religious associations.

[109] Light, 48.
[110] Light, 49.
[111] Light, 68.

To truly understand how to address the religious problems Spain faced, it is important to consider the actions the Nationalists took with respect to religion under Franco. The Nationalists re-established religion in education, abolished divorce, allowed government funds to pay clerical salaries, and subsidized the construction of convents, monasteries, and other religious buildings. Other notable changes under the regime include the persecution of those who were either opposed to the Church or who had previously persecuted the Church, citizens being obliged to declare themselves as Catholics, and the pervasive ubiquity of religious symbols in both Spanish society and government.[112] In the *Fuero de los Españoles*, one of the most fundamental parts of the Fundamental Laws, no outward demonstrations of any other religions besides Catholicism were permitted.[113]

One of the most important documents that dictated religious practices in Spanish society was the Concordat of 1953, a treaty signed between the Vatican and Spain. Among many declarations, it affirms many of the aforementioned policies, such as Roman Catholicism being the only religion of the Spanish nation, the necessity of a religious marriage (not civil unions), and that all educational institutions should include religious instruction, regardless if they were private or state-run institutions. One of the most important policies it outlined was the freedom of the clergy from being prosecuted by civil courts. As for the State, the State gained the privilege to name bishops, thus allowing it to assure the loyalty of the clergy to the regime, a small privilege in comparison to the many liberties granted to the Church underneath this accord.[114] Separately, in a 1958 document called "The Principles of the National Movement," the Spanish government directly acknowledged that the Church and Roman Catholic morals should directly influence legislation, therefore allowing the legal system to be governed by Catholic morals and judgments and permitting the nullification of previous judicial decisions that did not follow these morals.[115]

Interestingly, Franco backtracked a bit on his strict anti-religious freedom policy in 1967, passing the Law of Religious Freedom, which recognized the freedom of religious practice and established that no person should be coerced into conversion. However, it was limited in its scope, still recognizing Roman Catholicism as the religion of the state and prohibiting religious communities of any non-Catholic religions.[116]

Franco essentially made it so that the identity of the nation was tied to religion, which also

[112] Linz, 162.
[113] Pastor, Eugenia Relaño. "Spanish Catholic Church in Franco Regime: A Marriage of Convenience." Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte 20, no. 2 (2007): 279. http://www.jstor.com/stable/43751790.
[114] Ibid, 280-281.
[115] Ibid, 282.
[116] Ibid, 284.

legitimized his reign. Religion, or simply Catholicism, permeated Spanish life–so now comes the trouble in untangling this mess created by the previous regime. After the death of Franco, the Catholic Church has aligned itself against the former regime and its policies regarding religion. Nonetheless, that does not clean up the mess ahead of you all.

The information provided above gives substantial context to the entanglement of the Church and State. It is not to say that the new democracy should entirely attempt to secularize Spanish society, but it should clearly define the borders of what it considers appropriate under a new Constitution and government; the Constitution of 1931 should clearly point out the dangers of this action.[117]

This then begs considering the following questions: What are the rights guaranteed by the government in respect to the practice of religion? Can citizens openly proclaim a faith, or can they only practice in private? What about religious organizations? To what extent can they exist, publicly or privately, and how deeply can the state control their actions? To what extent can the state regulate the morals of its people through religious rhetoric (i.e. restricting divorce, civil matrimonies, etc.)? Are educational institutions required to follow religious doctrine, including state-run and private institutions? Can the state prohibit the use of religion in education? In general, what is the relationship between Church and State? What are the jurisdictions of the state in relation to regulating religion in society? Can the government fund religious organizations or appoint religious leaders?

This is not an exhaustive list, of course, but these are some of the questions that come to mind after considering the issue of religion in society and politics. Consider this history and these questions carefully, balancing both conservative and progressive ideologies with respect to religion, and try to find the policies and rules that you think would best fit a new Spanish democracy.

Economic Situation

A History of Stagnation

For over a century, Spain's economic picture was one of stagnation. While the rest of Western Europe began to rapidly industrialize in the late-18th, 19th and early-20th century, Spain, outside of Catalonia and the Basque Country, remained overwhelmingly agrarian. By the early 20th century, Spain, once home to the wealthiest colonial empire in history, was poorer than Britain, France, Germany and even Italy. After flourishing during World War I as a neutral nation, Spain's economy suffered, although less dramatically than many other nations, during the Great Depression.

Unsurprisingly, the civil war set Spain's economy further back. However, by 1945, there wasn't a country in Europe that was not economically

[117] Linz, 160.

devastated by World War II. Could Spain recover with the rest of Europe? The immediate answer to this question was no. Spain, being one of the last two fascist regimes in Europe, was diplomatically and economically frozen out by the United States. While much of the Western bloc received generous aid from under the Marshall Plan, sparking rapid economic recovery, Spain received nothing. With no American aid, Franco made the decision to pursue autarky, modeled after pre-WWII fascist Italy and Germany. A combination of extremely high protective tariffs, currency manipulation, import controls, and high levels of state-ownership were designed to help Spain industrialize. In the end, autarky was a failure, as Spain stagnated while the rest of Western Europe boomed.

The Spanish Miracle

Yet, in the past two decades, Spain's economy has achieved a stunning turn-around. On the verge of economic collapse, Spain introduced the Economic Stabilization Plan in 1959, which liberalized the Spanish economy and opened up the country to foreign trade and investment. The returns were immediate. Between 1960 and 1974, Spain's GDP grew at an average annual rate of 6.6 percent, making it the second-fastest growing economy in the world behind Japan.

