

Organization of
African Unity

OAU



MUNUC 35

Model United Nations of the University of Chicago

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CHAIR LETTERS

Dear Delegates,

Welcome aboard to the Organization of African Unity here in MUNUC 35! I am Derek, a second year at the University of Chicago and one of your Chairs for this committee. I am a Biology major pursuing the premed track who has diverse interests spanning from playing and watching basketball to singing and making music. On campus, I am also a certified Emergency Medical Responder, a board member on Phoenix Biology, and a member of the Asian American Intersarsity worship band.

This is a hybrid committee centered on the Congo Crisis of 1960, which is a consistently overlooked proxy war that profoundly escalated and intensified NATO-Warsaw Pact relations during the Cold War. You will get a glimpse of the recurring patterns of conflict derived from the power vacuums rendered by the withdrawal of western imperialism from novel, emerging states, and how these issues are shaped by diplomacy, violence, and external interventions that involve the pertinent parties.

The topic is undoubtedly a complex geopolitical conflict but I am always here to offer assistance and address your concerns. Please do not hesitate to reach out if you have any questions. I cannot wait to see you all in person and witness some fruitful debate blossoming amongst all 40 delegates.

Best,

Derek Chan

Co-Chair, Organization of African Unity (OAU)

Hello Delegates!

Welcome to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in MUNUC 35! Before you can dabble in your business, my name's Andersen and I'll be chairing for this committee alongside my lovely associates this year. I'm a Public Policy/Global Studies double major specializing in Law/Borders/Security who is not just a deadbeat bookworm in our campus libraries. I'm an ROTC cadet, competitively ranked e-sports player, acapella member, and kickboxer. Additionally, I serve as a representative on the Inter-House Council and am part of Makenew, an acts-two church in the greater Chicago area.

You will be participating in a hybrid style committee with your dealings oriented around the 1960 Congo Crisis. This conflict is a proxy war that was involved in dramatically scaling the tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. During your analyses, you will understand the profound impact that imperialism had on the African country concerning violence, interventions, and resolutions brought about by global actors.

This is a difficult topic in the midst of difficult times but if you have any questions, feel free to ask me or the other chairs. I look forward to seeing you in the coming season and wish you all the best in debating, formulating, and working with us.

Respectfully,

Andersen Eudaimon

Co-Chair, Organization of African Unity

Hello Delegates!

Welcome to the Organization of African Unity.

I am Ricky Shi, a third-year at the College, and one of your three Co-Chairs for MUNUC 35. I'm currently double-majoring in Economics and Sociology. Outside of MUNUC, I am also involved in the ChoMUN conference, our college MUN Team, TAMID (consulting), The Blue Chips Investment Club, the Hong Kong Students' Association, and the Ultimate Frisbee team. In the rare occurrence of free time, you might find me watching Formula 1, hanging out with friends on the quad, or eating good food downtown.

The issue of the Congo Crisis isn't often studied and thus presents a unique opportunity for delegates to glean the intricacies of Cold-War era politics and to learn about the nuances of contemporary African politics in general. The crisis was also a turning point for Congo's development, which enabled vigorous discourse pertaining to nation building sentiments with consideration for the many unresolved socioeconomic issues in the region left behind by the conclusion of the colonial era. I thus believe that the Congo Crisis will allow delegates to utilize all of their problem solving and diplomacy skills to tackle this unique conflict.

For many of you, this may be your first exposure to Model United Nations or to a committee of this type, and so I encourage you to reach out with any questions you may have about the topic, Model United Nations procedure, committee structure, or anything else. As your chair, I want to see all of you succeed and have the most enjoyable experience at this MUNUC 35.

All the best,

Ricky Shi

rickyshi@uchicago.edu

SENSITIVITY STATEMENT

Greetings Delegates,

As your MUNUC chairs, we hope for all of you to remain proactive and relentless throughout the duration of the conference, but please keep in mind that there is only a fine line between expressing what is politically accurate/stance-abiding and what is offensive, inappropriate, and vulgar. With that being said, please avoid navigating through certain sensitive cultural, societal, religious, and political content, as we will not tolerate any ad hominem, or discrimination at any point during committee. Still, we strongly condone and implore you to actively participate and remain engaged in debate and diplomacy. Thank you.

Yours Sincerely,

Anderson, Derek, and Ricky

COMMITTEE STRUCTURE AND MECHANICS

This committee will be fairly light in terms of crisis mechanics. Non-traditional parliamentary procedures will likely be commonplace, with Chairs' discretion guiding the number and intensity of the crisis breaks.

For the crisis portion of committee, we will not be employing backrooms unlike most other committees. Normally, delegates would respond to reactions and crisis breaks through writing notes in a backroom, but that mechanic will not be utilized in the OAU. However, if delegates feel the need to pass on concerns or lighthearted comments regarding the nature of the committee, please feel free during feedback or unmoderated caucuses.

This committee will conduct crisis breaks, several of which will happen each session. These occur to mimic the unpredictable nature of real-life crises. Delegates will have to cooperate with each other to draft smaller resolutions, or directives, in response to handling these crises. Our managing role as the dais is to offer guidance in response to your directives as committee progresses.

The Congo Situation is an especially challenging and serious crisis that delegates should maneuver around cautiously and pragmatically. The primary reason for tackling the crisis in the front room is to emphasize cooperation between represented nations instead of individuals working on solutions separately. By having crisis break mechanics, the stakes of the emergency situations are elevated to simulate realistic threats, making the experience of dealing with historical circumstances as immersive as possible. By introducing these mechanics, we hope that your responsive timing and teamwork capabilities are sharpened to overcome crises.

TL;DR: No backroom notes; numerous crisis breaks every session; short resolutions (directives) in response to breaks rather than full working papers; act professionally to resolve the Congo crisis.

