



United Nations Security Council,
1966 (UNSC)

MUNUC 34



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CHAIR LETTER

Hi!

My name is Debbie Adewale and I'm so excited to be your chair for UNSC at MUNUC 34. I'm a fourth year double majoring in Biology and Public Policy, and I'm on the pre-med track. It will be my third time serving as an executive after having been an AC for MUNUC 31 on the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, and chairing the Security Council at MUNUC 32 and MUNUC 33. In my spare time, I'm the President of UChicago's Model UN Travel Team, run a committee for the UChicago collegiate conference, ChoMUN, conduct research in a cancer biology lab on campus, and am a board member for the Organization of Black Students.

I'm so excited to bring fresh Security Council perspectives to the Biafran War. This will be the first time in three years that the Security Council at MUNUC will be historical, and we hope that this allows delegates to fully realize the immense power of international groups working together. As your chair I hope to guide debate in a manner that produces thoughtful content and creates solutions. From the dais I will also be sure to navigate smoothly between the general assembly and crisis portions of the committee and ensure all delegates are keeping up with the pace of the committee.

As a first generation Nigerian, the Biafran War and its effects on modern day Nigeria are close to my heart, and I hope to see substantive solutions created that will address the humanitarian needs of the region, and ideally attempt to steer the country in a better direction than seen before. That being said, several issues in the region are extremely sensitive and should be handled with the utmost respect and empathy. It is easy to feel distant and disconnected from these conflicts, but I urge you to stop and think about the trauma that comes with civil war and how to address it with the respect it deserves. Juliet, Nyah, and I have high expectations for all delegates in this committee and we have outlined them in the *Reminder From the Dais* that directly follows our letters.

That being said, I want this weekend to be fun and filled with great memories and great learning. If you have any questions, concerns, want to chat about biological research or your favorite sitcom, don't hesitate to reach out. I look forward to meeting you all and having an incredible weekend!

Best,

Debbie Adewale

Chair, United Nations Security Council, 1966

adewaled@uchicago.edu

CRISIS DIRECTOR LETTER

Hello Delegates!

Welcome to the United Nations Security Council of MUNUC 34! My name is Juliet Goswami, and I look forward to meeting you this February as your crisis director (in person!). I am a third-year at the University of Chicago with a major in Public Policy Studies and a minor in Computer Science. I competed as a delegate for seven years before coming to UChicago. I was the crisis director for MUNUC 33's UNSC, and was an AC on the same committee the year previously. I also research for an undergraduate think tank, focusing on urban and housing policy particularly in Chicago, and work with a pro-bono political consulting group. I usually spend my free time on Youtube cooking videos and telling people that I will definitely watch that TV show they're talking about sometime soon.

I look forward to hearing your ideas surrounding the Biafran Civil War. This topic is the context for many of the socioeconomic and geopolitical conflicts today and is also considered to be one of the greatest failings of the United Nations Security Council. I encourage you to familiarize yourself with the history of the war and to be prepared with possible solutions. Truly understanding the motivations of the actors involved will help you come into the conference armed with innovative, constructive solutions to combat these conflicts. We recognize that this is a difficult task, especially considering that the professionals themselves at the time clearly chose the wrong path, but we believe that with hindsight, hard work, and creativity, you will all be well-prepared for this topic.

As your crisis director, I plan to facilitate a weekend of enriching, entertaining debate as well as resolution and directive writing. The structure of this committee will contain continuous crisis elements in every session with the goal of writing a resolution that addresses the topic in the background guide. Given the nature of the Biafran conflict, Debbie, Nyah, and I expect all of our delegates to read and fully understand the background guide's *Reminder from the Dais*.

Please reach out if you have any questions about the committee. You can reach me at jgoswami@uchicago.edu.

I am very excited to meet you for a fun and educational weekend!

Best,

Juliet Goswami

Crisis Director, United Nations Security Council, 1966

jgoswami@uchicago.edu

CRISIS DIRECTOR LETTER

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the United Nations Security Council of MUNUC 34! My name is Nyah DeValle, and I cannot wait to meet all of you this February as one of your crisis directors! I am a third-year at the University of Chicago. I am majoring in Global Studies and minoring in Human Rights and French. In my first year at UChicago, I was an assistant chair for the UNSC, and this past year, I was the moderator for the UNSC. Outside of MUNUC, I have worked for nonprofits such as AllChicago, Every Voice Coalition, and City Year, all of which have an emphasis on a certain aspect of human rights. I am also a tour guide for the University, so I can spout some pretty interesting facts about UChicago at a moment's notice! In my free time, I like to bake, watch any of the new Netflix reality shows that are slowly melting my brain, and try to keep my many plants alive (I will become a plant mom if I try hard enough)!

I am very interested in hearing about your perspectives on the topic of the Biafran Civil War. Many conflicts that Nigeria is facing today can be traced back to this civil war. For example, ethnic tensions, economic issues, and ongoing suffering continues today as a result of the Biafran Civil War. It is considered by many to be one of the greatest failings of the United Nations Security Council. To be most prepared for the UNSC, it is best to familiarize yourself with the history of the war and to come prepared with alternative solutions. We recognize that this is a difficult task, especially with the many failures of the members of the UNSC during the actual Biafran War, however, we believe that you will all be well-prepared for this topic by thinking creatively and researching alternate opportunities.

As your crisis directors, Juliet and I will plan to facilitate a weekend of enriching, entertaining debate and resolution and directive writing. We will work toward the goal of you leaving with a feeling of accomplishment within the committee. We also want you to learn as well as have fun in a professional setting. The structure of this committee will contain continuous crisis elements in every

session with the goal of writing a resolution that addresses the topic in the background guide. Given the nature of the Biafran conflict, Debbie, Juliet, and I expect all of our delegates to read and fully understand the background guide's *Reminder from the Dais*.

Please feel free to reach out if you have any questions or concerns about the committee. You can reach me at devallenyah@uchicago.edu.

I am very much looking forward to meeting you and having a fun, educational weekend!

Best,

Nyah DeValle

Crisis Director, United Nations Security Council, 1966

devallenyah@uchicago.edu

REMINDER FROM THE DAIS

Delegates, it is easy to remove ourselves from the historical horrors that unfolded in Nigeria. In this committee and throughout the background guide, we will discuss the conflict in clinical, diplomatic terms. At some point these discussions can feel impersonal. It is difficult to imagine the extent of even one family's trauma that has compounded over decades, and even more difficult to do so in a way that respects their suffering.

In some ways, we are asking you to take on a critical challenge. We are asking for your compassion and objectivity—for both the humanity to grieve with those suffering and the detachment to analyze their political systems critically. In this committee we ask that you only focus on concrete solutions, while in our hearts, we constantly weigh the impact of these solutions. It is a balance that even seasoned diplomats struggle with—as evidenced by the contemporary Security Council's own lack of response to the Biafran War—and yet this dais will expect that of you in every speech that you give and clause that you write. We hold you to this standard because we believe you are capable of it. Year after year, we have been astonished by the maturity, the creativity, and the empathy of delegates when addressing problems that have baffled the international community for decades. For MUNUC 34, we ask you to direct that empathy to the Biafran-Nigerian Civil War and its compounding humanitarian conflicts, which include famine and, it is argued, genocide.

This means two things. First, it means that we expect the highest level of respect in discussing this issue. Debate on how to deal with violence and how to best provide assistance and refuge to those affected by it, will be welcomed. Taking advantage of crimes against humanity in committee or crisis, on the other hand, will not be tolerated by the dais. Second, it means that if at any point this weekend, you want to talk about the Nigerian Civil War in a context removed from Model UN, competition, and the Hyatt, you need only ask. Above everything, this weekend is an opportunity for you to grow as citizens of the world: to acknowledge but never accept the unspeakable horrors that have confronted students just like us, half a world and half a century away.