Spain's rapid economic expansion has largely been attributed to three main factors. The first ingredient in Spain's growth has been increased foreign investment. After Spain's autarkic policies were removed in 1959, foreign capital began to pour into the economy. The largest foreign investor in the Spanish economy was the United States, which gradually shifted from shunning Franco's Spain as a fascist relic towards supporting Spain as a key anti-communist partner. The second factor behind Spain's economic expansion is emigration. While one might instinctively assume that emigration would hurt Spain's economy, the opposite is true. Since 1959, over a million Spaniards have left the country, the vast majority going to France, Switzerland, and West Germany. All three of these countries have much higher average incomes than Spain, meaning that Spanish workers are often making more money than they would at home. Furthermore, much of the money Spanish workers earn abroad returns to Spain through remittances. In 1973 alone, Spanish emigrants sent more than $1 billion back to their home country through the form of remittances. Finally, the third major cause of the Spanish miracle has been the rapid expansion of the tourism industry. As Europe has grown more prosperous, more people have gained the disposable income necessary for traveling. Spain, with its warm weather, miles of coastline, and relatively weak currency, has become one of the most attractive tourist destinations in Europe. Mostly concentrated, but not limited to, the Mediterranean coast, the Balearic Islands, and the

Canary Islands, tourism has expanded to the point where it is now Spain's largest industry. Meanwhile, agriculture has quickly plummeted in importance, behind both the manufacturing and service sectors.[118]

New Challenges

As the three main ingredients of Spain's rapid economic expansion were foreign investment, remittances, and tourism, Spain has become very economically vulnerable to any slowdown abroad, which would hurt all three of Spain's ingredients to success. Unfortunately, as the seventies have progressed, the western European and North American economies have found themselves dealing with the uncomfortable economic combination of high inflation and low GDP growth, or 'stagflation.' While Spain was not targeted by the oil embargo of 1973, which kicked off stagflation, almost all of its most important trading partners were, and Spain's economy has slowed as a result. Thus, while Spain's unemployment rate hit a low of four percent in 1975, it has been on the rise ever since. Additionally, as Spain's political future is seen as being somewhat uncertain, foreign investment has slowed considerably. If the *Cortes* can put Spanish democracy on a stable footing, one can hope that foreign investment will pick up again. Finally, it is worth noting that throughout Franco's reign, Spain had a deeply regressive tax system that remains in place. It remains to be seen whether the general public will demand a wholesale rewrite of the Spanish tax code.[119]

Foreign Relations

As has been mentioned before, Spain was viewed with hostility by the victorious Allies after World War II, despite never actually joining the war on behalf of the Axis powers. Thus, Spain was diplomatically isolated from the Western bloc comprising the United States, Canada, and Western Europe. Unsurprisingly, the Soviet Union, having been the only foreign power to give direct aid to the republicans during the Spanish Civil War, was no more friendly to Spain than the Western Bloc. As a result, Francoist Spain's closest ally was its Iberian neighbor, Portugal, the only other fascist-ruled country in Europe after WWII. Additionally, Spain attempted to cultivate closer ties with Arab nations in the nearby Middle East and Latin America. Francoist Spain's attempts to strengthen ties with its former Latin American colonies had mixed results, depending on the country and the government. While Mexico, home to many ex-republican figures, was one of the leaders in the push to bar Spain from the UN, Franco had close ties with various authoritarian

[118] Delano Smith, Catherine, and Vicente Rodriguez. "Spain- Economy ." Encyclopædia Britannica, August 29, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Spain#ref70257.

[119] Carr, Raymond, and Raymond Carr. "The Monarchy of Juan Carlos: the Transition to Democracy." Essay. In *Modern Spain, 1875-1980*, 173-181. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Latin American leaders, such as Argentina's fascist-curious Juan Perón.

During the 1950s, however, the United States began taking an increasingly friendly posture towards Spain, with the two countries signing the Pact of Madrid in 1953, in which the United States agreed to provide military and economic aid to Spain in exchange for American access to several Spanish air and naval bases. In 1955, Spain was admitted to the United Nations with the assistance of the United States, who increasingly saw Franco as a bulwark against communism.

Thus, as the Franco era continued, Spain's foreign policy positions began to increasingly align with the United States'. There were of course exceptions–Spain maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba after the communist revolution of 1959 despite the American embargo and has hostile relations with Israel, the U.S.' closest ally in the Middle East–but it became clear that Spain saw the United States as its closest partner in the path out of diplomatic isolation. Nevertheless, there were limits to the willingness of the United States and Western Europe to ally with Spain. Franco's 1962 application to join the European Economic Community (EEC) was quickly rejected due to Spain's undemocratic nature. Moreover, Spain, despite its increasingly close relationship with the United States, was rejected from NATO due to its longstanding dispute with the United Kingdom over the status of Gibraltar.[120]

It is up to you to craft a Constitution with the desired elements that will help carry out your vision regarding Spain's involvement in world affairs.

[120] Pacheco Pardo, Ramon. "Chapter 38: Spanish Foreign Policy ." Essay. In *The Oxford Handbook of Spanish Politics*, edited by Diego Muro and Ignacio Lago, 650–67. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2020.