HISTORY OF COMMITTEE

The Organization of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor to the modern-day African Union (AU), serves as an intergovernmental regional body consisting of 54 African member states, 32 of which are the founding member states.¹ On May 25, 1963, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie convened with representatives from 32 novel African states in Addis Ababa, epitomizing the heightened sense of Pan-Africanism as a reaction towards the very recent European colonization and its lasting influences. Article 2 of the OAU Charter emphasizes the protection of African solidarity and sovereignty in face of imperialist western states and a complete removal of colonization.²

The OAU also dedicates itself to safeguarding human rights and economic cooperation, but such collaborative spirits may sometimes come into conflict with Article 3 of the OAU Charter, which stresses nonintervention — an extremely crucial interaction delegates must be wary of in the committee.³ Article 3's stipulations often lead to inaction and perceived apathy, paving the way for dictatorships and genocides (e.g., Rwandan Genocide). This commitment to avoiding intervention has given the OAU the reputation of being a merely demonstrational forum.⁴ Ideological differences between states also hamper progress, so delegates should definitely take note of this hurdle as well.

This regional body committee will primarily abide by traditional Model United Nations procedure. However, crisis elements will be introduced throughout the conference in the form of spontaneous updates on the issue at hand that require delegates to act with urgency and draft resolutions to address the new developments. All states are eligible to vote on resolutions and crisis directives unless otherwise specified during the conference.

¹ Beverton, Alys. "Organization of African Unity (1963-2002) •." Blackpast, October 2, 2020. <https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/organization-african-unity-1963-2002/>.

² "Organization of African Unity (OAU) ." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. . Encyclopedia.com. (June 21, 2022). <https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/applied-and-social-sciences-magazines/organization-african-unity-oau>

³ Ibid.

⁴ Beverton, Alys. "Organization of African Unity (1963-2002) •." Blackpast, October 2, 2020. <https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/organization-african-unity-1963-2002/>.

TOPIC: The Congo Crisis, 1960

Statement of the Problem

Introduction

The Congo Crisis represents a long-term conflict that arose from political tension brewing amongst the postcolonial power vacuum as well as the international community's initial apathy towards the pressing issue. The seemingly innocuous and well-intentioned Africanist movement actually dashed all hopes of a peaceful independence by entrenching the cultural and political differences between African ethnic groups in wake of the highly ambiguous and obscure goal of independence.⁵ The main factions at play at the beginning of committee are Lumumba's Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) and Kasa-Vubu's Alliances des Bakongo (ABAKO), with the latter calling for more radical and immediate independence. ABAKO's ambitious and nationalist attitude essentially pitted it against the much more moderate MNC.⁶ To complicate matters further, Tshombe's Confederation of Tribal Associations of Katanga (CONAKAT) Party is rapidly gaining momentum in Katanga by advocating for a southern Congo secession.⁷

The fragmented geopolitical scene is extremely apparent. The Belgians, though planning their eventual departure, were adamant about a very gradual route to independence. Despite the establishment of the Republic of Congo upon urges from the locals, the Belgians insisted on maintaining a "colonial" social order by retaining the Force Publique. The ensuing disagreements that arose from this insistence prompted then Prime Minister Lumumba to radicalize as well, promoting all Black soldiers by one rank and dismissing some White officers to challenge Belgian influence.⁸ However, then President Kasa-Vubu decided the longevity and sustainability of the

⁵ Freund, Bill. *The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of African Society since 1800*. London ; New York, NY: Palgrave, 2016.

⁶ Zeilig, Leo. *Lumumba Africa's Lost Leader*. London: Haus, 2008.

⁷ Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Moise Tshombe." Encyclopedia Britannica, July 19, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Moise-Tshombe>.

⁸ Zeilig, Leo. *Lumumba Africa's Lost Leader*. London: Haus, 2008.

country would be jeopardized if Belgian intervention was met with vehement opposition, generating division within the Black members of the Congolese government.⁹

Tension kept simmering and finally reached a boiling point when Belgium dispatched paratroopers to help White residents evacuate while Tshombe's party finally seceded.¹⁰ This was no longer an internal conflict that could be quelled without amplification; Belgian intervention imbued the conflict with a sense of violence that proved to be too much for Prime Minister Lumumba to handle without escalating further, despite President Kasa-Vubu's hesitance. Belgium's military operation and Katanga's secession marked the start of the crisis, which we will dissect into different facets below.

Economic crisis

Initially, Belgium wanted to propagate an economic system that would include Congo as part of its "commonwealth", very similar to the system practiced by the British, only to be countered with much backlash from the Congolese locals.¹¹ Economic pressures from Belgium further consolidated anti-Western sentiments among the Congolese government.

Upon seceding from Congo, Katanga, now solely governed by CONAKAT, began to consolidate its economic ties with the Central African Region, pouring its mining resources into the copper market there.¹² In fact, one of the primary incentives for secession was to refrain from sharing such scarce resources with the ineffectual Congolese government.¹³ The Belgians exploited the vulnerability of Congo's economic situation by facilitating the secession and permitting an even more expansive operation of Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK). The largest mining company in Katanga, investment in UMHK further sequestered the mining business within the new state, keeping profits far from Congolese reach.¹⁴ Less than a month later, another integral mining province called Kasai decided to embrace the sentiments of independence as well and chose to secede.¹⁵ Ultimately,

⁹ Gondola, Didier. *The History of Congo*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003.

¹⁰ Nugent, Paul. *Africa since Independence: A Comparative Study*. London: Palgrave macmillan, 2004.

¹¹ Pakenham, Thomas. *The Scramble for Africa*. London: ABACUS, 2010.

¹² Nugent, Paul. *Africa since Independence: A Comparative Study*. London: Palgrave macmillan, 2004.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Congo was stripped of around 40% of its very lucrative mining market, hampering its economy by leaps and bounds.¹⁶

Humanitarian Crisis

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to undergo one of the world's most sophisticated humanitarian crises. Six million people currently experience acute malnutrition and another 27 million people lack food security while also needing humanitarian aid.¹⁷ Disease, famine, and lack of sufficient resources make the Congo an increasingly dire crisis zone.