While the dais will focus on analysis and facts for the rest of this background guide, we sincerely hope you pause every so often to allow yourself to digest and come to terms with the situation. Your dais is here to support you in any way we can; we will always be available over email for whatever questions or concerns you may have.

Best,

Debbie Adewale

Juliet Goswami

Nyah DeValle

COMMITTEE STRUCTURE AND MECHANICS

Introduction

At its best, Model United Nations is a simulation that may not be highly realistic, but nonetheless is a critical learning experience for all those involved. Juliet, Nyah, and Debbie hope that every delegate in this committee walks away with a meaningful understanding of the contradicting mandates that diplomats can face; the struggle of balancing multiple perspectives in policy; how to maximize payoff for all parties while minimizing damages, future tensions, and unintended consequences. We can see the effects of this war and the Security Council's avoidance of it fifty years later, but any action (or inaction) you take must account for these potential issues. From this simulation we hope delegates will learn to question all sides of an issue and critically examine the underlying reasons for a country's and the Council's policy. Additionally, delegates should focus on how to balance both the macro-impacts of international policy with the micro-level consequences that real people will face as a result. Lastly, we hope that the committee recognizes there are no correct solutions and there are no final solutions. Hindsight can only get you so far; international policy is a difficult realm that requires solutions that continue to evolve to fit the needs of the situation.

Single Topic

The UNSC at MUNUC 34 will cover only one topic: the historical conflict of the Nigerian Civil War. The rest of this background guide will cover several subtopics pertaining to the lead up to the war and the internal and external tensions surrounding it, but it will not delve into another topic. As executives, we hope that only having one topic will encourage delegates to thoroughly research all sides of the issue and come into committee with comprehensive solutions. Delegates should come into the committee prepared to discuss all subtopics covered in the background guide as there is no ambiguity about what the committee will cover.

Position Papers

This year the UNSC will have a unique structure for position papers. Rather than the usual several paragraphs that provide a general outline of the problems of the committee and a brief overview of the country solutions, Juliet, Nyah, and Debbie ask that delegates submit position papers that are simple bulleted lists of possible solutions that they think their country would support on the issue of the different points of the conflict; consider potential solutions that would prevent the outbreak of the war, and also consider solutions to the potential humanitarian and geopolitical fallout from a civil war in Nigeria. We feel this is the best way to ensure that all delegates enter the committee with flexible solutions that they can use in the paper writing and debate process, without relying too heavily on one solution or stance. Delegates who submit positions papers will receive emails from Juliet, Nyah, and Debbie containing brief feedback on their solutions, either telling them this would be appropriate and should be further expanded upon in committee or receiving constructive criticism that will allow them to retool their possible solutions before coming into committee.

Resolution Elements

The resolution-side of this committee will simulate policy-making in the UNSC: the careful, calculated process by which resolutions are proposed and adopted or struck down. There are two main skills that we will simulate: debate during the creation of these policies and lobbying for those policies once they have been decided.

Speeches simulate the debate surrounding the creation of each policy considered by the UNSC. Generally speaking, there are two types of effective speeches in this committee. The first is meant to broadcast your country's position on a topic. The second is meant to critique another country's policies. Policy speeches explain how the policy you are advocating for should be implemented, and why it is necessary to solve the problem at hand. Ideally, the policies in these speeches are feasible, relevant, and leave the world and your country better off. Proposing a policy of this caliber requires careful research into case studies and similar policies, with careful attention toward how those approaches can be tweaked to maximize impact in the current situation.

The second type of speech opposes a policy proposed in a speech. The best critical speeches are direct, but respectful. Clearly stating a pitfall with a solution will not be perceived by the dais as hostile, unless those pitfalls are conveyed in a manner that is disrespectful. No delegate will walk into the committee room on Thursday with a perfect solution. This means that every policy proposed will be workshopped and debated. We will argue over whether one consequence is less significant than another, and for the sake of time and clarity, those arguments should be concise and clear. Critical speeches are the main way in which this debate happens, and as long as criticisms are grounded in country policy, research, and respect, the dais will encourage them.

A speech that is dramatic or flashy but doesn't actually keep people's attention, won't serve the purpose of the speech. Likewise, a speech that is full of content, but misses the pulse of the debate also fails to shape the direction of the room. *Whatever your style of speaking, you should be able to shape the discussion in the room to your advantage.* But these are generalizations. Debate in the committee room is a conversation, and conversations don't always happen in a stiff, two-sided back and forth. There is always room for style and thoughtful comments, whatever form those might

take. This dais will listen to every word you say, and consider it in terms of your sincerity, research, verve, and understanding of the flow of debate in the room.

Resolutions, as you can read from the MUNUC delegate training resources, as well as learn if you attend the pre-conference MUNUC training sessions, are often the culmination of a conference. They are the committee's response to the challenges it faces, and the combined solutions of multiple policy proposals that have been debated and negotiated over throughout the conference. UNSC resolutions, in particular, should focus on directly addressing the Nigerian-Biafran War, with the secondary (but still crucially important) concern of mitigating future problems that might arise in the region.

Crisis Elements

If the resolution process is meant to simulate the creation of policies, the crisis elements in this committee will simulate real-life reactions to those policies. Delegates who have never competed in crisis committees should come prepared to learn and have fun interacting with a much more dynamic type of Model United Nations than is found in traditional GA committees. Delegates who have done crisis committees before should throw out everything they think they know about this style of committee; the UNSC demands a unique style of crisis that strikes a different tone than most crisis committees on the highschool circuit.

Crisis on MUNUC's UNSC involves taking policies that are being considered in the room and simulating what the real-life reactions would be to those policies. For situations as complicated and as delicate as those debated in UNSC resolutions, every policy, no matter the scale or subject matter, has a definite and immediate impact on the ground. The decision to send food aid to an unstable region might prompt a cascade of effects that result in the completely unintended consequence of injury to peacekeepers and aid workers as well as the continued starvation of the intended recipients of the food aid. In the UNSC, crisis forces delegates to confront the consequences of their actions, and realize that there is never a correct answer or a policy that is one hundred percent beneficial. Instead, crisis elements map out the myriad of consequences stemming from a single word, in a single clause, of just one resolution. Succeeding in crisis means strategically choosing and enacting the set of consequences that is most beneficial to your country and the situation that was on the ground in Nigeria in the 1960s.

On a less abstract level, crisis in the UNSC at MUNUC 34 will occur in stages. In the first stage, the crisis directors will accept resource building notes. In these notes, delegates may write to the backroom (where the crisis staffers work), asking for clarification on their country's current assets in the region that are relevant to the Nigerian Civil War, and write to build resources that will help them further their country's goals. During this stage delegates should also feel free to clarify their country's policies in the region.

Examples of valuable resources include media capabilities, connections with local political parties, food aid, troops that are familiar with the region's geography, ties to the government, etc. By no means is that an exhaustive list. The best crisis delegates are those who take novel, creative approaches in building influence and power in a region. In resource notes, delegates will request resources that will be approved or denied by the crisis staff based on their feasibility, realism, and research into what types of resources would reasonably be available to their countries. The dais recommends having a goal in mind when asking for each resource; delegates should be able to answer the following questions when writing each resource note:

- Why does my country need this resource now?
- What long-term goals are served by acquiring this resource?
- Is it reasonable for my country to have the means to acquire this resource?
- Are there any resources that must be established first, before it is possible to acquire this resource?

Once delegates are familiar with writing resource notes, and each country has established resources, crisis will move on to the execution stage. At this point, delegates may use their resources to execute actions that affect the committee. The goal of an "execution note" is to meaningfully change the situation that the committee is grappling with. In the case of MUNUC 34's UNSC, that means affecting the conflict in Nigeria. We expect you all to think through the potential fallout from your execution notes, as these may affect the front room, where you and your fellow delegates are still crafting solutions.