Character Biographies

Gabriel Cisneros Laborda (UCD)

Gabriel Cisneros Laborda was born on August 14, 1940 in the small town of Tarazona in the Zaragoza province. He went on to study Political Science and Journalism alongside Law in his youth before entering into a career of civil service in the Francoist government. During the early transition, he joined the UCD and was named the general director of Social Assistance in the Ministry of the Interior in 1976. Cisneros was an ardent believer of *aperturismo*, literally from Spanish *apertura*, meaning opening, which was characterized by liberalization and wanting to open up the country, but also indicates a willingness to compromise. Additionally, Cisneros has become very interested in autonomy statutes, which has prompted some grumbles among members of the ETA. Growing up in Tarazona, Cisneros is also well acquainted with the textile industry of the country due to his hometown's involvement in said industry.

José Pedro Pérez-Llorca Rodrigo (UCD)

José Pedro Pérez-Llorca was born on November 30, 1940 in Cádiz, a prominent trading city, and went on to earn a degree in law from the Universidad Complutense of Madrid. His early years, before the transition, were spent first in a small role as a diplomat then as a lawyer for the Francoist *Cortes* in 1968. During the transition, he briefly joined the Popular Socialist Party before it fell apart and the Popular Party before it was absorbed into the UCD. He also spent much of his youth studying in economic institutions in other countries and began to collaborate in the Superior Council of Foreign Affairs, earning many friends that live abroad.

Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón (UCD)

Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón was born on June 18, 1940 in Madrid to a high school professor. He went on to study law in the Universidad Complutense of Madrid, and earned a PhD after studying abroad in Oxford, Paris, and Leuven. He worked for many years as a lawyer for the Spanish Council of State, and also wrote for the press on his ideas for the transition to democracy after the death of Franco. During the transition, he helped draft the Law of Political Reform and joined the UCD. He self-describes as an "*españolista de la España Grande*" and represents a fringe current of nationalism and neoforalism, an ideology that wishes to reinstate the old Spanish legal concept of *fueros*. Interestingly, he has also served on the side as counselor to the *Banco Exterior de España* (Foreign Bank of Spain), and has many financial ties to this organization.

Miquel Roca i Junyent (CDC)

Miquel Roca i Junyent was born on April 20, 1940 in Bordeaux to two important Catalan bourgeois families after his father had left Spain during the Civil War. Shortly after his birth, they returned to Spain due to the threat of WWII. He studied law in the Universitat de Barcelona, and, during his youth, he was part of the *Front Obrer de Catalunya*, an illegal left-wing organization with links to the Popular Liberation Front. He later became a law professor and worked professionally as a lawyer on the side. He was a founding member of the political party Democratic Convergence of Catalonia, serving as Secretary-General, and represented Barcelona in the first democratic parliament. He enters committee with connections to many movers and shakers (notably university students and bourgeois families) and with the determination to show his Catalonian pride. For him, anything goes.

Manuel Fraga Iribarne (AP)

Manuel Fraga was born on November 23, 1922 in Villalba, a town in the Lugo Province of Galicia. During his university years, he studied Law, Politics, and Economics, and entered into many positions under the Franco government. Starting in 1962, he served as the Minister of Information and Tourism and helped revitalize the Spanish tourism industry in the '60s. He also served as the ambassador to the United Kingdom in 1973 and became Minister of the Interior in 1975, a position he held between both regimes. Fraga is a fan of liberalizing from above and has a conservative outlook of the purpose of the state in society. He is also a founding member of the People's Alliance, but many people do not trust him nor his party. Fraga is also known to be a large supporter of the police, often sending them to clash with strikers.

Gregorio Peces-Barba Martínez (PSOE)

Gregorio Peces-Barba was born in Madrid on January 13, 1938, and studied law at the Universidad Complutense, with a thesis on the social thought of theologian Jacques Maritain, and the University of Strasbourg. After graduating he served as a defense attorney starting in 1961 and was even arrested by the Francoist police and suspended from practicing law, turning towards teaching instead. He also became a cofounder of the magazine *Cuadernos para el Diálogo*, where he became very proficient at secretly distributing copies of his work and scoring meetings with high profile people. Peces-Barba also was a member of the clandestine political party Democratic Left, a Christian left political party with a Christian democracy focus. He secretly affiliated himself with the PSOE in 1972, and was elected to represent Valladolid. To this day, he retains his important religious roots, which have gained him many friends among certain religious orders, and joins committee to serve justice for those affected by the terrorism of the Franco regime.

Jordi Solé Tura (PSUC)

Jordi Solé Tura was born on May 23, 1930 in Barcelona. During his youth, he was active in the Popular Liberation Front and the Communist Organization of Spain, and was one of the leaders of the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC), a political party that would later be grouped under the PCE. In his youth, he also enjoyed cycling all over Barcelona and taking scenic walks by the beach to relax during his studies. In 1977, he was elected to represent Barcelona nationally. Additionally, he has maintained many of his connections from the radical days of his youth and can easily get in touch with these radicalists (and cyclists...).