Displaced Populations

The DRC contains the largest displaced population in Africa with 2.6 million displaced people, 1.9 million returnees, 620k host community members, and 442k refugees all contributing to an overall vulnerable population due their inability to access adequate living standards.¹⁸ From this population data collected in 2020, 3.22 million children are involved with the chronic displacement crisis. Numerous factors contribute to the vast amount of displaced persons, such as unstable governance, collapsing infrastructure, and ongoing insecurity due to armed political conflict.¹⁹

Food Insecurity

The DRC remains one of the world's least developed countries in almost every aspect. More than half the population lives below the poverty line and 70 percent of the population engages in subsistence

¹⁶ Young, M. Crawford. "Post-Independence Politics in the Congo." *Transition*, no. 26 (1966): 34. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2934325>.

¹⁷"Democratic Republic of the Congo: Humanitarian Needs Overview and Response Plan 2022 at a Glance (February 2022) - Democratic Republic of the Congo." ReliefWeb, February 17, 2022. <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-humanitarian-needs-overview-and-response>.

¹⁸"Democratic Republic of the Congo – Humanitarian Crisis (DG Echo, UN, Ingos) (Echo Daily Flash of 04 January 2022) - Democratic Republic of the Congo." ReliefWeb, January 4, 2022. <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-humanitarian-crisis-dg-echo-un-ingos-echo>.

¹⁹"Democratic Republic of Congo." The IRC. Accessed September 10, 2022. <https://www.rescue.org/country/democratic-republic-congo>.

agriculture.²⁰ In fact, most farmers lack the resources to make a living from their work. This causes mass food insecurity as 21.8 million people are unable to meet their short-term needs.

Disease Outbreaks

The health system in the DRC is unstable on all fronts with staffing shortages, insufficient leadership, and a general lack of funding and supplies. Several epidemics are present in the Congo, with Cholera, the Measles, and Ebola rampaging the northern regions and crippling the already struggling health system. Finally, the Congo is still contending with the recent COVID-19 Pandemic and its resulting humanitarian effects.

Human Rights Violations

Currently, the process to identify victims of human rights violations is incredibly unclear, but estimates include roughly 15.7 thousand unaccompanied children, 8.1 thousand children associated with armed forces groups, and 110 thousand gender-based violence survivors living in the DRC.²¹ These populations have not received protection monitoring and typically lack timely support. Additionally, land rights have also been violated with an estimated 52.5 thousand people unable to access their legally owned properties.²² These violations are caused by parties to conflict being unaware of their obligations to stay within public land borders, as well as property owners remaining unaware of their rights amid these armed crises.

Political Crisis

Congo's political crisis in this period of the 1960s stemmed from the Belgian government's failure to create a governmental system that could account for the many different ethnic groups and political factions that existed in the developing country. Thus, turmoil over things like federalism, tribalism,

²⁰ "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Humanitarian Needs Overview and Response Plan 2022 at a Glance (February 2022) - Democratic Republic of the Congo." ReliefWeb, February 17, 2022. <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-humanitarian-needs-overview-and-response>.

²¹ "Democratic Republic of the Congo – Humanitarian Crisis (DG Echo, UN, Ingos) (Echo Daily Flash of 04 January 2022) - Democratic Republic of the Congo." ReliefWeb, January 4, 2022. <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-humanitarian-crisis-dg-echo-un-ingos-echo>.

²² Ibid.

and ethnic nationalism remained rooted in the society as it expanded. The central government during the early days of Belgian colonialism was weak and poorly equipped to govern over such a diverse population, and there remained pockets of faction power in many areas that eventually led to the Katangan secession.²³

The African Nationalist Movement came about in Belgian-colonialist Congo during the 1950s. The movement was strongly divided along ethnic and geographical lines of the land, and the involved groups tended to view each other as enemies rather than allies. The *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC) (in English: Congo National Movement) was by far the largest of these factions and was chartered under the leadership of future Prime Minister and President Patrice Lumumba.²⁴ However, the MNC garnered much disapproval from opponents due to its perceived moderate approach and lengthy timeline to independence.

The MNC was not alone on the top step, though, as the *Alliance des Bakongo* (ABAKO) was a close second in size. This faction was led by Joseph Kasa-Vubu, another figure who would later attain great power in the central government. The ABAKO's values revolved much around their belief that the Bakongo ethnic group were the rightful heirs of the land that belonged to the pre-colonial Kingdom of Kongo. A third group also joined the contenders to the Congolese throes of power in the form of the *Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga* (CONAKAT) (in English: Confederation of the Tribal Associations of Katanga). The CONAKAT was led by Moïse Tshombe, and spouted ideals of federalism in Congo's southern province of Katanga.²⁵

By 1959, political tensions were at a boiling point as all three major political groups and other smaller factions all rallied around the main goal of independence. Following mass riots in Leopoldville, the nationalist parties' spheres of influence expanded beyond the cities and into the countryside. During

²³ Rosoux, Valérie. "The Two Faces of Belgium in the Congo: Perpetrator and Rescuer." *European Review of International Studies* 1, no. 3 (2014): 16–38. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26593310>.

²⁴ Wallerstein, Immanuel. "Patrice Lumumba." *Britannica*. (2022) <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Patrice-Lumumba#ref57193>

²⁵ "Conflict in the Congo." *Africa Today* 7, no. 5 (1960): 5–13. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4184114>

this time, the ABAKO's leadership were disproportionately arrested by the Belgian colonial security forces, leaving the MNC in a much-advantaged political position.²⁶

In the fallout of the riots, leaders of the many groups in the Congo nationalist movement were invited to a special conference in Brussels to discuss the future of Congo-Belgian relations. Belgian efforts to maintain a 30-year hold before such an occurrence were unsuccessful, and the fateful day of June 30th, 1960 was set as the day of Congolese independence. Despite this, the aforementioned issues of federalism, ethnic disputes, and the role of Belgium in Congo's future remained unresolved.²⁷

As that date came and went, the Congolese government remained dependent on colonial forces such as the *Force Republique* (FR) military to maintain social order. The FR's White commander, Emile Janssens, even went ahead and wrote the words "Before Independence = After Independence" to signal his intention to continue commanding the force in the same way regardless of the status of Congolese independence. The Black officers were enraged by this, sparking their mutiny on July 5th, 1960.²⁸

As a result, unrest spread nationwide and White civilians ended up as the targets for a majority of the attacks. This enraged the Belgian government, which sent in paratroopers and arranged for the complete withdrawal of all European civil servants. Such an exodus of officials crucial to the functioning of the country caused a governmental shutdown, sending the Democratic Republic of the Congo into disarray.²⁹

It was in this complete political disarray and debacle that Moise Tshombe then declared Katanga to be the Independent State of Katanga.³⁰

²⁶ Covington-Ward, Yolanda. "Joseph Kasa-Vubu, ABAKO, and Performances of Kongo Nationalism in the Independence of Congo." *Journal of Black Studies* 43, no. 1 (2012): 72–94. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23215196>.