There are a variety of actions that are appropriate for the committee; we expect delegates to impress us with their creativity and effectiveness in shaping the conflict, and wresting power from each other and from the crisis staff. However, under no circumstances will any action that leads to, encourages, or implies gender violence, racism, ethnic cleansing, or violations of human rights be tolerated. Creating change or gathering power does not mean committing atrocities or actions that you would be ashamed to debate in a history class. In fact, much of your job in this committee is to avoid the atrocities that occurred in reality.

Some execution notes result in crisis updates, where the delegate's actions during crisis sessions are so relevant and directly related to committee that they are introduced into the committee for debate by the crisis directors. Those execution notes then become crisis breaks that the committee then attempts to address alongside the standard set of problems plaguing the Nigerian-Biafran War. Crisis breaks are manifestations of a delegate's crisis notes in the committee room; they often alter the circumstances that the committee is operating under to solve the problem, or change the problem entirely. In the context of MUNUC, crisis breaks serve to help delegates understand the impact of their actions on the world in real-time.

The UNSC can take action on crisis breaks through directives, which are short (one or two pages-long) sets of operative clauses that directly address the crisis update at hand. Similar to resolutions, directives attempt to solve the problems brought up in the crisis update, but unlike resolutions, they have neither preambulatory clauses nor solutions to long-term problems. Directives are intended as targeted actions for the UNSC to take in response to an emergency created by the crisis update.

Juliet, Nyah, and Debbie have mapped this transition from resource building notes to full execution notes so that delegates can engage in crisis regardless of experience. Hopefully, the lessons learned in crisis regarding the inadvertent perils of policy-making translate into more refined resolutions.

Timeline

The sessions will take place chronologically, beginning in 1964 after the general strike and the Nigerian national election, and continuing sequentially through the secession of Biafra and the resulting civil war. Delegates should be prepared to build blocs and debate policies on Thursday, and acquire crisis skills leading up through Friday. The committee will flip between generally assembly and crisis each session. Sessions I, III, and V will be General Assembly while Sessions II and IV will be crisis. We look forward to meeting each of you, and can't wait to see what direction the committee moves in! For a full outline of the UNSC's daily timeline, please refer to the UNSC page under "committees" on the MUNUC ³⁴ website.

TOPIC A: THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

History of the Problem

Brief History of the Nigerian Land and Ethnic Groups Through the 19th Century

Long before Nigeria as we know it today had its borders drawn by European colonizers, powerful African kingdoms reigned and wrestled for control over the region. These independent states were largely made up of separate ethnic groups that served as precursors for the players of the modern period. Each of these empires had its own set of religious, economic, social, and cultural customs and practices. The Benin (of the Edo people, not today's Republic of Benin which is its own state to the west of Nigeria), the Oyo (of the Yoruba people), the Fulani (of the Fulani people), the Kanem-Bornu (of the Kanuri peoples), and the Hausa (of the Hausa people) kingdoms dominated the region politically and economically.¹²³ However, other kingdoms, including the Nri Kingdom (of the Igbo people), existed during this time period as well.⁴ In the 15th and 16th centuries, territory constantly changed hands in the western region of what would become Nigeria as well; a notable example is Ife, a Yoruba city state with strong religious and political traditions, which eventually became a part of the Oyo Empire and whose traditions were absorbed into many Yoruba states.⁵ This was common practice during the risings and falls in West Africa; many of the modern ethnic divisions in Nigeria are grounded in these historical kingdoms and these distinct ethnic groups, which in and of themselves were incredibly diverse and prone to intracompetition. Each of these kingdoms had its own distinct identity and were often rivals; their legacies affected future kingdoms and, eventually, Nigerian states.

The Kingdom of Nri held significant political power and territory in Igboland, the homeland of the Igbo people in the eastern region of modern Nigeria, from roughly 900 AD until the mid 16th

¹ Encyclopedia Britannica Online. s.v. "Western Africa" <https://www.britannica.com/place/western-Africa>.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Encyclopedia Britannica Online. s.v. "Nri Kingdom" <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nri/>.

⁵ Encyclopedia Britannica Online. s.v. "Ile-Ife" <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ile-Ife>.

century.⁶ It is considered to have created the foundation of Igbo culture. It was ruled by priest-kings; the state did not recognize slavery (and thus did not participate in the Atlantic slave trade), and its economy centered around internal and external trade of agricultural goods.⁷ However, its fall was largely attributed to its failure to engage in the slave trade. Subsequently, the region segmented into the hands of different kingdoms and rulers. The Igbo were often kidnapped and sold in the Transatlantic Slave Trade. Importantly, while the Igbo usually were under control of other kingdoms and empires for most of history, the ground-level administration did maintain its decentralized and largely democratic political system, and fostered a culture of animosity between the Igbo and the ruling kingdom.⁸ The lack of a well-recorded history and a historically powerful ethnic empire created the narrative that the Igbo are stateless, a lens that those in power during colonial and Republic rule maintained when considering mid-century Igbo nationalism.⁹

The emergence of the Trans-Saharan trade in the mid 15th century made a strong impact on the regions' factions, particularly on the Hausa and Fulani kingdoms in the northern region of modern day Nigeria. This trading corridor not only allowed for a strong cultural exchange with Islamic empires from the North (particularly the Kanem-Bornu Empire), but it also expanded the Trans-Saharan slave trade.^{10 11} The Fulani adopted Islam early, and as Sahelian communities, shared many traits with the Hausa.¹² The Hausa kingdoms grew increasingly wealthy from this trading corridor, and began adopting many Fulani customs, to the point that by the 20th century, the Hausa and Fulani societies were significantly integrated.¹³ These kingdoms developed an authoritarian and largely non-participatory political structure. This state was largely organized around conservative Islamic

⁶ "Nri Kingdom."

⁷ Lovejoy, Paul E. *Identity in the Shadow of Slavery*. London: Continuum, 2009.

⁸ Shillington, Kevin. "Education, Higher, in Postcolonial Africa." Essay. In *Encyclopedia of African History*. p-z, Index, 674. New York: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2005. 674

⁹ Eze, Okonkwo & Omeje, Paul & Chinweuba, Uchenna. The Igbo: "A Stateless Society". *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*. 5. 10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n27p1315. 2014.

¹⁰ Zainab, Sulaimon. "Islam in AFRICA: The Story OF Hausa Fulani Empire." *SalamWebToday*, March 12, 2021. <https://today.salamweb.com/islam-in-africa-the-story-of-hausa-fulani-empire/>.

¹¹ Kao, Philip. Trans-Saharan Africa in World History, *South African Historical Journal*, 65:4, 664-666, DOI: 10.1080/02582473.2012.759997, 2013. 664

¹² Department of the Arts of Africa, Oceania, and the Americas. "The Fulani/Fulbe People." *metmuseum.org*. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, October 2002. https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/fula_2/hd_fula_2.htm.