Santiago José Carrillo Solares (PCE)

Santiago Carrillo and socialism go way back. Carrillo was born on January 18, 1915 in Gijón, Asturias. He got his start in politics at a very young age—thirteen, to be precise—by working for the PSOE's newspaper, *El Socialista*. Aside from his general duties, he enjoyed drawing cartoons for the paper. In his youth, he was also active in the Socialist Union, the Workers' General Union, and the Socialist Youth. For his association with a failed coup, Carrillo was stuck in prison from 1934 to 1936, and then made the decision to leave for the USSR to meet the leader of the Young Communist International group. After the outbreak of the civil war in Spain, Carrillo joined the Communist party, and, once the republicans lost, moved to Paris. In his exile, he met Joseph Stalin, but this interaction did not encourage Carrillo's further involvement with Stalinist politics, however, as he decided to distance himself from it. In 1960, he became Secretary-General to PCE, and, in 1976 (after the death of Franco), he returned to Spain, only to be arrested by the police and unceremoniously released days later. He enters committee with a reputation for a complicated past, full of connections and rich with experience, and with a determination to fulfill his duty to his nation.

Xabier Arzalluz Antia (EAJ/PNV)

Xabier Arzalluz Antia was born on August 24, 1932 in Azkoitia, Gipuzkoa in the Basque Country. As a child, his favorite activity was spending time in the Aralar Range of his beautiful Basque Country and playing *pilota* with his friends. Sometimes, when he is stressed, he looks back on those moments to make himself feel better. As a child, he was also considered to be very bright, and his parents made the decision to support him in his education ever since then. At the University of Zaragoza, Arzalluz elected to study law and philosophy, much like the rest of his peers in this committee. After his time in Zaragoza, he decided to spend time in Germany writing a thesis on German Christian Democracy and Theology. This work greatly inspired him, and Arzalluz became a Jesuit priest, although he later would become laicized and married. In 1969, Arzalluz joined the EAJ/PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) and was elected to represent his home

region of Gipuzkoa in 1977. Arzalluz still thinks back quite frequently to his youth in his beautiful Basque Country and thus enters committee with a strong interest in achieving what is best for his homeland, even if that may be autonomy under the new government.

José María de Areilza y Martínez-Rodas (UCD)

José María de Areilza was born on August 3, 1909 in Portugalete, Vizcaya. He studied law at the University of Salamanca and began a career in—you guessed it—law afterwards. In a natural progression of things, in 1938, he became the mayor of Bilbao after the city had fallen to the Nationalists. After this stint as mayor, Areilza served as Spanish Ambassador to Argentina, the United States, and France from 1947 to 1964. Shortly after, he became friendly with the new king, Juan Carlos I, and became part of his private council leading the monarchist opposition to Franco. Areilza then helped found the People's Party, which unfortunately was soon absorbed into the UCD. He has had a stroke of bad luck, however; his relationship with the co-founder of the party, Adolfo Suárez, deteriorated, and he was also stiffed by the king to become prime minister. Areilza enters committee with a determination to drive off this bad luck, plenty of experience, and a feeling of betrayal from the monarchy. To him, the best Spain is a Spain that remembers its long and rich history and stays true to its identity.

Felipe González Marquéz (PSOE)

Felipe González was born on March 5, 1942 in Bellavista, Seville. His father was a small dairy farmer, so González spent much of his youth helping his father with the farm. Needless to say, he is quite familiar with the struggles of southern farmers. When it became time to go to university, González decided to stay close to home and studied law at Seville University. He started his career as an attorney working in labor law after his graduation. Through this occupation, he became involved in the General Union of Workers, a trade union that has connections with the PSOE, and then in the underground affairs of the PSOE itself. Unsurprisingly, he was elected as their Secretary General during one of their clandestine meetings in France. On the side, González is known to play some guitar and both watch and dance flamenco in his home city of Seville.

Father José María de Llanos (PCE)

Father José María de Llanos was born on April 26, 1906 in Madrid, going on to study chemistry before starting the process of joining the Jesuit order. During the Civil War, he left Spain to study in Belgium, but, after becoming aware of his brothers' deaths in the War, he returned to Spain. Upon arriving in Spain, he became ordained in Granada and joined the National Movement, working closely with the Francoist government. He organized a group of Catholic youth called the "*luises,*" whose purpose was to preserve the moral integrity of Spain; he still remains close to many of his former students from the *luises* to this day and

still remains involved in many students' organizations. In 1950, he began to work on a program to teach poor, rural communities how to read and write and become literate. Soon after, he suffered an existential crisis and moved to the lower class neighborhood *El Pozo del Tío Raimundo* of Madrid. Here, after seeing all the poverty and destitution of the neighborhood, he shifted towards leftist politics and became part of the opposition to Franco, joining the PCE and trade union *Comisiones Obreras*. Now, at the time of writing a new Constitution, Father Llanos hopes to represent both a voice for the lower classes and reform the relationship between religion and society.

Juan de Ajuriaguerra Ochandiano (EAJ/PNV)

Juan de Ajuriaguerra Ochandiano was born on August 6, 1903. As a child, he was always very curious about how things worked; this curiosity followed him into his higher education, as he studied chemical engineering in Germany at the age of seventeen until returning to his hometown of Bilbao to finish his degree in industrial engineering instead. His first foray into politics was his becoming a member of the *Bizkai Buru Batzar* (BBB), the executive body of the PNV in Vizcaya, shortly before the start of the Spanish Civil War. After the fall of Bilbao during the war, Ajuriaguerra helped to draft the Santoña Agreement, which acknowledged the defeat of the Basque Army. After the war came to a close, he was thrown in jail by Francoist forces and sentenced to death, although his sentence was ultimately commuted. Ajuriaguerra was not released for six years. Upon his release (in 1943), he then went into exile, conducting many secret operations with the EAJ/PNV and eventually became the leader of the party. In this role, he effectively kept the party alive during the years of Franco's dictatorship. After Franco's death, Arjuriaguerra returned to Spain and was elected in 1977 to represent Vizcaya. His time in prison strengthened his spirit, so Ajuriaguerra enters committee with a strong resolve to see his goals for a reborn Spain carried out. When considering his grit along with his penchant for concerning himself with the smallest details, a relic of his engineering past, one can conclude that Ajuriaguerra is truly a force to be reckoned with.

