

Historical General Assembly, 1991

HGA

gn Associates

s for
corporations

KLM



MUNUC 35

Model United Nations of the University of Chicago

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAIR LETTERS.....	3
HISTORY OF COMMITTEE	6
TOPIC: SOMALI CIVIL WAR	7
Statement of the Problem.....	7
History of the Problem.....	11
Past Actions	17
Possible Solutions	22
Bloc Positions	25
Bibliography.....	27

CHAIR LETTERS

Delegates,

Welcome to MUNUC 35 and welcome to this Historical General Assembly! This HGA will be delving into the 1992 Situation in Somalia, focusing on conflict resolution, state-building, and dealing with a complicated web of actors in a volatile region. I'm confident in our committee's ability to tackle this conflict from a variety of avenues!

To introduce myself; I'm Neha! I'm a third-year double-majoring in Public Policy and Data Science with a minor in South Asian Languages and Civilizations. This is my second year in MUNUC and last year, I was a moderator for the FDA committee with my co-chair this year, Shweta! I'm a part of all things MUN at UChicago: outside of MUNUC, I'm a member of the competing MUN team and an Under-Secretary-General for ChoMUN XXVI, our collegiate conference. Outside of MUN, I'm a member of the South Asian Students Association on campus and occasionally do some Indian classical dance!

As a part of this assembly, you all will be addressing many sensitive topics like the aftermath of violence and brutal regimes, as well as civil wars and international conflict. However, I hope that you all will focus your efforts on rebuilding and rehabilitating the post-conflict region in a multitude of ways; from cultural to economic to political, there are dozens of avenues you can take! My hope is that, through this conference, you all will gain a deeper understanding of an important part of history and an appreciation for the difficult task that is state-building post-conflict zones, taking this knowledge through your daily lives beyond MUNUC. I'm excited to meet all of you and look forward to our time together at MUNUC 35!

Best Regards,

Neha Sadasivan

nehasadasivan@uchicago.edu

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to MUNUC, and to our committee, the Historical GA, which will focus on the Somali Civil War. I'm Shweta, and I will be one of your co-chairs. To briefly introduce myself, I am a third year at the College double majoring in Sociology and Public Policy. I was born in India, but I grew up in multiple places including Taipei, Shanghai, Delhi, and a small town outside of Philadelphia. I am extremely involved in UChicago's MUNiverse—I am also chairing an urban development committee for our collegiate conference with your wonderful USG, and I am one of the Vice Presidents of our travel team. When I am not in class or doing MUN, you can find me giving campus tours for the admissions office or drinking an oat cappuccino!

Over the course of your weekend with us, we encourage you to consider the role of famine, culture, weak infrastructure, and colonial effects when drafting your resolutions and shaping your delegation's goals. In doing so, we hope you gain a well-rounded understanding of the complex situation within Somalia that is often not reported about in the news. More importantly, we hope you devise solutions that prioritize rehabilitation and creativity. Various factors were at play during the war, and I am excited to see how you all work through them!

As a gentle reminder, considering our committee will be set in a time of violence and oppression, it is vital that we speak with sensitivity and respect during the committee. All solutions on the floor must move Somalia in a positive direction, one that prioritizes rebuilding what has been lost and providing aid to those who have been harmed. Furthermore, being considerate of your fellow delegates' backgrounds and identities is essential whether that is inside or outside of the committee. If we see any rhetoric or behavior that is concerning, we will immediately shut it down. Tolerance and respect are our utmost priority (followed closely by having a great time!)

I look forward to getting to know you all, and I'm so excited to be able to work with you! I truly hope you enjoy this experience as a delegate as much as we did creating it. If you have any questions or concerns, don't hesitate to reach out to me!

Best,

Shweta Nanda

shwetananda@uchicago.edu

HISTORY OF COMMITTEE

Rather than simulating one of the subcommittees of the UN General Assembly (like SPECPOL or DISEC), this Historical General Assembly will be simulating the UN's General Assembly. As such, it is critical that all proposed solutions take a multi-faceted approach to fixing the situation in Somalia. Proposed solutions are not constrained to one issue area or committee scope (i.e. DISEC, SOCHUM, etc.). Instead, approach the problem from multiple perspectives, including but not limited to war and violence, the economy, political organization, and social issues. This background guide is meant to serve as a touchstone for the variety of issues that delegates should address in the solutions they present.