²⁷ Merriam, Alan P. "The Congo's First Year of Independence." *Current History* 41, no. 242 (1961): 232–37. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45310595>.

²⁸ Young, M. Crawford. "Post-Independence Politics in the Congo." *Transition*, no. 26 (1966): 34–41. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2934325>.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Dee, Liz "Congo in Crisis: The Rise and Fall of Katangan Secession." Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training. (2015) <https://adst.org/2015/09/congo-in-crisis-the-rise-and-fall-of-katangan-secession/>

History of the Problem

Pre-Colonial Congo

Fragmented kingdoms and city-states

The advent of civilization in Congo arose in the form of kingdoms, city-states, or other kinds of political entities spread throughout the Central African region. The most elaborate and noteworthy, culturally and socially speaking, were the Kongo Kingdom in the West and Luba-Lunda states in the East.³¹ The former originated as a federation of distinct city-states that were merged to form a single royal patrimony via conquest.³² The kingdom profited immensely from the Atlantic Slave trade facilitated by the Portuguese and was marked with political strife stemming from economic and territorial disputes with Portuguese colonists.³³ In the Battle of Mbwila of 1665, Portugal's forces slayed the reigning king of Kongo, generating a power vacuum that left Kongo in shambles. Civil wars became a recurring problem that enabled Portugal to wholly take over the kingdom and integrate it into an adjacent colony that later became known as Angola.³⁴

On the east side of Central Africa, the Luba-Lunda states thrived due to centralized political power and agricultural regulation. They had deftly acquired "client states" who served them with loyalty and tribute of goods in exchange for security and adoption into a widely accepted sacred lineage of the Luba-Lunda monarchs.³⁵ By 1650, trade routes with Europeans had been established and this emerging empire had monopolized all copper trade in the region.³⁶

³¹ Lemarchand, R. , Cordell, . Dennis D. , Wiese, . Bernd Michael and Payanzo, . Ntsomo. "Democratic Republic of the Congo." Encyclopedia Britannica, June 30, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo>.

³² Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Kongo." Encyclopedia Britannica, March 5, 2020. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kongo-historical-kingdom-Africa>.

³³ Miller, Joseph C.. "4. The Slave Trade in Congo and Angola" In *The African Diaspora: Interpretive Essays* edited by Martin L. Kilson and Robert I. Rotberg, 75-113. Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2013. <https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674593220.c6>

³⁴ Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. "Kongo." Encyclopedia Britannica, March 5, 2020. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kongo-historical-kingdom-Africa>.

³⁵ Bortolot, Alexander Ives. "Kingdoms of the Savanna: The Luba and Lunda Empires." In Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2000–, October, 2003, http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/luba/hd_luba.htm.

³⁶ Ibid.

Yet, the perpetually expanding slave and ivory trade in the rest of the world had exerted stress on the Luba-Lunda Empire's extensive trade networks as the skyrocketing demand outpaced the Empire's commercial capacity. The copper monopoly was not as robust as before and southern states of the general "Commonwealth" were raided by small-scale yet lethal African civilizations yearning for even more slaves to trade.³⁷ This trend spawned the intensification of slave exploitation within the heart of the Empire to generate more economic power at the cost of enhanced social differentiation.³⁸ The Empire's political dominion seemed to have eroded away with the ancient monopolies and the entire Commonwealth was absorbed into the Congo Free State by Belgium.

Slave Trade

Central Africans, of course, including predecessors of the later Congo Free State, were among the earliest people exploited as slaves to leverage profit from European cash crop plantations. Portugal introduced colonialism to Africa as early as the 1470s with the establishment of São Tomé, an island colony just off the coast of West Africa. The coerced migration of slaves to the sugarcane plantations of São Tomé instigated and set into motion the development of the much more expansive Atlantic Slave Trade less than a century later.³⁹ Portugal was able to acquire an astronomical number of slaves through its conflicts and consistent victories against the Kongo Kingdom while the Luba-Lundas willingly exported their own slaves to meet the enormous demands for free capital in colonies all over the world.⁴⁰

The most inhumane abuses occurred when Congo found itself right on an integral intersection between both the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean trade routes during an inaugural wave of modern globalization. Congolese slaves were primarily transported to Haiti and launched further into the Americas when the foreign influence of France began to supersede that of Spain and

³⁷ Macola, Giacomo. "Luba-Lunda States." *The Encyclopedia of Empire*, 2015, 1–6.
<https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118455074.wbeoeo60>.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Birmingham, D.. "Central Africa." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, November 22, 2021.
<https://www.britannica.com/place/central-Africa>.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

Portugal.⁴¹ A grand total of approximately 5.7 million slaves were exported from the Congolese-Angolan region during this time.⁴² A drawn-out, seemingly interminable history of the exploitation of Congo was told from the putrid decks of Atlantic slave-dealing ships incarcerating those who have fallen victim to the most unspeakable facets of human nature.