¹³ Ochonu, Moses E. *Colonialism by Proxy: Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria*. Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2014. Accessed August 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt16gzcd>.

emirs who reported directly to the Sultan: the supreme authority on political and religious matters. During and after the Fulani Wars, which started in 1804 as a result of the power vacuum left by the weakening Kanem-Bornu Empire, the older Hausa kingdoms were overthrown and replaced by the Sokoto Caliphate which maintained this style of governance.¹⁴ Slavery was an essential component of the Caliphate economy with almost half of the state's population being enslaved, though enslaved people could reach high positions in society and own their own property. They were also very connected to the Atlantic and Trans-Saharan slave trades, which was a major source of income for the kingdom.¹⁵ This state continued in prosperity (though not as prosperous as its southern Igbo and Yoruba neighbors) until the early 20th century, upon the British annexation of Nigeria. The Oyo Empire was the dominant Yoruba power that came into power in the 1300s, overtaking the other great Yoruba power of the time, the Ife, by the 1600s. It maintained territory in the western part of modern Nigeria, and began its decline in the late 1700s until its ultimate demise in 1896.¹⁶ Its extremely complex—and successful—administrative, military, and political systems ensured the Empire's longevity. The king, also known as the Alaafin, exercised great power, but the political system had a series of checks and balances. The Alaafin was elected by a council of nobles, and the kingdom's detailed administration emphasized local control. Additionally, while these elected monarchs wielded great authority, the leaders were subject to the approval of their constituents. The leaders, including the Alaafin, were regularly compelled to commit ritual suicide if they demonstrated incompetence or otherwise unacceptable governing practices.¹⁷ The Oyo society allowed for social mobility and was generally prosperous, very connected to the Trans-Saharan Trade. However, after a series of weak Alaafins in the mid-1700s, a cascade of vassal states and tenuously-held territories revolting in the early 1800s, continued invasions by Sokoto Caliphate forces in the mid 1800s, and finally European colonization in the late 1800s, the Oyo Empire saw its downfall.¹⁸

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Tambo, David C. "The Sokoto Caliphate Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 9, no. 2 (1976): 187-217. Accessed August 21, 2021. doi:10.2307/217564. 187

¹⁶ Encyclopedia Britannica Online. s.v. "Oyo Empire" <https://www.britannica.com/place/Oyo-empire>.

¹⁷ Adesina, Olutayo. "The Alaafin in Yoruba History, Culture, and Political Power Relations." HNet. Humanities and Social Sciences Online, June 25, 2018. <https://networks.h-net.org/node/73374/announcements/1960018/alaafin-yoruba-history-culture-and-political-power-relations>.

¹⁸ Otunola, Ibitomi Ibiwumi. "Fall of the Oyo Empire: Causes, Consequences and Lessons for Modern Day Nigeria." *Voice of International Affairs*, February 23, 2021. <https://internationalaffairsbd.com/fall-oyo-empire-causes-consequences-lessons-modern-day-nigeria/>.

British Colonization

European influence in the region began to expand with the rapid growth of the Transatlantic Slave Trade. The British were one of the largest exporters of enslaved people out of West Africa throughout the 16th to 19th centuries.¹⁹ In the first two centuries, Europeans provided an expanded market for the African slave trade but did not enter the continent for fear of disease and resistance from African kingdoms.²⁰ British forces had only set up small forts and settlements in West Africa by the early 1700s. However, upon passing the Slave Trade Act in 1807, which prohibited British citizens from engaging in the slave trade, the British began exerting increased levels of control in West Africa. The British government first began lobbying European and African powers to stop engaging in the slave trade as well.²¹ Some of the antislavery treaties signed by the British and West African powers contained clauses that forced the latter to accept increased British power over the region.²² The British redirected their economic interests in the region and invested heavily in the palm oil and other agricultural industries (these interests grew to include petroleum after the British and fossil fuel companies embarked on oil expeditions in the 1940s).²³ To wield greater power over their West African businesses, the British established the Lagos colony in what is now southern Nigeria, from which the government expanded their influence in the surrounding area.²⁴

British merchants used this interest and the foothold of Christian missionaries to begin establishing full-fledged colonies in the 1850s. In 1879, British merchants created The Royal Niger Company to exploit resources along the Niger River.²⁵ They quickly set up a base in Nigeria, and they considered

¹⁹ The National Archives. "Slavery and the BRITISH Transatlantic Slave Trade." The National

²⁰ Inyang, Anietie & Bassey, Manasseh. "Imperial Treaties and the Origins of British Colonial Rule in Southern Nigeria," 1860-1890. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* (2014). 5.10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n20p1946.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Encyclopedia Britannica Online. "Nigeria." <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/The-arrival-of-the-British>.

²⁴ Omosini, Olufemi. "ALFRED MOLONEY AND HIS STRATEGIES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LAGOS COLONY AND HINTERLAND, 1886-1891." *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 7, no. 4 (1975): 657-72. Accessed August 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41971220>.

²⁵ Pearson, Scott R. *The Economic Imperialism of the Royal Niger Company*. Stanford, Calif: Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ, 1972. 69-72.

themselves to be the dominant economic, political, and military force in the region.²⁶ This was a result of their signed treaties with local rulers that gave them sovereignty over the land and exclusive access to trade, effectively pushing out other European competitors and punishing uncooperative locals.²⁷

In the late 19th century, the British launched a series of increasingly aggressive military campaigns. The British attacked the Ijebu Kingdom (of the Yoruba people) for its trade barriers in 1892, and once they toppled this power, they easily swept through the rest of Yorubaland.²⁸ In 1897, they gained control over the remnants of the Benin Empire. Originally, the British hired Hausa mercenaries to fight wars for them in the North, but from 1900 – 1902, they waged many battles to capture Hausa-Fulani territory, replacing the local emirs and the Sultan with British-approved candidates.²⁹ In 1901, they began their attempts to conquer Igboland, but had difficulty ensuring that the conquered villages remained under their control due to the decentralized organization of the Igbo—this difficulty resulted in regular British patrols and missions to the region to maintain rule.³⁰ Beginning in 1900, the area officially consolidated into two protectorates,³¹ which were unified by the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria (1914–1954)³² and its successor Federation of Nigeria (1954–1960)³³.

The British originally employed an indirect rule, allowing the existing political systems to stand by installing their chosen leaders and maintaining executive authority. They pushed for infrastructure expansion, conscripting local people to do work by threatening imprisonment.

²⁶ Afeadie, Philip Atsu. "Spoken Reminiscences of Political Agents in Northern Nigeria I." *History in Africa* (2017) 34: 1–30. doi:10.1353/hia.2007.0000.

²⁷ Inyang.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ubah, Chinedu N. "The British Occupation of the Sokoto Caliphate: The Military Dimension, 1897-1906." *Paideuma* 40 (1994): 81-97. Accessed August 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40341677>.

³⁰ "The Nature of the British Conquest of Igbo Land. Compiled by Senator Iroegbu." OBLONG MEDIA. Duruebube, November 2, 2017. <https://oblongmedia.net/2017/11/02/the-nature-of-the-british-conquest-of-igbo-land-compiled-by-senator-iroegbu>.

³¹ "Northern Nigerian Protectorate (1900-1914)." DEAD COUNTRY STAMPS AND BANKNOTES, n.d. <http://www.dcstamps.com/northern-nigeria-1900-1914/>.

³² "Nigeria Profile - Timeline." BBC News. BBC, February 18, 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13951696>.

³³ Cowan, L. Gray. "Federation for Nigeria." *International Journal* 10, no. 1 (1954): 51-60. Accessed August 21, 2021. doi:10.2307/40198090.

As the British gave little consideration as to the ethnic divisions within their colony when they drew its borders, they split their administration into three regions tied by economic interest but little else: the Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Yoruba in the West, and the Igbo in the East. These three regions were separate, but the North remained far more culturally distinct from the south (the East and West).³⁴

In all three regions, the British used local leaders to enforce their direct rule. They allowed the Hausa-Fulani to keep their religious and cultural identity intact but pushed Western and Christian tradition on the other regions. Economic ties strengthened these three regions, but the British actively discouraged intermixing and often exploited infighting to keep the regions in line. This perhaps inadvertently contributed to the rise in Southern Nigerian nationalism.³⁵

In creating this artificial state, the British united the three regions against each other; by the 1920s, the southern region united under a regionally novel type of nationalism that was influenced by European and American nationalist philosophies and religious traditions.³⁶ These ideas were discussed in professional and academic associations throughout Southern Nigeria that splintered along ethnic lines—this movement was particularly poignant among the Igbo, who previously lacked a sense of ethnonationalism. The first political parties, the National Council of Nigerians and Cameroon (NCNC),³⁷ the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP),³⁸ and the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) had a similar fate.³⁹ Unions acted as an important means of political organization following World War II, but also fell apart under regional (and, by nature, ethnic) tensions as well.⁴⁰

³⁴ Afeadie.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Encyclopedia Britannica Online. "National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons." <https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Council-of-Nigeria-and-the-Cameroons>.