While this committee is a historical one, we have chosen to not have a "start date" for the committee's proceedings. While we understand that several changes to the situation in Somalia occurred in 1991, it is more important to focus on solving the overarching issues which led to the current situation. As such, delegates should not feel that it is prescient to know on what day certain groups declared, for example, the 1960 federation null. Instead, delegates can and should remove themselves from actual history to instead focus on debating solutions that will help Somalia move forward—irrespective of the "present" situation. Particularly for political solutions, delegates shouldn't focus on recognizing one faction or group. Rather, think about how political reform can successfully leverage the rich clan history of Somalia into a new system of government. As always, if you are concerned with how we will be handling the time of the committee, do not hesitate to reach out to the Chairs or USG with concerns.

TOPIC A: SOMALI CIVIL WAR

Statement of the Problem

Barre's Repressive Regime

Cold war politics changed ideologies within Africa, and during this period, Somalia turned socialist. The military leader turned President Mohamed Siad Barre installed a dictatorship, and although he built many schools and roads, he did it under a frightening regime. Persecution, torture, and unwarranted arrests were commonplace during his time in office. Analysis of the human rights situation in the country revealed killings of newly arrived refugees, state-sponsored terrorism against the Isaaq clan in the north, detentions, torture, rapes, and severe restrictions on movement and expression. Amnesty International went on to report that torture methods committed by Barre's government included beatings in contorted positions, simulated executions, and death threats.¹ Similar to other dictatorial governments in history, Barre's government passed a law that granted it the power to detain those who expressed negative views of the government and arrest them without due process. This was done, as the government claimed, out of concern for national security. This terror incensed many clans who formed identity-based armed groups and undertook guerilla operations to reclaim power. Nevertheless, those who were caught suffered horribly. It was estimated that over 50,000 civilians were killed by government forces in these conflicts.²

¹ "Somalia: A Human Rights Disaster," Amnesty International, August 4, 1992, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr52/001/1992/en/>.

² "Somalia: A Government at War with Its Own People," Africa Watch, January 1990.



General Mohammed Siad Barre³

Clan-based Warlordism

Within Somalia, clans serve as the bedrock of society and identity. Somalia is a fairly homogenous country—most people identify as African and Muslim. However, within the Somali ethnic group, there are many sub-clans based on lineage.⁴ As a result, clans are the primary factor for division within the country. After independence, every opportunity for peace has been blocked due to clan-based violence, which eventually ushered in the war itself. Even though clans were united in overthrowing Barre, the power vacuum meant that clans had to decide who would replace Barre, creating strife and leading to extended violence. Additionally, Barre's favor for certain clans over

³ Pedersen, Amund. 2018. "Kupp Og Kommuniststyre 1969-1978." Ndl.no. NDLA. January 12, 2018. <https://ndla.no/nb/subject:1:eoafaa8-cefd-481f-bf79-b45ad4d7c5e7/topic:3:182163/topic:3:166242/resource:1:185362/1173>.

⁴ "Somalia: Fall of Siad Barre and the Civil War," Mass Atrocity Endings (World Peace Foundation, August 7, 2015), <https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/somalia-fall-of-siad-barre-civil-war/>.

others destroyed the fragile peace agreements between clans that existed before his regime and left, in his wake, a violent and bitter landscape of clan-based violence. Power is also transferred within the country based on clan identity. Favors like jobs, weapons, and aid are offered to individuals accordingly, strengthening clan lines.⁵

Competition for Resources

In addition to clan dynamics and warlordism, natural resources played a key role in causing the Somali Ogaden conflict. Even before civil war erupted in Somalia, clans conflicted with a finite amount of natural resources in the area including water, livestock, and grazing land.⁶ The most fertile land in Somalia is concentrated in the South, where, historically, agro-pastoral clans resided. This land has historically been passed between clans through local mediation systems with no influence from the state, preventing conflict and violence between clans.

However, during Barre's regime, a new land-registration rule was instituted that transferred all property rights to the state and forced peasants and individuals to go through a lengthy legal process to attempt to reclaim their land. Most peasants could not afford legal fees to go through their process or were beaten out by wealthy businessmen. This consequently concentrated the most fertile and valuable land in the hands of a few wealthy, powerful men. Barre's regime attempted to utilize Somali land as a tool to succeed in the Ogaden War with Ethiopia. When they were defeated, the Barre government utilized land to further divide and sow conflict amongst Somali clans by unequally allocating resources to clans favored by the regime. As Barre's regime fell and the state deteriorated, conflict over land and resources only worsened.⁷

In the absence of a stable government, clan-based conflict over land reverted to traditional forms of resolution. However, without clan elders to mediate across clan lines, clashes became increasingly violent and destructive. The Rahanweyn and Darood clans fought over their historical ownership of southern fertile land. From Mogadishu in the north, the Hawiye clan journeyed south to attempt to