Belgian Congo

The Congo Free State

In 1874, Henry Morgan Stanley commenced his renowned exploration of the Congo River that piqued the interest of Belgium's King Leopold II due to the discovery of vast natural resources in the area. Countless trade posts or "stations" were implemented along the river after a committee founded by Leopold II to oversee commerce in Congo obtained its right to governance across the entire region.⁴³ The scope of Belgian jurisdiction became the Congo Free State. Despite his poorly concealed desire to completely take over Congo when the international community granted him permission, Leopold II extinguished external suspicion in the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884 with his beguiling "humanitarian" and "religious" intentions to help Congo prosper.⁴⁴ The international community mistakenly deemed Congo to be devoid of resources and their indifference paved the way for Leopold II's atrocious artifice of both natural and human exploitation to fuel his commercial and political interests at the cost of colossal casualties that potentially rival those of the Holocaust's.

Unbeknownst to most at the time, Congo housed a vast, nearly inexhaustible pool of rubber, a resource with increasing prominence upon the invention of rubber tires for bicycles. Leopold II took advantage of public ignorance and essentially coalesced all the Congolese people — men and women and children alike — into a perennially-running rubber extraction machine built from their

⁴¹ Davis, Chris. "Before They Were Haitians: Examining Evidence for Kongolese Influence on the Haitian Revolution." *Journal of Haitian Studies* 22, no. 2 (2016): 4–36. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44478387>.

⁴² Fox, Alex. "New Research Reveals the Transatlantic Slave Trade's Genetic Legacy." *Smithsonian.com*. Smithsonian Institution, July 28, 2020. <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/study-reveals-brutal-genetic-legacy-slave-trade-180975423/>.

⁴³ Cordell, D. D. , Wiese, . Bernd Michael , Payanzo, . Ntsomo and Lemarchand, . René. "Democratic Republic of the Congo." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, June 30, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo>.

⁴⁴ Reeves, Jesse S. "The Origin of the Congo Free State, Considered from the Standpoint of International Law." *The American Journal of International Law* 3, no. 1 (1909): 99–118. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2186209>.

labor.⁴⁵ Of course, ivory continued to be harvested from the region as a profoundly important and now scarce resource in the world. During this time, Leopold II created the notorious Force Publique (FP) to supervise the entire enslaved Congolese population. Not only were rebels or deserters punished brutally with public deaths, but workers were also mutilated, assaulted, and abused in some form if they did not meet the rubber and/or ivory quotas imposed upon them.⁴⁶

The nightmarish disaster finally drew to a close when exposés published by journalists and authors like Mark Twain as well as missionaries became widely disseminated throughout the world and international condemnation prompted the Belgian parliament to annex Congo to protect it from Leopold II.⁴⁷

Independence

Belgian Congo Rule

Although the Congo was no longer under the rule of Leopold II, Belgian rule proved less violent yet equally oppressive with the 'colonial trinity' of the state, missionaries, and private companies all reigning over the general populace. The material interests of the state and the financial interests of companies often intertwined with one another, meaning that workers and the regions they labored in were individually sectioned to prevent striking.⁴⁸ To further quality improvement efforts, hierarchical administrations were created to compliment a uniform 'native policy.' This was different compared to French or British colonial ruling systems who preferred administrative oversight of local leaders. Unsurprisingly, racial segregation was the norm, with White immigrants moving to the Congo after World War II being treated better than Black citizens already in the Congo.

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the Congo began to heavily urbanize and the colonial government sought to implement various development programs aimed at improving the Congo into a model industrial colony. By the 1950s, the Congo boasted a vast labor force larger than any other African

⁴⁵ Moncheur, Baron. "Conditions in the Congo Free State." *The North American Review* 179, no. 575 (1904): 494–503. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25105298>.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Cordell, D. D. , Wiese, . Bernd Michael , Payanzo, . Ntsomo and Lemarchand, . René. "Democratic Republic of the Congo." *Encyclopedia Britannica*, June 30, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo>.

⁴⁸ Turner, Thomas (2007). *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality* (2nd ed.). London: Zed Books.

colony, most likely due to the territory's rich supply of natural resources.⁴⁹ One feature that emerged from the early development programs was the development of a Europeanized African middle class, named 'Évolués,' primarily in cities.

In the 1950s, the 'Évolués' brought about an African nationalist movement, which was heavily divided into many groups and parties along with other ethnic and geographic differences. The *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC), the largest moderate front dedicated to achieving independence within a longer timeframe, was united around a charter.⁵⁰ Prominent figures such as Patrice Lumumba, Cyrille Adoula, and Joseph Lléo were significant contributors with Lumumba spearheading movement by the end of the 1950s.

The MNC was opposed by the Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO), a more radically aligned group led by Joseph Kasa-Vubu.⁵¹ They called for immediate independence and that governance of the new state should be entitled to only the Bakongo, an ethnically Bantu group. They were joined by other smaller factions such as the Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT) and the Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA) who represented the interests of other smaller ethnic groups.

Radicalization of the Évolués

With this many nationalist parties emerging, riots soon broke out in Léopoldville, the Congolese capital, in the late 1960s as a political demonstration turned violent. The Force Publique soon became involved and used force against the ABAKO, CONAKAT, and PSA rioters, killing many and injuring even more.⁵² The violence became advantageous to the MNC, as opposition was diminished and Black people outside of the Évolué class became involved with the independence movement. However, the situation led to many White communities becoming radicalized with militia groups forming to counter a Black majority government.

⁴⁹ Freund, Bill. *The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of African Society since 1800*. London ; New York, NY: Palgrave, 2016.

⁵⁰ Zeilig, Leo (2008). *Lumumba: Africa's Lost Leader*. London: Haus.

⁵¹ Carter, Gwendolen Margaret, ed. (1963), *Five African States; Responses to Diversity: the Congo, Dahomey, the Cameroun Federal Republic, the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, South Africa*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, OCLC

⁵² Renton, David; Seddon, David; Zeilig, Leo (2007). *The Congo: Plunder and Resistance*. London: Zed Books.