³⁸ Encyclopedia Britannica Online. "National Democratic Party." <https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Democratic-Party-political-party-Nigeria>.

³⁹ Arifalo, S. O. "THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE NIGERIAN YOUTH MOVEMENT, 1934 — 1941." *The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs* 13, no. 1 (1986): 59-76. Accessed August 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45342049>. 59.

⁴⁰ Orr, Charles A. "Trade Unionism in Colonial Africa." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 4, no. 1 (1966): 65-81. Accessed August 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/159416>. 67.

The Yoruba political organization, which was later a political party, the Action Group (AG) formed in the Western region in 1951. The Action Group pushed for Yoruba statehood and independence from colonial rule and supported Yoruba irredentism in the other regions.⁴¹ Beginning in the 1940s when the emirs allowed a small group of Western-educated Nigerians to form the Northern People's Congress (NPC) to provide a counterweight to the Action Group, Northern political activists aimed for Northern independence and maintenance of Northern society.⁴² By 1950, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), originally formed as a more radical and modern peer of the NPC, had already splintered.⁴³ The NCNC, created by the future first Nigerian president and man of Igbo descent, Nnamdi Azikiwe, was perceived as distinctly Igbo nationalist due to its founder's ethnicity.⁴⁴

A series of constitutions slowly gave the Nigerians more and more power under British colonial rule. The 1922 Clifford Constitution allowed the Southern Nigerians to elect four representatives to an advisory legislative council with limited powers, but still failed to adequately represent the colonized populations.⁴⁵ In 1946, the Arthur Richards Constitution established a unified advisory legislature for the North and South, but it unofficially drove a deeper wedge between regional interests as they competed for the legislative seats.⁴⁶ Further iterations expanded the legislature and strengthened regional self-administration, deepening the divides between the North, East, and West.

In 1957, the Eastern and Western regions were granted full internal self-government, and the Northern region was granted the same power two years later (this delay was allegedly at their own request—they wanted time to catch up with the more modernized and educationally advanced Southern regions).⁴⁷ In 1958, under pressure from all three regions' governments, and given the

⁴¹ Encyclopedia Britannica Online. "Action Group" <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Action-Group-political-party-Nigeria>.

⁴² "Northern People's Congress." Oxford Reference. ; Accessed 21 Aug. 2021. <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100239410>.

⁴³ Abba, Alkasum. *The Northern Elements PROGRESSIVE Union and the Politics of Radical Nationalism in Nigeria 1938-1960*. Zaria, Nigeria: The Abdullahi Smith Centre for Historical Research, 2007. 8.

⁴⁴ Encyclopedia Britannica Online. "Nnamdi Azikiwe." <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nnamdi-Azikiwe>.

⁴⁵ "Hugh Clifford Constitution: WEST-AFRICAN Constitutional Development." Nigerian Scholars, January 31, 2019. <https://nigerianscholars.com/tutorials/west-african-constitutional-development/hugh-clifford-constitution/>.

⁴⁶ "Arthur Richards Constitution: WEST-AFRICAN Constitutional Development." Nigerian Scholars, January 31, 2019. <https://nigerianscholars.com/tutorials/west-african-constitutional-development/arthur-richards-constitution/>

⁴⁷ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Nigeria."

contemporary wave of African independence, the British declared that Nigeria would become an independent state in the British Commonwealth on October 1st, 1960.⁴⁸

1960 – 1966

When Nigeria achieved its independence, the extreme disunity among the regions manifested itself in governmental representation. Worried of being politically and economically subjugated by the more prosperous and educated South, the North argued for a political system in which the regions would remain divided, yet with a majority controlled by the North.⁴⁹ Additionally, when the British first colonized Nigeria, the ethnic majorities were strong, but by 1960, there was significant intermixing between the regions, especially in cities.⁵⁰

As the sector with the most land and over half of the of the country's population, the Muslim Hausa-Fulani of the North won the plurality of the parliament's seats and the prime minister's seat under the NPC and Abubakar Balewa.⁵¹ The Christian Igbo of the East captured the second largest number of seats under the NCNC, and Azikiwe was relegated to a largely ceremonial role. These parties originally formed an alliance, and the left-wing opposition formed under the Yoruba's AG party.⁵² A faction of the AG argued that the Yoruba were losing out on business opportunities to the Igbo, and sought to expand the Yoruba's role in the national government; this created internal strife within the West, and the prime minister declared martial law, arresting the leaders of the AG and diminishing the power of the party.⁵³

In 1963, the nation declared itself a federal republic distinct from the British Commonwealth. Azikiwe became the first President of Nigeria, but again had a largely ceremonial role in comparison to the Prime Minister Balewa. A fourth region, the Mid-Western Region, was established for the Edo-

⁴⁸ Federal Research Division, Country profile, Nigeria § (2008).

⁴⁹ Campbell, Amb. John. "Why Nigeria's North South Distinction Is Important." HuffPost. HuffPost, May 25, 2011. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-nigerias-north-south-_b_817734.

⁵⁰ Olawoyin, "Historical Analysis of Nigeria–Biafra Conflict" (1971), pp. 137–139.

⁵¹ "Elections in Nigeria." AFRICAN ELECTIONS DATABASE. Accessed August 21, 2021. <https://africanelections.tripod.com/ng.html>.

⁵² Encyclopedia Britannica Online. "Action Group."

⁵³ Siollun, Max (2009). Oil, Politics and Violence: Nigeria's Military Coup Culture (1966-1976). Algora, 15.

majority in that land, but it wielded less political and economic power than its three sister states.⁵⁴ The 1964 elections were delayed in some Southern districts as they boycotted the elections when there were large discrepancies between the census names and the voter rolls. The parties ran in two general alliances (North vs. South), and the NPC and its allies (NNA) won a significant majority of the parliament seats.⁵⁵ Nigerians and international players alike lampooned the elections for being fraudulent and manipulated through violence. During this time, the Yoruba parties split, with the more conservative wing (NNDP) joining the NCP and the AG joining the NCNC. The AG leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, was arrested—to his supporters, it appeared to be without cause. This, in addition to NNDP members appeared to win easily in AG strongholds, causing riots in the West.⁵⁶ This unrest and distrust in the electoral process set the stage for the 1966 coups and the subsequent Civil War.

Conclusion

The ethnic tensions that would eventually manifest themselves in the Nigerian-Biafran Civil War were deeply rooted in the history of West Africa. These tensions were only exacerbated by British colonial rule, which cared little for the damage their borders and means of administration had on Nigerian relations. Their indirect rule set clear advantages for the Hausa-Fulani of the North and sowed even greater division and regional nationalism. The political and economic legacy of colonialism cannot be overlooked when addressing the coups, the Civil War, and the humanitarian fallout of these events.

⁵⁴ Encyclopedia Britannica Online. "Bendel" <https://www.britannica.com/place/Bendel>.

⁵⁵ Anglin, Douglas G. "Brinkmanship in Nigeria: The Federal Elections of 1964–65." *International Journal* 20, no. 2 (June 1965): 173–88. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002070206502000203.174>.

⁵⁶ "33. Nigeria (1960-present)." *Political Science*. University of Central Arkansas. Accessed August 21, 2021. <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/nigeria-1960-present/>.

Statement of the Problem



Given that this is a historical UNSC, the format of this section is going to be a little different. Our committee will begin with the 1966 military coups and the declaration of Biafran secession in May 1967. As such, this section will outline what *actually* happened, in addition to establishing the main drivers and effects of the Civil War. The goal of this committee is to create resolutions and directives that *avoid* these disastrous humanitarian and geopolitical consequences. The events that historically occurred may or may not actually be a part of debate and crisis—it all depends on you! Consider this section a jumping-off point, not a blueprint, for your own solutions to this difficult set of problems.