⁵ Afyare A Elmi, "Understanding the Sources of the Somali Conflict," *Third World Resurgence*, 2011, pp. 15-20.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ "Land, Property and Housing in Somalia | UN-Habitat" (UN-Habitat), accessed October 10, 2022, <https://unhabitat.org/land-property-and-housing-in-somalia>, 88-100.

claim valuable land for themselves. These three major clans continued to fight over the finite resources in southern Somalia, with no peaceful or non-violent resolution in sight.⁸

Current Foreign Intervention

The terror of Barre's regime raised red flags for the international community, prompting an organized strategy of foreign intervention known as UNOSOM, or the United Nations Operation in Somalia. While UNOSOM aimed to address the political and social turmoil in Somalia at the time, it made more headway in alleviating humanitarian concerns and did not successfully solve the power vacuum that was created after Barre's regime fell. A late-1992 United States-led intervention with increased forces and supplies established an "uneasy peace" and pushed supplies in areas suffering from famine,⁹ but still was not able to quell clan-based violence and warlordism and did not have an impact on reducing violence. Despite the increased military presence, few positive impacts were felt from UNOSOM, calling into question the efficacy of such foreign intervention plans.¹⁰

⁸ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Refworld | Victims and Vulnerable Groups in Southern Somalia," Refworld, accessed October 10, 2022, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a8092.html>.

⁹ "Somalia - Civil War | Britannica," accessed October 10, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Somalia/Civil-war>.

¹⁰ Sally Healy and Mark Bradbury, "Endless War: a Brief History of the Somali Conflict," *Endless war: a brief history of the Somali conflict* | Conciliation Resources, February 1, 2010, <https://www.c-r.org/accord/somalia/endless-war-brief-history-somali-conflict>.

History of the Problem

Colonial Legacies and Earlier Foreign Influence



Somalia in 1915¹¹

At the turn of the 20th century, during the scramble for Africa, colonial powers divided the Somali peninsula into five different regions. The northwest regions and Northeast Frontier District (NFD) were taken by Great Britain. France took over what is now independent Djibouti, and Italy controlled southern Somalia. During this period, Ethiopia was rewarded with the western portion of Somalia for its cooperation with the colonial powers. After colonizing Somalia itself, Great Britain handed over many Somali territories to Ethiopia and Kenya, fueling resentment within the Somalian state. Indeed, it was because of this slight that Somalis started to mobilize for independence against colonial powers. After Somalia became independent in 1960, it spent its efforts regaining lost regions as opposed to improving current regions. The current collapse of the Somali state is also tied

¹¹ Review of *File:1915 Ww1 - Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Gobroon, Kenadiid & Diiriye Guure Kingdom.png*. 2021. Wikimedia Commons. MediaWiki. October 8, 2021. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1915_ww1_-_Anglo-Egyptian_Sudan,_Gobroon,_Kenadiid_%26_Diiriye_Guure_kingdom.png.

to foreign interventions—during the 1977 Ethio-Somali war over the 'Ogaden' region, military intervention from the Soviet Union and Cuba led to Somalia's defeat in the war.¹²

Somali Clan Structures

In Somalia, clans make up the backbone of the social fabric. These clans have a complex structure and hierarchical system consisting of kinships and social contracts based on patrilineal lineage. Each clan has a segmented lineage system consisting of the clan family, or the upper limit of clanship, and the clan itself, which encompasses many mag-paying groups. Mag-paying groups are the most important level of social organization for Somalis; men are defined by their membership in specific mag-paying groups and their descent from a specific lineage. In each mag-paying group, Somalis abide by customary laws known as xeer. Xeer obliges members of mag-paying groups to support each other in political and jural responsibilities and are based on precedents, making them capable of continued evolution. One of the most critical components of xeer law is the establishment of collective responsibility. Under xeer law, individual perpetrators of crimes do not face responsibility on their own. Rather, the entire mag-paying group becomes responsible for their actions and consequences from other clans.¹³

It is almost impossible to define and identify clan groups because they are constantly changing, but the types of clans can largely be divided into two categories; nomadic and agro-pastoral. Nomadic groups are "united by a common, mythological perception of direct lineal descent from the forefather Samaal and the household of the prophet Mohammed."¹⁴ Nomadic clans include the Darood, consisting of 3 main groups: the Ogaden, Marehan, and Harti, who are considered the strongest pan-Somali nationalists; the Hawiye, which has 2 main subdivisions: the Habar Gedir and Abgal; the Dir, consisting of the Issa, Gadabursi, and Biymaal; and the Isaaq. The Isaaq face controversy about their clan status from neighboring clans and are the primary inhabitants of Somaliland. Agro-pastoral clans include the Mirifle, the Digil, and the Rahanweyn. Their structure differs from the nomadic structure and is much more rooted in villages and home states. Many ethnic minorities exist outside of the traditional clan structure, including the Sab. The Sab are

¹² Elmi, "Understanding the Sources."