After the Léopoldville Riots, a Round Table Conference was held in Brussels to settle the matters of independence between Brussels and all the major Congolese parties in attendance.⁵³ A variety of important matters went unresolved and the Belgian government soon began to turn against Lumumba, whom they accused of being communist while also supporting rival factions. Nonetheless, the MNC won the Congolese elections in May 1960. In June 1960, the proclamation of the Republic of Congo's independence was given in a ceremony.⁵⁴

Katanga and South Kasai Secessions

Force Publique Mutinies and Crisis Beginnings

On July 11, 1960, the leader of CONAKAT, Moïse Kapenda Tshombe, declared for the Congo's southern province to be independent as its own state of Katanga with a relocated capital and himself as president.⁵⁵ The CONAKAT Party reasoned that the style of governance they wanted was already distinct from the rest of the Congo, and that the Katangese were ethnically different from the Congolese. Additionally, the Katanga region itself was mineral rich, with Katangese separatists intending to keep the wealth rather than share it with the rest of the Congo. The major driving force of the CONAKAT Party, however, was to escape the chaos of disintegration of law and order in the majority of the Congo.

CONAKAT had won substantial support from the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK), the most prominent mining company in Katanga. The UMHK was mostly owned by the Société Générale de Belgique, a holding company who feared nationalization of their assets by the MNC which also had close ties with the Belgian government. The UMHK influenced the Belgian government into providing military support for Katangese fighters.⁵⁶ Despite Belgian support, Katanga was never

⁵³ Struelens, Michel (1978). *The United Nations in the Congo, Or O.N.U.C., and International Politics*(1st ed.). Brussels: Max Arnold.

⁵⁴ "DRC: Background to the 1965 election". Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). Archived from the original on 25 July 2014. Retrieved 8 July 2014.

⁵⁵ Olivier, Lanotte (2010). *Chronology of the Democratic Republic of Congo/Zaire (1960-1997)*. <https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/chronology-democratic-republic-congozaire-1960-1997.html>

⁵⁶ Gondola, Didier (2002). *The History of Congo*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood.

formally recognized by any other country.⁵⁷ The Katangese secession revealed a national weakness within the Congolese central government, which was the deterioration of calls for unification.⁵⁸

In addition to the Katangese secession, a smaller region of the Kasai province announced its autonomy from the central government as the Mining State of South Kasai.⁵⁹ Like Katanga, the area was mineral rich and predominantly composed of its own ethnic group, the Luba. The reason then-president Albert Kalonji gave was due to the persecution of the Luba in the rest of the Congo.⁶⁰ South Kasai also had support from Forminière, another Belgian mining company. With the secession of two states, conflict would be inevitable as the Congo Crisis continued on.⁶¹

Foreign Intervention in Response to Secession

False Hopes from the International Community

In light of Belgian support for the secessionist states, there was growing support in the United Nations (UN) for the withdrawal of all Belgian forces from the Congo. This support came to a head on the 14th of July 1960, in the form of the UN Security Council's Resolution 143. This Resolution called for a complete Belgian withdrawal from the Congo and the introduction of a UN-commanded force,⁶² an armament of peacekeepers under the United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC).⁶³

Prime Minister Lumumba and his government initially welcomed the arrival of the peacekeepers, with the hope that they would help quell the secessionist states and restore order under the central government.⁶⁴ However, to Lumumba's disappointment, the ONUC's initial mandate only included the maintenance of law and order. This was due to the UN Secretary General believing the matter to

⁵⁷ Mockler, Anthony (1986). "Soldiers of Fortune: 5 Commando, the Congo 1964–65". *Orbis*. Vol. 1, no. 6. The Elite. pp. 116–120.

⁵⁸ Young, Crawford (1966). "Post-Independence Politics in the Congo". *Transition*. Indiana University Press (26): 34–41.

⁵⁹ The Imperial Collection: The Autonomous State of South Kasai

⁶⁰ Nugent, Paul (2004). *Africa since Independence: A Comparative History*. New York: Palgrave-MacMillan.

⁶¹ Borstelmann, Thomas (1993). *Apartheid, Colonialism, and the Cold War: the United States and Southern Africa, 1945–1952*. New York: Oxford University Press.

⁶² United Nations. "Resolution 143." United Nations Security Council, 1960. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/143>.

⁶³ AKSU, EŞREF. "The UN in the Congo Conflict: ONUC." In *The United Nations, Intra-State Peacekeeping and Normative Change*, 100–129. Manchester University Press, 2003. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt155j6v7.9>.

⁶⁴ Encyclopedia Britannica. "The Congo Crisis." Accessed August 8, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo/The-Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo>

be an internal political situation and not something the UN should be involved with.⁶⁵ Outside of the UN, the United States (under Dwight D. Eisenhower) also refused to provide Lumumba with military aid outside of sanctioned ONUC activities.⁶⁶

The Soviets Get Involved

Left with little else to turn to, Lumumba finally approached the Soviet Union for assistance, and they soon agreed to provide the needed military assistance to the Congo Central Government. This aid included 30 Soviet Aircrafts to help mobilize troops.⁶⁷ Lumumba's deal with the Soviets drew much rebuke from his government, causing a rift between him and President Kasa-Vubu as Kasa-Vubu was concerned with the consequences of receiving Soviet help. The United States was also concerned with the potential of a communist expansion into central Africa as a result of such an agreement.⁶⁸

Nevertheless, the Invasion of South Kasai was launched with Soviet support.⁶⁹ While the invasion was successful, the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) became tangled up with infighting between the Baluba and Bena Lulua ethnic groups. As a result, several large massacres of Luba civilians erupted, causing the deaths of around 3,000 innocent civilians.⁷⁰ This violent invasion caused many Baluba civilians to flee their homes and escape the fighting.⁷¹

Following this tragedy, the continued involvement of the Soviet Union brought out fresh memories of the USA's involvement with the Cuban Revolution. This unease from U.S. officials reinforced long-

⁶⁵ Gibbs, David N. "The United Nations, International Peacekeeping and the Question of 'Impartiality': Revisiting the Congo Operation of 1960." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 38, no. 3 (2000): 359–82. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/161703>.

⁶⁶ Nwaubani, Ebere. "Eisenhower, Nkrumah and the Congo Crisis." *Journal of Contemporary History* 36, no. 4 (2001): 599–622. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3180775>.

⁶⁷ Iandolo, Alessandro. "Imbalance of Power: The Soviet Union and the Congo Crisis, 1960–1961." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 2 (2014): 32–55. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26924483>.