María Teresa Revilla López (UCD)

María Teresa Revilla López was born in 1936 in Tétouan, a city in northern Morocco (which was then still Spanish), but she claims that she is truly from Valladolid. She studied law in the Autonomous University of Madrid, and, after graduating, she got married and moved to Valladoid to start her career in law. Shortly after her arrival in Valladolid, Revilla joined the Popular Party (which was absorbed by the UCD) as a member of the Provincial Committee of Madrid. In 1977, she was elected to represent Valladolid, making her one of only twenty-seven women in the Constituent *Cortes*. She is also the only woman to have the opportunity to work closely with the Constitution. Revilla is a fierce defender of women's rights and sees

her involvement in the committee as a chance to ensure that the rights of the women of Spain are protected. In her free time, she has been known to contribute to the newspaper, *El Norte de Castilla*, even contributing to their literary section.

Enrique Tierno Galván (PSP)

Enrique Tierno Galván was born on February 8, 1918 in Madrid. He decided to stay in his hometown for his higher education, obtaining his doctorate in law in 1942 from the Universidad Complutense. After earning his degree, he worked as a professor and helped to lead the opposition to Francoism within the university community. Due to this risky political activity, he was arrested in 1957. After being traumatized by his interactions with the police, Tierno then left the country to teach abroad, most notably at Princeton. Upon his return to Spain in 1968, he founded the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) and returned to teaching at Spanish universities in 1976. He and the PSP faced major opposition from the PSOE, who thought that the new party was not radical enough and was too willing to compromise. Tierno enters committee with connections to the intellectual community in Spain and a determination to defend the ideals of the PSP, although within reason; he recognizes the value in compromise.

Licinio de la Fuente y de la Fuente (AP)

Licinio de la Fuente was born on August 7, 1923 in Noez to a family of conservative farmers. During the Civil War, his family fled to the Francoist zone of the country. This upbringing has vastly influenced de la Fuente's political beliefs, even today. De la Fuente earned a degree in law from the Universidad Complutense in Madrid and started a career in civil service. He served as a State Lawyer in many cities and was appointed as the Minister of Labor in 1969. Early on after Franco's death, he promoted the *Democracia Social*, a fledgling political party deemed as being solely neo-Francoist, but later joined the People's Alliance (AP) instead. In 1977, he was elected to represent the city of Toledo. Entering this committee, de la Fuente may find great frustration, as the body could be ideologically very different from himself, especially when considering the question of Spanish respecting regional autonomy. In his free time, he enjoys taste testing different varieties of nuts and collecting Damascene jewelry.

Fernando Abril Martorell (UCD)

Fernando Abril Martorell was born on August 13, 1936 in Valencia. He studied agricultural engineering and political science in the Universidad Complutense in Madrid, later earning a doctorate degree in not just one, but both subjects. In his early years after graduation, he was the president of the Provincial Delegation of

Segovia and was appointed to be the civil governor of the same district. With a real knack for agriculture, Abril then acted as the technical director of FORPA, an agricultural regulation organization, and was also later the Director of Agricultural Production. Due to his ample agricultural experience, Abril was appointed as Minister of Agriculture from 1976 to 1977. He is one of the founders of the UCD and has been elected to represent Valencia. Due to his love of agriculture, he maintains a small bunny farm that produces carrots and radishes on the coast of Valencia. Abril comes into committee with a great appreciation for agricultural policy and fierce loyalty to Valencia.

Alfonso Guerra González (PSOE)

Alfonso Guerra was born on May 30, 1940 in Seville, the eleventh out of thirteen brothers. His father, Julio Guerra Apresas, was a soldier. Despite being one of many children, Guerra enjoyed a great childhood playing soccer with his friends and getting lost in the streets of Seville. Guerra, ever a polymath, obtained a degree in Philosophy and Literature from the University of Seville, but went on to also earn a degree in industrial engineering. During his twenties, he became involved in the underground socialist movement in Spain. He joined the Socialist Youth of Spain and affiliated himself with the clandestine operations of the PSOE a few years later. In 1970, Guerra joined the executive committee of the PSOE and, in 1975, became the Secretary of Information and the Press of the PSOE. During this era, he greatly influenced the construction of the new PSOE identity and platform, and was elected to represent Seville in 1977.

Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado (Independent)

Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado was born on April 30, 1912 in Madrid to an influential Madrilenian bourgeois family. His parents died when he was young, so he was raised by his uncle, a famous editor by the name of Saturino Calleja, who enrolled Gutiérrez in the prestigious private school *Real Colegio de las Escuelas Pías de San Antón*. He joined the General Military Academy of Zaragoza, which was then run by General Francisco Franco. During the Second Spanish Republic, he was promoted to second lieutenant and finished his military education in the Academy of artillery and Engineers in Segovia. Gutiérrez joined the Falange in 1935 and participated in the coup against the Republican government; he was later jailed by the Republican government for his involvement in the coup but was acquitted shortly after of any crime. During the Franco regime, he occupied a variety of military positions, including being promoted to major general in 1973. King Juan Carlos I promoted Gutiérrez to a lieutenant general position in 1976, where he expressed his commitment to the Rule of Law and the King, which was influential in aligning the military with the ideals of the transition to democracy. On September 23, 1976 he was appointed vice president of Defense Affairs and helped create the new Ministry of Defense. As we enter the age of democracy, Gutiérrez is looking

forward to a brighter future for the relationship between the military and the government, but this does not mean his Falangist past does not still haunt him...

Jaime Lamo de Espinosa y Michels de Champourcin (UCD)

Jaime Lamo de Espinosa was born on April 4, 1941 in Madrid to a prominent Falangist politician and lawyer. He went on to study agricultural engineering and economics at the Universidad Complutense of Madrid. Lamo de Espinosa then went into a career teaching Economics and Agricultural Policy in many universities across Spain. As for public office, he was the deputy commissioner of one of the *Planes de Desarrollo* (Development Plans) in 1973, which we know was one of Franco's late economic reforms to boost the Spanish economy. In addition, Lamo de Espinosa joined the Ministry of Agriculture, also becoming the Director General of Food Industries. In 1976, he became the assistant secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, cementing his position at the forefront of economic reforms in the transition to democracy. At the bequest of Fernando Abril Martorell, he joined the UCD in 1977 and started a career in electoral politics when he was elected to represent the province of Castellón. Lamo de Espinosa joins committee with enthusiasm to enact lasting economic reforms, especially given the many connections he has forged with farmers over his years in the agriculture sector.

Torcuato Fernández-Miranda y Hevia (UCD)

Torcuato Fernández-Miranda was born on July 22,1915 in Gijón, the largest city in Asturias. Always the brightest student in his class, Fernández-Miranda graduated from the Universidad Complutense of Madrid with a degree in law in 1936, just in time for the outbreak of the Civil War. The youngest of twelve children in a religious, upper-middle-class family, it was inevitable that Fernández-Miranda would join the Nationalists, quickly becoming a lieutenant in Franco's army. After the war, Fernández-Miranda left the army and returned to his home region of Asturias, joining the University of Oviedo as a law professor. The young professor quickly made a name for himself as one of the country's top political minds, and it was this reputation, along with his commitment to Francoism, which pushed Franco to appoint Fernández-Miranda as the tutor to the future king, Prince Juan Carlos. After the assassination of Admiral Carrero Blanco, Franco's prime minister and heir apparent, it was widely speculated that Fernández-Miranda would be named Franco's new prime minister. Yet, to the shock of many, including Fernández-Miranda, Carlos Arias Navarro was named prime minister. Snubbed by the *caudillo* he had been loyal to for decades, Fernández-Miranda, who remained close to Juan Carlos, began to consider the various ways in which Francoism could be discontinued after Franco's inevitable death. After Franco's death and Arias' resignation, it was Fernández-Miranda, now speaker of the *Cortes*, who encouraged the king to select the

relatively unknown Adolfo Suárez as the new prime minister. Together, Suárez and Fernández-Miranda worked to write and pass the Law of Political Reform, which paved the way for democratic elections. However, although Fernández-Miranda joined Suárez's UCD, he has grown frustrated with the Prime Minister, opposing his efforts to legalize the Communist Party and firmly opposed to any efforts to increase regional autonomy. Fernández-Miranda still lives in his native Asturias and commutes to Madrid via plane.

Leopoldo Ramón Pedro Calvo-Sotelo y Bustelo (UCD)

Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo was born on April 14, 1926 in Madrid to a prominent right-wing family. One of the most formative events for young Leopoldo was the assassination of his uncle, José Calvo-Sotelo, an Alfonsine monarchist who had served as Primo de Rivera's finance minister in 1936, which helped spark the outbreak of the Civil War. In his teenage years, Calvo-Sotelo began displaying a knack for baking and tinkering with clocks. As being a baker was out of the question for someone from such an affluent background, Calvo-Sotelo studied at the Technical University of Madrid, graduating with a degree in civil and chemical engineering. The young engineer put his degree to good use, joining RENFE, Spain's state-owned rail operator. Thanks to his prowess in both engineering and managing office politics, Calvo-Sotelo quickly rose through the ranks at RENFE, being appointed president of the operator by Franco in 1967. Calvo-Sotelo made the jump into politics in 1971, when he was elected as a deputy to the *Cortes*, where he represented the Union of Chemical Industries. A committed monarchist, Calvo-Sotelo soon became convinced that authoritarianism could not survive Franco, and that for Spain to fully integrate with Western Europe, a full transition to democracy (with a constitutional monarch, of course) would be necessary. Having served as Minister of Trade under the brief Arias Navarro government, Calvo-Sotelo quickly became a close ally of the new prime minister, Adolfo Suárez and was elected as a UCD deputy for Madrid in the election of 1977. A devout Catholic, Calvo-Sotelo lives in Madrid's Salamanca district with his wife, María, their eight children, and three cats.