¹³ UNHCR, "International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing Somalia," September 2022, 15-18.

¹⁴ Austrian Red Cross ACCORD. "Clans in Somalia," December 31, 2009, <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4b29f5e82.pdf>.

composed of members of various outcast groups who practice a variety of skills and are therefore grouped based on occupation. Other ethnic minorities include the Bantu, who reside in the southern areas of Somalia and practice agriculture, and the Barawanis and other coastal minorities.

The rights of members of groups and clans are protected by force. Due to xeer law's application of collective responsibility, each clan's tenure of rights depends on their ability to defend themselves and their fighting capabilities. Revenge killings which acted as retribution for acts of humiliation were widespread and rampant. However, women, children, and elders are not allowed to be affected by acts of violence in principle. This system discriminates against smaller clans and minorities, who lack the unilateral ability to defend themselves against larger clan warfare. As a result, weak and scattered clans are driven to seek protection from larger clans through contractual agreements, which may end up harming them in other ways from resource extraction or exploitation.¹⁵

¹⁵ Austrian Red Cross ACCORD. "Clans in Somalia," December 31, 2009.



Map of regions in Somalia¹⁶

Civil Tensions in Somalia

After Somalia was defeated in the Ogaden war, its military conflict against Ethiopia, the Barre regime was strained. The failure of a military coup in 1978 and the oppressive regime run by Barre led to the formation of two primary opposition groups, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM). SSDF was associated with the Majeerteen clan located near the Mudug region in central Somalia. By contrast, SNM was tethered to the Isaaq clan in Northern Somalia. Nevertheless, both organizations took on guerilla operations from Ethiopian bases given their disdain for Barre. The guerilla activities of both organizations and pressure from

¹⁶ University of Texas – Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection: Somalia (Political), 2002. http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/somalia_pol02.jpg.

Barre's Western supporters compelled the Somali regime to try mending its relationship with neighbors like Kenya and Ethiopia. Ironically, the peace accord drafted between Ethiopian leader Mengistu Mariam and Barre incensed the clan-based organizations who believed they would lose their Ethiopian home bases. Both groups replaced their guerilla operations with direct attacks on the government. Soon after, clan-based guerilla operations exploded across Somalia to fight Barre's rule. Their efforts were successful. In January of 1991, the United Somali Congress led a massive uprising that overthrew Barre, evicting him from power.¹⁷

Many of these clans had access to weapons on the outskirts of the country, allowing them to carve out spheres of influence during the power vacuum. In fact, the north of Somalia, under SNM control, declared independence shortly after Barre's exit from office. The activities of clan militia severely damaged the landscape and health of Somalia and its people. Clan warfare destroyed grain-producing regions and water bodies, inviting widespread famine. Any humanitarian efforts instated to relieve the food shortages were undercut by clan looting. Over 4.5 million people, accounting for over half the population, were threatened with malnutrition during this time. A report estimated that approximately 300,000 people died since November 1991, 1.5 million lives were at immediate risk, and almost one million Somalis sought refuge in neighboring countries due to the interminable threats of violence and famine.¹⁸

Economy and Political Organization

Economy

Somalia remains one of the poorest countries in the world, barely surviving on an income of foreign aid, remittances, and informal economic activities. Approximately 60 percent of the economy is rooted in agriculture.¹⁹ Moreover, agricultural production is not tied to crop farming but livestock raising, which is not nearly as profitable. Three types of agricultural activity compose the Somali economy: pastoralism which involves raising goats, sheep, camels, and cattle, traditional sector

¹⁷ "Somalia - Civil War | Britannica."

¹⁸ United Nations Peacekeeping. "UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I) - Background," Accessed July 11, 2022. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unosom1backgr2.html>.