⁶⁸ <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d59>.

⁶⁹ Iandolo, Alessandro. "Imbalance of Power: The Soviet Union and the Congo Crisis, 1960–1961." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 2 (2014): 32–55. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26924483>.

⁷⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_South_Kasai.

⁷¹ Ibid.

held Western concerns that Lumumba was a secret communist, along with CIA warnings that Congo may be experiencing a communist takeover⁷² similar to the fate of Cuba.⁷³

A Government in Crisis

Central Government Split

Lumumba's agreement with the Soviets drew great criticism both at home and abroad. Western democracies were now pushing to remove him from power, and perhaps more damningly, his own government officials were appealing to President Kasa-Vubu to go against Lumumba's judgment.⁷⁴ Unbeknownst to the two men, their appointed Secretary of National Defense and Brussels Round Table representative, Mobutu, took de facto control of the Congolese armed forces, allocating foreign military aid and handing out promotions to gain the officers' support.

Using the massacres of the South Kasaï invasion, Mobutu's control of the country's armed forces, and the promise of American support, Kasa-Vubu announced his unilateral dismissal of Lumumba on national radio on the 5th of September 1960.⁷⁵ However, this was met with resistance in both chambers of the Congo Parliament, and Lumumba still had enough political support left to block this action.

Wielding the power of the entire Congolese army, Mobutu then launched a bloodless coup⁷⁶ that replaced both Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu with a "College of Commissioners-General" as an interim government with the alleged purpose of allowing both of the politicians a "cooling-off" period before they regained control of the government.⁷⁷ In actuality, Mobutu ended up supporting Kasa-

⁷² Weissman, Stephen R. "What Really Happened in Congo: The CIA, the Murder of Lumumba, and the Rise of Mobutu." *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 4 (2014): 14–24. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24483553>.

⁷³ Hollway, Don. "The CIA's Cuban Air Force Battles Communists in the Congo." *Historynet* (2021). <https://www.historynet.com/the-cias-cuban-air-force-battles-communists-in-the-congo/>.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Lumumba, Patrice. "Radio Broadcast Message." Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1961, pp 37-38. <https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/lumumba/1960/09/radio.htm>

⁷⁶ Dan. "September 14, 1960 – Congo Crisis: Mobutu Sese Seko launches a military coup." September 14, 2021. <https://20thcenturywars.com/september-14-1960-congo-crisis-mobutu-sese-seko-launches-a-military-coup/#:~:text=On%20September%2014%2C%201960%20Mobutu%20Sese%20Seko%2C%20head,its%20independenc,e%20of%20Belgium%20on%20June%2030%2C%201960.>

⁷⁷ Abi-Saab, Georges. "The United Nations operation in the Congo, 1960-1964" New York : Oxford University Press, 1978. <https://archive.org/details/unitednationsopeooooabis>

Vubu and reappointed him as president while placing Lumumba under house arrest in early 1961. Lumumba's subsequent execution⁷⁸ following a dramatic escape from imprisonment saw the elimination of the strongest source of opposition to Mobutu and Kasa-Vubu's agenda.⁷⁹

Nevertheless, this incident sparked international outrage and added fuel to the flames of domestic division in the young Congo.

⁷⁸ Akwei, Ismail. "The chilling details of Patrice Lumumba's assassination and how he was dissolved in acid." Face2Face Africa. January 17, 2019. <https://face2faceafrica.com/article/the-chilling-details-of-patrice-lumumbas-assassination-and-how-he-was-dissolved-in-acid>.

⁷⁹ Kuklick, Bruce. "Killing Lumumba." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 158, no. 2 (2014): 144–52. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24640202>.

Past Actions

United Nations Intervention

On July 14th, 1960, the United Nations enacted Resolution 143 and called upon Belgium to completely withdraw its forces from the Congo under the supervision of peacekeeping forces.⁸⁰ Prime Minister Lumumba initially embraced foreign aid to eradicate the Katangan dissenters and reintegrate Katanga back into the Congo. However, the United Nations interpreted the resolution differently, and decided against quelling the rebellion as they would be violating national sovereignty and non-interference policies.⁸¹ The two parties' divergent opinions on the extent to which the UN could operate within the Congo stifled peacekeeping efforts and Katanga's tumult remained unresolved. This example exhibits the idealistic nature of deploying peacekeepers as not only is national sovereignty always a controversial and obscure obstacle, but the peacekeepers cannot act first in any violent situation. Lumumba's relationship with the UN worsened as he accused them of colluding with Tshombe due to the UN's perceived apathy, prompting him to turn to the Soviet Union for help.⁸²

Humanitarian Actions

The International Rescue Committee had worked in the DRC for over two decades at this point, but has ramped up its assistance since 2017 due to the deterioration of established security measures, Ebola, and Covid. Additionally, the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), which compiles reports for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, has already devised an Overview and Response Plan for 2022. The report categorizes and emphasizes the needs of 27 million Congolese people requiring humanitarian aid, as well as the additional 12.3 million unable to meet their basic needs.⁸³

⁸⁰ MacQueen, Norrie. *The United Nations, Peace Operations and the Cold War*. London: Routledge, 2017.

⁸¹ Ibid

⁸² Williams, A. Susan. *Who Killed hammar skjöld?: The UN, the Cold War, and White Supremacy in Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2017.

⁸³ "Democratic Republic of the Congo: Humanitarian Needs Overview and Response Plan 2022 at a Glance (February 2022) - Democratic Republic of the Congo." ReliefWeb, February 17, 2022. <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-humanitarian-needs-overview-and-response>.

Possible Solutions

Note: These suggestions are meant to be guiding forces, not instruction manuals for your response efforts throughout the duration of conference.