Origin of the Conflict (1964 – 1966)

As was discussed in greater detail in *History of the Problem*, the legacy of British colonization of the region and historical tension between the different ethnic groups set the stage for the Nigerian Civil War. The likely fixed 1964 elections exacerbated these pre-existing tensions, and internal violence had escalated to a point of no return by January 1966.

On January 15, 1966, Nigerian military officers (mostly Igbo) overthrew the Nigerian government for its 'corrupt ways'; they killed Prime Minister Balewa, several senior Northern politicians, and several high-ranking officers. The coup leaders declared martial law in the North, and upon accepting the leadership, Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi accepted leadership and suspended the Nigerian Constitution.⁵⁷ During this time, the Ironsi government attempted to ban political parties and put in place several provisions that would guarantee this "temporary" regime for several years.⁵⁸ In response, anti-Igbo pogroms swept through the North from May to September, perpetrated by Northern military officers and civilians. Whether or not these actions were officially sanctioned is unclear, but somewhere between 3,000 – 30,000 people of Igbo or other Southern ethnic ancestry were killed.⁵⁹ The number of Igbos who fled to the East is similarly unclear, but estimates range from 150,000 to 1,000,000 people.⁶⁰ During an interim period between these waves of violence, Northern military officers successfully launched a counter coup. Aguiyi-Ironsi was killed and Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon assumed the position of Head of State. Gowon anticipated a Southern (particularly Eastern) secession, and decreed that the four regions would be split into 12 states to allow greater political autonomy to minority ethnic groups, who themselves feared persecution from Igbo-led governments. As such, non-Igbo ethnic groups now found themselves in the majority in

⁵⁷ "How First Coup Still Haunts Nigeria 50 Years On." BBC News. BBC, January 15, 2016. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35312370>.

⁵⁸ Okupu, Ugbana. "THE POLITICS OF STATE CREATION AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR." *Transafrican Journal of History*, vol. 11, 1982, pp. 147–166. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24328538. Accessed 21 Aug. 2021. 154.

⁵⁹ Agbibo, D. (2013). Ethno-religious Conflicts and the Elusive Quest for National Identity in Nigeria. *Journal of Black Studies*, 44(1). 3-30.

⁶⁰ World Peace Foundation. "Nigeria: Civil War." *Mass Atrocity Endings*, August 7, 2015. <https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/nigeria-civil-war/>.

their own states and did not want to secede; this became an important motivator for Federal Nigeria in the war.⁶¹

We will be beginning our committee action at this flashpoint. The regional conflict is at the brink of exploding into a war, but it has not begun yet. The UNSC is still in the position of managing humanitarian crises and enacting policy that will either prevent or mitigate this conflict.

Remember, Chapter VII of the UN charter allows the UNSC to intervene when “there is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.”⁶² The job of this committee is to mitigate and/or resolve these conflicts without offending the sovereignty of Nigeria. These are some considerations that the UNSC must take into account when choosing whether or not to enter this conflict.

Igbo Pogroms and Refugees

As established above, the coup and countercoup triggered widespread and—if not state-sanctioned, then at the very least state-ignored—violence against Igbos and other Eastern ethnic groups in Northern and Western Nigeria. Longstanding ethnic tensions exacerbated by “the British colonial administration in Nigeria [that] had cast the Igbo in a very bad light”⁶³ primed the Nigerian powder keg, but regional upheaval and turmoil lit its fuse. Four waves of anti-Igbo pogroms occurred in 1966, resulting in as many as 30,000 people killed.⁶⁴ This indiscriminate violence included women and children, who were uninvolved in politics. Firsthand accounts describe door-to-door mobs that searched for anyone of Eastern origin. There is some disputed evidence that this violence was planned with the intent of wiping out all Igbos and Easterners living in the North.⁶⁵ Regardless, the government did not have a strong enough response to stop the violence from occurring.⁶⁶ In

⁶¹ Agbibo, 3-30.

⁶² “UN Charter Chapter 7” 26 June 1945. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7>.

⁶³ Korieh, Chima J., “Biafra and the Discourse on the Igbo Genocide” (2013). History Faculty Research and Publications. 145. https://epublications.marquette.edu/hist_fac/1458. 8.

⁶⁴ Agbibo, 3-30.

⁶⁵ Korieh, 6.

⁶⁶ World Peace Foundation. 2015

retaliation for this violence, some Northerners living in Port Harcourt (an Eastern city) were massacred. Recounts and exaggerations of these attacks led to continuing waves of violence on both sides. By some estimates, over 1 million Igbos fled toward the South, creating a massive refugee crisis.⁶⁷ The UNSC has a chance to provide aid and potentially alleviate this conflict.

Confidence in Elections

Much of this conflict stemmed from allegations that the 1964 election was not free and fair. These concerns included the blocking of Eastern candidates from ballots, the purging of voter rolls, and voter intimidation. While UN election monitoring was not officially sanctioned by the UN until 1991, participation rates of outside organizations picked up in the 1960s upon the countries' request for election observers that could either validate or reveal problems with election processes.⁶⁸

Oil Security

For many international actors, especially the P5 actors like Britain and the United States, securing the Nigerian oil source was of utmost importance. Because most of the oil in the state was in the Eastern region, any conflict would certainly involve this territory. Given that this land would be targeted by any party to the conflict, international actors wanted to protect this land and the business interests in this area. Additionally, as oil fields such as these are ripe for exploitation, instability around oil fields can breed and fall into the hands of fringe radical groups who cause even greater harm to the workforce and the political systems in place.⁶⁹ The UNSC will not only have to manage the potential fallout of any conflict in the region, but the individual states on the council will have their own motives for keeping the burgeoning Nigerian oil industry alive.

⁶⁷ Agbiboa, 3-30.

⁶⁸ Matanock, Aila M. "How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals." *Annual Review of Political Science* 23, no. 1 (2020): 357-83. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-033504>.

⁶⁹ Piazza, James A. "Oil and Terrorism: An Investigation of Mediators." *Public Choice* 169 (December 2016): 251-268. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-016-0357-0>. 267.

Declaration of War and Initial Biafran Success (1967)

This administrative overhaul (see *Origin of the Conflict*) was rejected by the Igbo. The East had seen a strong rise in Igbo nationalism in the past decades, and was unwilling to bend to Northern rule. On May 29, 1967, the military governor of the East Lt. Colonel Emeka Ojukwu declared the secession of the East and the creation of the Republic of Biafra.⁷⁰ Immediately after this declaration, Nigeria declared an embargo on all goods except oil shipped in and out of Biafra, but closed this loophole within the month.⁷¹ While Biafra was chronically under-resourced and outgunned, the Nigerian Army had done nothing to prepare for the possibility of war—in fact, the conditions of Nigerian independence had essentially relegated the army to a supplementary role for the police. The 1966 coups had killed almost all of the well-trained commanders on both sides, and the remaining officers were untrained and often corrupt.⁷²

The war officially began on July 6, 1967.⁷³ Biafra had many early wins while fending off the Northern Nigerian Offensive, but lost Nsukka, an Igbo stronghold, by July 14th. In August, Biafra launched its own offensive into the Mid-Western region as a response and was easily able to take over the state. The Mid-West briefly declared itself “The Republic of Benin” on September 19, an independent state allied with Biafra. However, Nigerian forces successfully recaptured the state the next day and this declaration was quickly made moot.⁷⁴ This major loss marked the beginning of the end for the Biafrans; the army continued to lose significant ground and their supply lines were regularly cut.⁷⁵ The UK had, by this point, started covertly providing military support to Federal Nigeria by providing the Nigerian troops with a fresh supply of weapons and advisory teams. The Soviet Union was

⁷⁰ Nafziger, E. Wayne. “The Economic Impact of the Nigerian Civil War.” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 10, no. 2 (1972): 223-45. Accessed August 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/159964>. 233.