Rodolfo Martín Villa (UCD)

Rodolfo Martín Villa was born on October 3, 1934 to a farming family in Santa María del Paramo, a small Leonese town. As a young child, he stood out as a prodigious soccer player and dreamed of playing for Real Madrid. Sadly, at the age of fourteen, Martín's foot (and his nascent soccer career) was crushed after he got between the family bull and a particularly appealing blade of grass. Martín never fully recovered from the accident, physically or emotionally, but he attended the Technical University of Madrid, where he received a degree in engineering. It was at university where Martín first became involved with politics, joining the *Sindicato Español Universitario* (or SEU)–the corporatist student union–and eventually becoming president

of the SEU, which gave him a seat in the *Cortes*. After graduating from university, Martín moved to Barcelona, where he worked as an automotive engineer at SEAT, the state-owned auto company, quickly becoming a high-ranking executive at the company. In 1971, Martín, who had remained closely involved with Francoist politics after his brief stint in the *Cortes*, was appointed as the civil governor of Barcelona province, a difficult job in a region generally considered hostile to Franco. Although Martín was never particularly popular in Barcelona, his performance was notable enough that Adolfo Suárez appointed him Minister of the Interior in 1976. Although Martín's genuine political beliefs are something of a mystery, he nonetheless joined Suárez's UCD and was elected to the *Cortes* in 1977 from his home province in Leon, where he lives happily (enough) with his wife, Gloria, their five children, and their twenty–yes, twenty–poodles.

Francisco Javier Solana de Madariaga (PSOE)

Javier Solana was born on July 14, 1942 to an upper-class family in Madrid. The son of a chemistry professor, Solana attended the *Colegio del Nuestra Señora del Pilar,* an exclusive private Catholic school. Despite his wealthy upbringing, the Solana family was always much more liberal-minded than the vast majority of Madrid's upper class. Thus, Solana always opposed the Franco government, especially after his older brother was imprisoned for joining an unsanctioned student union in 1959. A high-achieving student, Solana attended the Universidad Complutense of Madrid, where he secretly joined the still-illegal PSOE in 1964. After graduating with a degree in physics, Solana attended graduate school at the University of Virginia, where he took part in protests for civil rights and against the Vietnam War. After receiving his doctorate in 1971, Solana returned home to Spain, where he was hired as a professor at the Autonomous University of Madrid and re-immersed himself in PSOE. In 1976, at PSOE's first legal conference in Spain since the fall of the Second Republic, Solana was named Secretary of the party's executive committee and was elected as a PSOE deputy for Madrid in 1977. Solana lives in Madrid with his wife Concepción, a professor of literature.

Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora (AP)

Gonzalo Fernández was born on August 1, 1924, but spent most of his early childhood in Madrid. In 1936, while Fernández was on vacation with his family in Galicia, the civil war broke out, and Fernández was forced to finish secondary school in the northwestern stronghold of the Nationalists. A voracious reader, Fernández attended the University of Salamanca, where he worked as a librarian and earned a law degree. An enthusiastic supporter of the Franco regime, Fernández joined the Spanish Diplomatic School in 1946 and was subsequently posted to the Spanish embassy in Buenos Aires. After five years in Argentina, Fernández

was named Ambassador to Italy and, finally, Ambassador to the Holy See. Fernández returned home to Spain in 1970, where Franco immediately named him Minister of Public Works. Although Fernández had little experience with or interest in infrastructure, he did not complain and was rewarded by being named the head of the Spanish Diplomatic School in 1974. Outraged by what he sees as Suárez's reckless dismantling of the Spanish state in favor of separatism and Marxism, Fernández quit the diplomatic corps in 1976 to help form the *Alianza Popular* and was elected as a deputy from the Galician province of Pontevedra in 1977. Fernández, who splits his time between Madrid and Galicia, is an enthusiastic amateur bagpipe player, much to his family's chagrin.

Bibliography

Allegory of the Second Spanish Republic. Creazilla. Accessed August 31, 2023. https://creazilla.com/nodes/3147754-allegory-of-the-second-spanish-republic-illustration.

Archives, National. *President Gerald R. Ford and Generalissimo Francisco Franco Riding in a Ceremonial Parade in Madrid, Spain*. 1974. NARA & DVIDS PUBLIC DOMAIN ARCHIVE. https://nara.getarchive.net/media/president-gerald-r-ford-and-generalissimo-francisco-franco-riding-in-a-ceremonial-5c4c0d.

Ben-Ami, Shlomo. "The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera: A Political Reassessment." Journal of Contemporary History 12, no. 1 (January 1977). https://www.jstor.org/stable/260237.

Berman, Sheri. "The Transition to Democracy in Spain." Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe, 12 Apr. 2021. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197539347.003.0016.

Carr, Raymond. Essay. *Modern Spain, 1875-1980*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Commons, Wikimedia. *File:Ccaa-spain.png*. July 25, 2016. Wikimedia. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ccaa-spain.png.

Commons, Wikimedia. *File:Guernica reproduction on tiled wall, Guernica, Spain (PPL3-Altered) julesvernex2.jpg*. September 8, 2018. *Wikimedia Commons*. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Guernica_reproduction_on_tiled_wall,_Guernica,_Spain_%28PPL3-Altered%29_julesvernex2.jpg.

Commons, Wikimedia. *File:Spain topography.png*. February 10, 2006. Wikimedia. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Spain_topography.png.

Coverdale, John F. "Spain from Dictatorship to Democracy." *International Affairs* 53, no. 4 (October 1977). https://doi.org/10.2307/2616232.