¹⁹ John Darnton, "Somalia Tries to Live by Both the Koran and 'Das Kapital,'" *The New York Times*, October 11, 1977, sec. Archives, <https://www.nytimes.com/1977/10/11/archives/somalia-tries-to-live-by-both-the-koran-and-das-kapital.html>.

agriculture which involves rain-fed farming and irrigated farming, and market-oriented farming which involves the cultivation of rice, cotton, bananas, mangoes, and papayas on plantations.²⁰

From 1969 to the early 1980s, Somalia instituted a system of “scientific socialism” inspired by the Cold War dialogue at the time. This socialist system resulted in the nationalization of banks, insurance firms, large industrial companies, and oil companies. Furthermore, state-owned enterprises, farms, and trading companies were established. This experiment significantly weakened the economy as it isolated the country from global competition. When the military regime collapsed, the economy was fully decimated and has yet to recover. The country has few power stations, no dams to support large-scale industrial production, and its banks solely provide loans. Somalia has experienced minimal economic growth since its inception due to such severe underdevelopment.²¹

Political

Prior to the outbreak of civil war in Somalia, clans handled political decisions disparately and individually. Interclan affairs were handled by committees of clan elders and chiefs, which differed across the northern and southern regions. In the north, clans had contractual agreements that specified fines for specific breaches of law. However, in the south, lineages were more wary to agree to contractual obligations but were open to agreements based on blood-wealth size, grazing, and other arrangements.²² However, following the fall of the Barre regime, the four main clans established a power-sharing agreement known as the “4.5 formula.” The 4.5 formula divides the Somali population into 5 groups; 4 of which constitute major clans Hawiye, Darood, Dir, and Rahanweyn. The last group includes all other clans and minorities not included and is worth half of the value of the other groups in terms of political representation.²³

²⁰ “Somalia - Economy | Britannica,” accessed October 10, 2022, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Somalia/Economy>.

²¹ Ibid.

²² “Sociopolitical Organization - Somalis.” n.d. [Www.everyculture.com](http://www.everyculture.com). Accessed September 10, 2022. <https://www.everyculture.com/Africa-Middle-East/Somalis-Sociopolitical-Organization.html>.

²³ Jama, A. 2018. Review of *The 4.5 Formula*. *Ajamarabi* (blog). March 7, 2018. <https://ajamarabi.medium.com/the-4-5-formula-6fo820646cc5>.

Past Actions



Tanks in Somalia as a part of UNOSOM²⁴

Historical international involvement in Somalia centered around a massive unilateral UN operation: UNOSOM, or the United Nations Operation in Somalia, which began taking shape in early 1992.²⁵ As Barre's regime fell in 1991, a power struggle emerged between two warring clan lords, Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed.²⁶ In January of 1992, the UN-led talks between all major clan lords in Somalia (except, Aideed, who refused to participate) about reducing arms in the region.²⁷ While some leaders were wary of agreeing to reduce their arms presence, all leaders expressed interest in a UN-led reconciliation effort. As a result, at the end of the month, UN representatives

²⁴ Review of *File:UNOSOM Somalia Tanks.jpg*. 2007. Wikimedia Commons. MediaWiki. June 2, 2007. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:UNOSOM_Somalia_tanks.jpg.

²⁵ United Nations Peacekeeping. "UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I) - Background," Accessed July 11, 2022. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unosom1backgr2.html>.

²⁶ Annabel Lee Hogg, "Timeline: Somalia, 1991-2008," *The Atlantic*, December, 2008, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/12/timeline-somalia-1991-2008/307190/>.

²⁷ United Nations Peacekeeping, "UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I) - Background."

negotiated an immediate secession of hostilities and sent in a technical team to prepare plans for monitoring the precarious ceasefire.²⁸ The international community recognized the short-term nature of the ceasefire and sought to establish long-term peace in the region, so on April 24, 1992, the UN passed Resolution 751 establishing UNOSOM, or the United Nations Operation in Somalia.²⁹ UNOSOM aimed to protect the ceasefire while establishing systems for long-term stability through installing 50 military observers in the capital, providing protection and security for UN personnel and equipment to protect against attack, and escorting deliveries of humanitarian supplies to those in need.³⁰

At first, UNOSOM's efforts seemed to be helping the famine as well as the security situation in Somalia. However, several months after the program's creation the UN Secretary-General reported that humanitarian efforts were continuously undermined by gang warfare and attacks on ships and shipments and recommended deploying 4 additional UN security units.³¹ The UN then passed Resolution 775 establishing 4 zone headquarters of UNOSOM and adding additional personnel and equipment.³² By September, the total UNOSOM strength was 4,219 personnel.³³ With the addition of more UN personnel, focus turned to bolstering humanitarian efforts with the creation of the UN 100-Day Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance.³⁴ The plan highlighted actions to prevent famine and death and focused on 8 main objectives:

1. Additional food aid
2. Expansion of supplementary feeding infrastructure
3. Health services and measles immunization
4. Access to clean water, sanitation, and hygiene services
5. Bolstered shelter materials and housing

²⁸ United Nations Peacekeeping, "UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I) - Background."