⁷¹ Uche, Chibuike. “Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War.” *The Journal of African History* 49, no. 1 (2008): 111-35. Accessed August 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40206616>. 111.

⁷² Barua, Pradeep P. “The Military Effectiveness of Postcolonial States.” *Brill*, 2013, 9–24. <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004249110>.

⁷³ “Timeline: Biafra War in Key Dates.” Channels Television, December 31, 1969. <https://www.channelstv.com/2020/01/14/timeline-biafra-war-in-key-dates/>.

⁷⁴ Barua, 2013.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

providing overhead bombing support to Federal Nigeria as well.⁷⁶ Internal mistrust among the ranks stemmed from Ojukwu himself, self-sabotaging Biafra's own leadership in crucial junctions in which the secessionist state lost ground.

Stalemate, Blockade, and the End of the War (1968 – 1970)

By May of 1968, the two sides had fought themselves into a stalemate; while Nigeria undoubtedly had the upper hand and was in no danger of *losing* territory, the remnants of Biafra defended themselves fiercely.⁷⁷ Both sides relied heavily on foreign mercenaries and international aid.⁷⁸ At this point, the Nigerian blockade surrounded Biafra, creating a hotspot of humanitarian disasters which were then exploited by the Biafran government for international propaganda.⁷⁹ This was one of the first occasions of widespread Western media coverage of non-Western tragedy; pictures of the widespread Biafran famine and of the crimes against humanity that originated from both sides spread like wildfire on TV programs and in papers. The Biafran politicians leveraged this outrage from Western politicians and civilians for aid and international recognition. The increased international attention also strengthened Nigeria's incentive to end the war as quickly as possible. Military, financial, and humanitarian aid poured in on both sides.⁸⁰ With significant British support, the Nigerian army launched a series of final offensives in 1969 and 1970 that successfully captured the last Biafran/Igbo strongholds.⁸¹ Ojukwu fled, exiled to the Ivory Coast, and his deputy Philip Effiong handled and signed the surrender papers on January 14, 1970. Fighting ended within days after, and reconstruction began to unite the two adversaries with similar swiftness.

⁷⁶ Forsyth, Frederick. "Buried for 50 Years: Britain's Shameful Role in the Biafran War | Frederick Forsyth." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, January 21, 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/21/buried-50-years-britain-shameful-role-biafran-war-frederick-forsyth>.

⁷⁷ "Timeline," 1969.

⁷⁸ Uche, 112.

⁷⁹ Ugochukwu, Françoise. "The Nigerian Civil War and Its Media: Groping for Clues." Media, War & Conflict 3, no. 2 (August 2010): 182–201. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635210360083>. 190.

⁸⁰ Belmonte, Monica L., and Edward C. Keefer, Foreign relations of the United States, 1969-1976 § (2007).

⁸¹ Atofarati, Abubaker A. Rep. The Nigerian Civil War: Causes, Strategies, And Lessons Learnt, 1992. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/AAA.htm>.

Enduring Effects of the Biafran Civil War on Nigeria

Biafra and Federal Nigeria appeared to reconcile at a shockingly fast pace—“war and partition ironically created a consensus: The country, now united, should never be allowed to break apart again.”⁸² Soldiers who fought on Federal Nigeria’s side did not receive any medals, and amnesty was granted to Biafran combatants. However, the Civil War has had long-lasting political and ethnic ramifications in addition to more socioeconomic and universal human effects.

During the war, all regions of Nigeria felt the immediate economic effects of war; the economy’s growth rapidly decelerated.⁸³ There was a sharp decline in the consumption of civilian goods as manufacturing almost exclusively produced military equipment. The economy rebounded fairly quickly due to the oil interests in the region and strict fiscal policy that Federal Nigeria instituted at the beginning of the war. Furthermore, the oil interests compensated for the import losses incurred during the war. Nigeria managed to avoid rapid inflation during and following the war, and consumer prices for goods and food actually decreased by 1968 in Federal Nigeria at the expense of the Biafran blockade.⁸⁴ After the war, consumer prices rose rapidly as demand for goods increased and manufacturing needed time to pivot. Unemployment increased in all areas of Nigeria, but it disproportionately affected former Biafran territories.

Igbo Nigerians, previously wealthier and more academically-accredited than their Northern counterparts, found that their property and jobs had been seized during the war.⁸⁵ Regardless of what was in their bank accounts, all Biafrans received N ₦ 20. Nigeria also changed its currency, so any pre-war Nigerian currency owned by Biafrans was useless. In addition, there were allegations that supplies and investments meant to help rebuild the Eastern region following the war were diverted to Federal Nigeria. Igbos found that the oil economic policies redistributed profits from their region to other parts of the country. The Igbo people interpreted these policies as means to

⁸² Siollun, Max. “Nigeria Is Haunted by Its Civil War.” *The New York Times*. The New York Times, January 15, 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/15/opinion/nigeria-civil-war-anniversary.html>.

⁸³ Nafziger, 230.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Okwuosa, Lawrence, Chinyere T. Nwaoga, and Favour Uroko. “The Post-War Era in Nigeria and the Resilience of Igbo Communal System.” *Jàmbá Journal of Disaster Risk Studies* 13, no. 1 (April 19, 2021). <https://doi.org/10.4102/jamba.v13i1.867>.

block them from regaining lost wealth and block them from gaining significant economic power again.

However, it was the humanitarian impacts that were felt most sharply. On both sides, as many as 100,000 military personnel died, 2,000,000-4,500,000 civilians were displaced, and between 500,000-3,000,000 Nigerians became refugees.⁸⁶ The blockade on Biafra resulted in anywhere from 500,000 to 2,000,000 Igbo people dying from starvation in addition to several million more who had died during the war and pogroms.⁸⁷ At the time, this was almost 2% of the entire population of Nigeria and 15% of the population of Biafra. Millions more had lasting health effects due to severe malnutrition. Some Igbo Biafrans have called for international acknowledgement of the blockade as a deliberate act of genocide.

Both sides of the conflict are accused of committing war crimes. The Nigerian army has been accused of widespread sexual assault, torture, and killing of civilians of Igbo and other ethnic minorities they accused of collaborating with Biafra. At the same time, Igbo Biafran soldiers have been similarly accused of targeting ethnic minorities within their own territory, suspicious that the groups were helping Federal Nigeria.⁸⁸

While men were the soldiers in the war, it was the women who have disproportionately felt the long-term ramifications of this conflict. Women were targeted by sexual violence, and pregnant women regularly killed. Women also made up a significant plurality of Biafran civilian areas, but the overhead bombings targeted Biafran territory indiscriminately — hospitals, residential buildings, marketplaces, and refugee camps (all places with a high percentage of civilian women) were regularly destroyed. The international outcry over these acts led to a Federal Nigerian Code of Conduct that was established to protect women and children, which had limited success. A recent 2021 study has shown that all Nigerian women exposed to the Nigeria/Biafra conflict suffered a severe decline in their quality of life in the decades following the war, including having less

⁸⁶ World Peace Foundation, 2013.

⁸⁷ Norman, Mikael and Peter Ueda. Biafran Famine. In: Preedy V., Patel V. (eds) Handbook of Famine, Starvation, and Nutrient Deprivation. Springer, Cham. (2017) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40007-5_8-1.