De la Cierva, Ricardo. *Agonia y Muerte de Franco: 1975*. Madrid, ES: ARC, 1996.

Delano Smith, Catherine, and Vicente Rodriguez. "Spain- Economy." Encyclopædia Britannica, August 29, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Spain#ref70257.

Delano Smith, Catherine, and Vicente Rodriguez. "Spain- Land." Encyclopædia Britannica, August 29, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Spain#ref70257.

Delano Smith, Catherine, and Vicente Rodriguez. "Spain- The Restored Monarchy, 1875-1923."

Encyclopædia Britannica, August 29, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Spain#ref70257.

"Dictadura Del General Franco. Las Cortes Españolas 1943-1977," Congreso de Diputados, March 2022, https://www.congreso.es/es/cem/cortesp.

Douglass, William A., and Joseba Zulaika. "On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process." Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 32, no. 2, 1990. www.jstor.org/stable/178914.

Encyclopaedia Britannica, The Editors Of, ed. "Bilbao." Encyclopædia Britannica, July 12, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Bilbao.

Flores Juberías, Carlos. "The Autonomy of Catalonia." In Cambridge University Press EBooks. *Cambridge University Press*, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139088206.008.

Fotograf, Ukjent, Ricardo Martín (1882–1936), Ingebjørg Birkeland, and Alejandro Søreng-Wold   (Universitetet i Bergen).

"Miguel Primo de Rivera." Store norske leksikon. Accessed August 31, 2023. https://snl.no/Miguel_Primo_de_Rivera.

Gooding, Nigel. "First Spanish Republic," 2022. http://www.nigelgooding.co.uk/Exhibits/NigelGooding/Spanish%20Republic/Frame01.htm.

Graham, Helen. *The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction*. OUP Oxford, 24 Mar. 2005.

Gunther, Richard, and Jonathan Hopkin. "A Crisis of Institutionalization: The Collapse of the UCD in Spain." *Political Parties*, March 7, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199246742.003.0008.

Hottinger, Arnold. "Spain One Year after Franco." *The World Today* 32 no. 12 (1976). https://www.jstor.org/stable/40394898.

Kennedy, Paul. "The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party: Continuity, Innovation and Renewal." In *In Search of Social Democracy*, edited by John Callaghan, Nina Fishman, Ben Jackson, and Martin Mcivor. Manchester University Press, 2009. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1wn0s45.10.

Light, Matthew. "Fixing Franco's Folly: Regional Autonomy Heals Spain's Authoritarian Legacy." *Harvard International Review* 15, no. 3 (Spring 1993). https://www.jstor.org/stable/42761124.

Linz, Juan J. "Church and State in Spain from the Civil War to the Return of Democracy." *Daedalus* 120 no. 3 (1991). https://www.jstor.org/stable/20025392.

Malefakis, Edward. *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970.

Pacheco Pardo, Ramón. "Chapter 38: Spanish Foreign Policy." Essay. In *The Oxford Handbook of Spanish Politics*, edited by Diego Muro and Ignacio Lago. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198826934.013.39.

Padró, Tomás. Alegoría de la Primera República Española. 1873. Picryl. https://picryl.com/media/alegoria-de-la-primera-republica-espanola-por-tomas-padro-8b7dba.

Paniagua, Javier. "De La Dictadura a La Guerra Civil (1923-1939)." Aula-Historia Social, no. 2 (1998). https://www.jstor.org/stable/40343296.

Pastor, Eugenia Relaño. "Spanish Catholic Church in Franco Regime: A Marriage of Convenience." Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte 20, no. 2 (2007). http://www.jstor.com/stable/43751790.

Rodriguez, Vicente, Timothy John Connell, and Blake Ehrlich. "Madrid." Encyclopædia Britannica, August 22, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Madrid.

Rodriguez, Vicente, and Timothy John Connell. "Barcelona." Encyclopædia Britannica, August 27, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Barcelona.

Roskin, Michael. "Spain Tries Democracy Again." *Political Science Quarterly* 93, no. 4 (1978). https://doi.org/10.2307/2150107.

Sánchez-Navarro, Angel José, and Michel Vale. "The Political Transition of the Francoist Cortes: Toward the Law for Political Reform (1975-1976)." *International Journal of Political Economy* 20 no. 2 (1990). https://www.jstor.org/stable/40470537.

Sandars, C. T. "New Allies in the Mediterranean." Oxford University Press EBooks, 9 Mar. 2000. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198296874.003.0008.

Shabad, Goldie, and Richard Gunther. "Language, Nationalism, and Political Conflict in Spain." *Comparative Politics* 14, no. 4 (July 1982). https://www.jstor.org/stable/421632.

Shaw, Stephen. "Spanish Dialects in Spain," *Wikimedia Commons*, 29 Mar. 2008, commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Spanish_dialects_in_Spain-en.png.

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC. “Spanish Civil War.” *United States Holocaust Memorial Museum*, encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/spanish-civil-war#:~:text=The%20Spanish%20Civil%20War%20proved. Accessed 31 Aug. 2023.

Wigram, Edgar. *1906, Northern Spain, pp. 062-063, León*. Casa del Ayuntamiento. 1906. Picryl. https://picryl.com/media/1906-northern-spain-pp-062-063-leon-casa-del-ayuntamiento-6379f6.