²⁹ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 751. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/751>

³⁰ United Nations Peacekeeping, "UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I) - Background."

³¹ United Nations Peacekeeping, "UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I) - Background."

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

6. Delivery of seeds, tools, and animal vaccines with food aid
7. Prevention of refugee outflows from Somalia
8. Establishment of long-term institutions

This increased focus on humanitarian efforts left the political landscape to continue declining. In October of 1992, there was still no central government established in Somalia, and Mogadishu was divided by rival militias and factions.³⁵ Widespread looting plagued the region and the de-facto authorities refused UN aid deployment and attacked UNOSOM troops. 3,000 Somalians were still dying every day.³⁶



UNOSOM truck convoy in Mogadishu³⁷

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Review of *File:Convoy trip in Mogadishu.jpg*. 2007. Wikimedia Commons. MediaWiki. July 18, 2007. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Convoy_trip_in_Mogadishu.jpg.

Horrified by the situation, United States Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger indicated that the United States would take the lead in organizing member states to ensure UN relief efforts were delivered properly amidst the instability in the region.³⁸ At this point, the UN was left with a finite number of options for action. They could continue and intensify UNOSOM efforts with no guarantee of success, turn to shows of force and violence in Mogadishu, or establish a new countrywide action by a group of member states. UN officials chose the third option, and UNITAF was created.³⁹

Deployed in December of 1992, UNITAF, or the Unified Task Force, was a coalition of 24 member-states led by the U.S. with the express goal of establishing a secure environment for urgent humanitarian assistance.⁴⁰ UNITAF worked hand in hand with UNOSOM's efforts to aid the humanitarian and political situation. While UNITAF did succeed in securing the main city centers in Somalia and allowing the free flow of humanitarian aid, it had several main issues. Being a U.S.-led mission, UNITAF failed to consider the incredibly unique social structures already existing in Somalia.⁴¹ Clan politics and war leaders operate very differently from traditional Western forms of government, and these nuances were largely overlooked in the UNITAF plan along with problems unique to Somalia and integral to the core of the crisis. Additionally, while UNITAF eventually succeeded in allowing humanitarian aid, "it was pursued firstly as an exercise in conflict resolution between powerful individuals, without addressing the policies each pursued which led to Somalia's continuing devastation."⁴² The complicated nature and causes of the Somali Civil War, Barre's regime, and the social fabric of Somalia were not adequately taken into account when creating UNITAF, leading to blanket solutions that did not address the root causes of the conflict and left the region vulnerable to further instability and violence.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Human Rights Watch. "SOMALIA FACES THE FUTURE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY," April, 1995, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/somalia/>.

⁴² Human Rights Watch, "SOMALIA FACES THE FUTURE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY."



U.S. military forces in Somalia through UNITAF as part of Operation Restore Hope⁴³

⁴³ Review of *File:US Military in Somalia 1992.jpeg*. 1992. Wikimedia Commons. MediaWiki. December 7, 2007. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:US_Military_in_Somalia_1992.jpeg.

Possible Solutions

At the onset of the Somali Civil war, the country is in a state of disarray. Somalia is politically torn and economically underdeveloped. One economic solution proposed to alleviate the dire economic situation is a mechanism for debt relief. When the country's central government collapsed in 1991, the country began to accumulate unpaid debt obligations to other member states and international organizations. Over the period from 1980 to 1990, foreign indebtedness grew tremendously in Somalia. As of 1990, Somalia's outstanding external debt has risen to 277% of its GDP.⁴⁴ A domestic or global mechanism that allows Somalia to cancel or relieve portions of the debt it owes would be beneficial. Doing so would allow Somalia to focus its financial resources on its large impoverished population while growing its economy.

Another economic solution to relieve the economic situation in Somalia is the creation of regional economic zones to foster small pockets of economic growth. Central governments are responsible for preventing violent conflicts like the civil war itself, but they are also responsible for maintaining economic activity and supplying critical public goods like roads, schools, and law and order. This endeavor is currently not possible because Somalia entirely lacks a central government. As a result, it may make sense to carve out smaller geographic regions and focus on their individual economic development.

This economic decentralization has the potential to improve the efficiency of public service delivery.⁴⁵ Oftentimes, local governments possess a better understanding of local preferences and access to resources. This proximity gives local governments an informational advantage over the central government in deciding which goods are required to aid their citizens. Jurisdictions that cover smaller geographical areas also experience a better internalization of public costs and benefits, improving the equal distribution of economic goods and services.