Humanitarian

Humanitarian solutions will likely arise primarily from the expansion of ongoing efforts with the needs of vulnerable populations. For example, addressing the lack of basic amenities such as safe drinking water, shelter, and food by relief efforts should be supported with long-term sustainable goals and plans. These include introducing proper irrigation and agricultural systems into disadvantaged communities, developing sustainable housing projects for civilians stuck in conflict zones, etc. Stable infrastructure for displaced persons should be complemented with reformations of the healthcare system and government procedures. This of course remains impossible without first establishing peace throughout the country by pursuing non-hostility pacts. The resources required for infrastructure implementation can be offered at the charity of more economically developed countries. Peacekeepers can also be in charge of distributing essential items to victims of the conflict.

Economic

It is extremely crucial to address Katanga's monopolization of the mining industry in Central Africa: the Katangan secession is not merely the construction of new geopolitical borders but is also defined quite distinctively by this radical economic breakaway. Depending on your country's stance, you may wish to find a way to maintain the status quo, incentivize Katanga to permit Congolese shares and investments, or simply wrest the market from Katanga back to the Congolese government. This may call for negotiations with the other Central African states, which heavily relies on the delegates to reach a compromise across the OAU.

Furthermore, delegates, regardless of their countries' reported stance on the secession, can also turn into or help seek foreign investors as an opportunity to involve third parties and revitalize microbusinesses in the entire region. The Congo has a vast supply of tropical fruit, petroleum, wood,

and other profitable goods that these businesses can capitalize on to elevate the economic situation of the entire region. Delegates can also form specific trade partnerships and agreements with those in their blocs and create economic blockades when crises transpire.

Political

It should be noted that economic sanctions should only be imposed as a last resort because such actions work counter to the spirit of compromise and collaboration fostered by MUNUC. Though it may be tempting and convenient to simply prompt NATO or the Warsaw Pact (depending on the country's bloc) to sanction those in the opposing entity, the crisis would remain unresolved, and prolonged conflict is obviously not desired. In other words, **avoid economic sanctions when coming up with solutions to this multifaceted issue.**

Though UN peacekeepers are encouraged to be dispatched as an impartial third party to monitor the situation and quell potential disputes, they should still be used with caution. Again, UN peacekeepers cannot act unless first aggressed upon, thus rendering them ineffective in some non-violent, but still antagonistic scenarios. There have also been instances of peacekeeping misconduct (e.g., victims are sexually assaulted, property is stolen or vandalized, etc.) that cannot be overlooked. Delegates must be sensitive to the fact that these third-party intermediaries are not always acting in the best interest of the civilians whom they are tasked with protecting.

Bloc Positions

Organization of African Unity Voting Committee Roster

Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Libya, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, and Uganda

Initial OAU Members Since 1963 Founding

Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, DR Congo, Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanganyika, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zanzibar

Introduction to Bloc Positions

Below are more the political affiliations of the international community than the OAU during the Congo Crisis. The OAU was not even founded until 1963, when prior events such as the assassination of Lumumba and the Katanga secession had already concluded. However, the Kwilu and Simba Rebellions against the Tshombe government and interim leadership would create further turmoil for the Congo. Despite historical restrictions of the OAU charter, we expect delegates to construct peaceful resolutions that promote economic prosperity and general welfare.⁸⁴ Do not feel confined by the options below — feel free to get creative with your partnerships/approaches.

1964-1965 Pro-Democratic Republic of the Congo

This faction is primarily supported by the United States, Belgium, and the United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC). While the Simba Rebels continued to commit numerous massacres throughout captured territory, ONUC was withdrawing personnel in the eastern part of the country. Unfortunately, most were stranded along with western missionaries, leading to them requesting UN

⁸⁴ Traugott, Mark. "The Economic Origins of the Kwilu Rebellion." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21, no. 3 (1979): 459–79. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/178542>.

peacekeeping assistance through rescue operations. The United States was against Mulelism and Maoist inspired Congolese revolutionaries, leading them to render aid to mercenary groups backed by the Congolese National Army (ANC). These particularly brutal mercenary groups hailed primarily from Central and South Africa were backed by the CIA. Belgium had also responded to the Simba Rebellion taking White hostages by deploying paratroopers with American planes.

1964-1965 Pro Kwilu and Simba Rebels

This faction is primarily supported by the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. Pierre Mulele had served under the Lumumba government and had also undergone military training in the Eastern Bloc, leading him to adopt Maoism and Mulelism. The second independence movement sought to rid the government of kleptocracy and any form of wealth inequality.⁸⁵ The rebels had founded the People's Republic of the Congo, occupying Stanleyville with its own president. This newly emerged state received arms supplies from the Soviet Union, China, and even Tanzania. Cuba sent around a hundred advisors to improve the Simba Rebels' tactics and doctrine.

Geography and Security Issues

Even though the OAU charter promoted non-interference, it was clear that rebel activities transcended artificial borders, which was feared to create problems on the continental scale. Another factor was mercenaries that hailed from South and Central Africa acted without an overseeing force.⁸⁶ Member states were inclined to agree that non-intervention was a security issue for every country and that *ad hoc* commissions were needed to create peaceful resolutions in this climate.

Disagreements and Neocolonialism

Every member state has different interests, and perhaps the Congo Crisis was too divisive for the fledgling organization. The OAU was divided between the Casablanca and Brazzaville groups, which

⁸⁵ Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges (2007). *The Congo, From Leopold to Kabila: A People's History*(3rd ed.). New York: Palgrave. ISBN 9781842770535.

⁸⁶Innovative Research Methods. Accessed September 5, 2022. <https://innovativeresearchmethods.org/the-organisation-of-african-unity-and-their-role-in-the-congo-crisis-why-did-they-fail-to-bring-about-a-solution-in-the-crisis/>.

resulted in unreliable policies towards the conflicting parties. Both sides had differing views towards Tshombe, with some viewing him as the rightful leader and others proclaiming him to be the murderer of Lumumba.⁸⁷ His very presence is so divisive that merely permitting him to be part of peace talks could be viewed as a betrayal of the OAU's liberation values against the forces of neocolonialism. Members should remain wary of their country's stance on Tshombe.

⁸⁷Innovative Research Methods. Accessed September 5, 2022. <https://innovativeresearchmethods.org/the-organisation-of-african-unity-in-the-historical-narrative-and-the-african-union-today/>.

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