⁴⁴ "Debt Cancellation for Somalia: The Road to Peace, Poverty Alleviation and Development," Somalia NGO Consortium, 2018,

https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/eurodad/pages/517/attachments/original/1590683684/Debt_Cancellation_for_Somalia.pdf?1590683684.

⁴⁵ Mousse Sow and Ivohasina Razafimahefa, "Fiscal Decentralization and the Efficiency of Public Service Delivery" (International Monetary Fund), accessed July 11, 2022, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1559.pdf>.

Decentralization can not only benefit the citizens of Somalia economically but it can also benefit them politically. Decentralization can increase the accountability between the government and its citizens.⁴⁶ The geographic proximity of public institutions to citizens is especially critical in social sectors like education and healthcare. During Barre's regime, it was common for Somalians not to receive the adequate care they needed. For this reason, one solution may be to expand the branches of larger federal ministries by setting up smaller cabinets across the country. Alternative solutions to decentralize political power and distribute social services may be building a network of daycare centers alongside local non-profit organizations or having partnerships with the United Nations for drop-in healthcare clinics across Somalia. Restructuring efforts that rebuilds systems of power across Somalia rather than concentrating power in one place will serve its citizens well.

Aside from UNOSOM and these limited solutions, little has been done to salvage the country of Somalia. While these solutions present some hope of restructuring the country for the better, other issues continue to prevail. The gap between the central and state governments will continue to hinder long-term economic growth even though it may provide some short-term respite. How can this dilemma be accounted for? Debt relief may remove the financial burden on the Somalian people but it will not grow the economy. What solution will?

⁴⁶ Ibid.



US Marines greet civilian relief workers they will be escorting⁴⁷

⁴⁷ "A Village Elder Greets Marines Who Are Serving as Escorts to Civilian Relief Workers Delivering Food Supplies to His Village, Located near Baidoa. The Marines Are in the Region as Part of the Multinational Relief Effort Operation Restore Hope." 1992. The U.S. National Archives. December 17, 1992. <https://nara.getarchive.net/media/a-village-elder-greets-marines-who-are-serving-as-escorts-to-civilian-relief-bcf3job>.

Bloc Positions

NATO Bloc

Member states who are a part of NATO are in favor of political stability to establish individual freedoms and civil rights. The lack of a central government in Somalia is one of the primary interests of this group. NATO members are also pro-intervention especially if human rights are being violated or humanitarian aid needs to be delivered imminently. The possibility of intervening in Somalia is motivated by humanitarian concerns but also by NATO members' desire to maintain their presence in the region. Regarding the economy, NATO members hope to further capitalism, remove regulations on private industry, and bolster free markets across the globe. NATO members are weary of the socialist advances of the Eastern bloc and are ready to push back on any proposed action by this group.

Former Eastern Bloc

Member-states who form the Former Eastern Bloc emphasize the need for economic reforms and are in favor of socialist or communist economic structures. The lack of a central government in Somalia along with its dire economic situation may present an opportunity for these member-states to spread their economic systems in an effort to help Somalia. They support state-led industry initiatives as opposed to private ownership of industry and resources, and they may help Somalia to do so by taking control of its industries. Overall, these member-states are against unilateral action by the U.S. or NATO and instead focus on preserving territorial integrity. Still, these member-states support building military power and are in favor of assisting Somalia in building independent strength and power outside of international influence.

Non-Aligned Movement Bloc

Member states who are a part of the non-aligned movement are largely in the Global South. They follow an anti-foreign interventionist approach and seek to promote the development of multilateral ties and connections between members within the movement. With regards to the situation in Somalia, these member-states are likely to favor inter-movement solutions without involvement

from the NATO bloc or the Former Eastern Bloc. Additionally, these member-states focus heavily on maintaining sovereignty and territorial integrity as many recently gained independence from colonial powers. These member-states support long-term solutions that focus on strengthening individual countries without foreign presence.

Bibliography

Austrian Red Cross ACCORD. "Clans in Somalia," December 31, 2009, <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4b29f5e82.pdf>.

"A Village Elder Greets Marines Who Are Serving as Escorts to Civilian Relief Workers Delivering Food Supplies to His Village, Located near Baidoa. The Marines Are in the Region as Part of the Multinational Relief Effort Operation Restore Hope." 1992. The U.S. National Archives. December 17, 1992. <https://nara.getarchive.net/media/a-village-elder-greets-marines-who-are-serving-as-escorts-to-civilian-relief-bcf3ob>.

Darnton, John. "Somalia Tries to Live by Both the Koran and 'Das Kapital.'" *The New York Times*, October 11, 1977, sec. Archives. <https://www.nytimes.com/1977/10/11/archives/somalia-tries-to-live-by-both-the-koran-and-das-kapital.html>.

"Debt Cancellation for Somalia: The Road to Peace, Poverty Alleviation and Development," Somalia NGO Consortium, 2018, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/eurodad/pages/517/attachments/original/1590683684/Debt_Cancellation_for_Somalia.pdf?1590683684.

Elmi, Afyare A. "Understanding the Sources of the Somali Conflict." *Third World Resurgence* No. 251/252, 2011.

Healy, Sally, and Mark Bradbury. "Endless War: a Brief History of the Somali Conflict." *Endless war: a brief history of the Somali conflict | Conciliation Resources*, February 1, 2010. <https://www.c-r.org/accord/somalia/endless-war-brief-history-somali-conflict>.

Historpedia, "The Causes of Somalia's Civil War (Fall 2102)," Accessed July 11, 2022, <https://sites.google.com/a/umn.edu/historpedia/home/politics-and-government/the-causes-of-somalia-s-civil-war-fall-2102>.

Hogg, Annabel Lee. "Timeline: Somalia, 1991-2008," *The Atlantic*, December, 2008, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/12/timeline-somalia-1991-2008/307190/>.

Human Rights Watch. "SOMALIA FACES THE FUTURE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY," April, 1995, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/somalia/>.

Isse, Hodan, and Sagal B.H. Musa. "Somalis Need More than an Election to Lift Them out of Economic Despair." *Foreign Policy*, February 5, 2021. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/05/somalia-election-conflict-women-economic-development/>.

- Jama, A. 2018. Review of The 4.5 Formula. Ajamarabi (blog). March 7, 2018. <https://ajamarabi.medium.com/the-4-5-formula-6fo82o646cc5>.
- Mousse Sow and Ivohasina Razafimahefa, "Fiscal Decentralization and the Efficiency of Public Service Delivery" (International Monetary Fund), accessed July 11, 2022, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1559.pdf>.
- Pedersen, Amund. 2018. "Kupp Og Kommuniststyre 1969-1978." Ndl.no. NDLA. January 12, 2018. <https://ndla.no/nb/subject:1:eoafaa8-cefd-481f-bf79-b45ad4d7c5e7/topic:3:182163/topic:3:166242/resource:1:185362/1173>.
- Pham, J. Peter. "No Hollywood Ending to Piracy off Somalia ." TribLive , <https://archive.triblive.com/opinion/featured-commentary/no-hollywood-ending-to-piracy-off-somalia/>.
- Review of File:1915 Ww1 - Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Gobroon, Kenadiid & Diiriye Guure Kingdom.png. 2021. Wikimedia Commons. MediaWiki. October 8, 2021. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1915_ww1_-_Anglo-Egyptian_Sudan,_Gobroon,_Kenadiid_%26_Diiriye_Guure_kingdom.png.
- Review of File:Convoy trip in Mogadishu.jpg. 2007. Wikimedia Commons. MediaWiki. July 18, 2007. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Convoy_trip_in_Mogadishu.jpg.
- Review of File:UNOSOM Somalia Tanks.jpg. 2007. Wikimedia Commons. MediaWiki. June 2, 2007. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:UNOSOM_Somalia_tanks.jpg.
- Review of File:US Military in Somalia 1992.jpeg. 1992. Wikimedia Commons. MediaWiki. December 7, 2007. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:US_Military_in_Somalia_1992.jpeg.
- "Sociopolitical Organization - Somalis." n.d. Www.everyculture.com. Accessed September 10, 2022. <https://www.everyculture.com/Africa-Middle-East/Somalis-Sociopolitical-Organization.html>.
- "Somalia - Civil War | Britannica." Accessed October 10, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Somalia/Civil-war>.
- "Somalia - Economy | Britannica." Accessed October 10, 2022. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Somalia/Economy>.
- "Somalia: Fall of Siad Barre and the Civil War." Mass Atrocity Endings. World Peace Foundation, August 7, 2015. <https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/somalia-fall-of-siad-barre-civil-war/>. "The Scarcity of Land in Somalia," Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2009, https://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/occasional_paper_III_04-09.pdf.

Third World Resurgence, "Understanding the causes of the Somali conflict," July/August, 2011,
<https://www.twn.my/title2/resurgence/2011/251-252/covero4.htm>.

United Nations Peacekeeping. "UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I) -
Background," Accessed July 11, 2022.
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unosom1backgr2.html>.

United Nations Security Council, Resolution 751. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/751>

University of Texas – Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection: Somalia (Political), 2002
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/somalia_polo2.jpg.