⁸⁸ Osaghae, Eghosa E. "Ethnic Minorities and Federalism in Nigeria." African Affairs 90, no. 359 (1991): 237-58. Accessed August 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/722781>. 245.

educational attainment and maternal safety.⁸⁹ Children born right before, during, and directly after the war in Enugu (the former capital of Biafra) who had been conceived or born during the famine and who survived the famine show health problems with two-to-three times higher prevalence of hypertension, glucose intolerance, and overweight than those born before or after the war.⁹⁰

After the war, Nigeria split into 36 different states, each being home to an ethnic majority.⁹¹ Instead of attempting to force the different ethnic groups into one system, the government pushed a “federal character” that united Nigeria into one state.⁹² While this was done to avoid problems of division, it has also served to splinter the country by ethnic groups even more. Violent separatists and terrorists are able to carve out niches for themselves; a recent example is Boko Haram, a terrorist organization based in Northern Nigeria that has drawn upon the ethnic militancy of the Civil War and its continuing legacy of religious violence, particularly from the 1980s.⁹³

The Role of Oil in the Civil War

Oil exploration began in Nigeria in 1908, but exploration was stilted and monopolized by British oil companies through the 1940s.⁹⁴ In the interim period, Nigeria’s economy was largely dependent on its agricultural output. A Shell and BP consortium first broke ground in 1951, and oil was first found in 1958. Non-British firms were granted oil exploration licenses throughout the 1950s and 60s, but British interests still held a large share of oilfield ownership.⁹⁵

⁸⁹ Akresh, Richard, Sonia Bhalotra, Marinella Leone, and Una Osili. “First and Second Generation Impacts of the Biafran War.” IZA Institute of Labor Economics, August 2017. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w23721>.

⁹⁰ Norman, 2017.

⁹¹ “This Is How the 36 States Were Created.” Pulse Nigeria, October 23, 2017. <https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/nigerian-states-this-is-how-the-36-states-were-created/mdtnq3e>.

⁹² Ladipo Adamolekun, John Erero, Basil Oshionebo, ““Federal Character” and Management of the Federal Civil Service and the Military,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 21, 4 (Fall 1991), <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a037980>. 77.

⁹³ Onyemelukwe-Waziri, Helena, “Impact of Two Wars on the Educational System in Nigeria” (2017). International Development, Community and Environment (IDCE). 122. https://commons.clarku.edu/idce_masters_papers/122.

⁹⁴ “History of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry.” Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. Accessed August 21, 2021. <https://www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPC-Business/Business-Information/Pages/Industry-History.aspx>.

⁹⁵ Uche, 123.

Most of the oil-rich land was in the Niger River Delta in the Eastern region. As part of the 1960 independence agreement, the tax revenue of this was redistributed to the national government. Part of the reasoning behind Biafra's secession was the desire to capture more of this profit. The Niger River Delta and its oil-rich fields became a part of Biafra when it seceded, and possession of this land was crucial to both parties.⁹⁶ Western interests in this oil directly affected how international actors involved themselves in this conflict.


When the war broke out, Federal Nigeria put a shipping embargo on all goods coming in and out of Biafra, but made an exception for oil tankers as they wanted to maintain the international investment base. However, when Biafra demanded and received royalties from Shell-BP, Federal Nigeria immediately added oil tankers to its embargo and forced Shell-BP to pay all outstanding debt. The British government required BP-Shell to stop operations in Biafra in the meantime.⁹⁷ By mid-1968, Federal Nigeria had recaptured the land, and drilling operations restarted. Due to equipment damage, the output level remained low as Federal Nigeria had to rebuild many of the sites. Once this was accomplished, they were able to purchase more military equipment and mercenary services, rendering Biafra unable to compete and support itself.

After the war, Gowon's government instituted an oil revenue and output taxation system that allowed the federal government to decide which states would receive the revenue.⁹⁸ This taxation and the state control of the oil industry led to its opacity. This a matter of ongoing tension for many regions and ethnic groups, who feel as though they are not given their proper share of oil profits, and this is especially the case with the Eastern region.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Uche, 127.

⁹⁸ Ejobowah, John Boye. "Who Owns the Oil? The Politics of Ethnicity in the Niger Delta of Nigeria." *Africa Today* 47, no. 1 (2000). Accessed August 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4187306>. 38.



As the war continued into 1968, it was clear that Biafra would not win the war. However, they held on for as long as possible, despite the blockade, losing the oilfields, and continually losing Igbo strongholds to the Federal Nigerian Army. The result was millions of starving Biafrans lived in a wartorn zone, under constant bombardment from overhead bombers. This was one of the first major humanitarian disasters of the modern media era. As household television ownership had skyrocketed, the media covered the crisis extensively, showing images of starving children and injured civilians. Both combatants used this coverage to push their side's propaganda.¹⁰⁰ Modern international aid NGOs first cut their teeth in this conflict, and given that the majority of Igboes were Christian, many of these charitable organizations were Christian as well.¹⁰¹ Many of these organizations set forward on a relief effort termed "the Biafran airlift," in which food (especially

⁹⁹ Concern Worldwide. A News Report from Des Mullan Who Twice Visited Biafra to Report on the Crisis for the Evening Herald and the Irish Independent. n.d. <https://www.concern.org.uk/news/s.o.s-how-ireland-helped-a-nation-a-new-podcast-series-from-concern>.

¹⁰⁰ Ugochukwu, 200.

¹⁰¹ O'Sullivan, Kevin. "Humanitarian Encounters: BIAFRA, NGOs And Imaginings of the Third World in Britain and Ireland, 1967–70." *Journal of Genocide Research* 16, no. 2-3 (August 21, 2014): 299–315. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2014.936706>. 307.

protein sources) would be dropped into Biafran territory as it was otherwise difficult to deliver aid.¹⁰² Many governments were also involved in this effort behind the scenes. There have been some unsubstantiated claims that airlift missions would covertly include military support as well. The aid organizations often made their volunteers sign gag orders that maintained the organization's neutrality, but international volunteers were targeted along with Biafran soldiers and civilians.

A separate function of international involvement was that of mercenaries; given that Federal Nigeria outgunned and outmanned Biafra, the latter relied heavily on these for-hire soldiers. Many of those who fought previously in the Congo flocked to Biafra, but they were ineffective this time as the Federal Nigerian army was far more competent than their previous opposition. While Biafran military leaders would later reflect upon how unhelpful these supplementary forces were, many of the mercenaries, uncharacteristically to their profession, developed a strong personal connection to the cause. Even when it became clear that they would not win, the mercenaries stayed and fought through the end of this conflict.¹⁰³

Conclusion

The quick and determined path towards reconciliation was a conscious effort by leaders on both sides of the War. General Gowon declared at the end of the conflict that there was "no victor, no vanquished."¹⁰⁴ There were not any harsh terms of surrender for the former Biafrans, and they were generally absorbed back into Nigerian society. However, unofficial and quietly implemented policy has, according to the Igbos, kept the region and ethnic groups separated. The reconciliation meant that there was little semblance of justice for wrongdoings done on either side; the lack of tribunals meant no recourse for the war crimes and potential genocide. This war, often called "the Forgotten War," has been papered over, without true international acknowledgement or criminal

¹⁰² "The Amazing Biafran Airlift - Heroics in the Sky and on the Ground." Concern Worldwide. Concern Worldwide U.S., Inc, July 6, 2018. <https://www.concernusa.org/story/biafran-airlift/>.

¹⁰³ United Nations Security Council (UNSC) In Hindsight: Guns for Hire—The Security Council and Mercenarism (13 March 2021).

¹⁰⁴ Memory, Reconciliation, and Peacebuilding in Post-Civil War Nigeria. Social Science Research Council (June 2017) http://ssrc-cdn1.s3.amazonaws.com/crmuploads/new_publication_3/memory-reconciliation-and-peacebuilding-in-post-civil-war-nigeria.pdf

proceedings.¹⁰⁵ The ethnic tensions still exist and erupt to the surface periodically. The UNSC failed to aid before, during, and after the conflict, choosing to ignore the Nigerian-Biafran War entirely, and it is our job to do our best to combat these problems.

¹⁰⁵ Imiete Onyighi, Akebin . "The Nigerian Civil War and the failure of United Nations: A Jurisprudential Analysis" Afribary (2018). Accessed August 21, 2021. <https://afribary.com/works/the-nigerian-civil-war-and-the-failure-of-united-nations-a-jurisprudential-analysis>.

Past Actions

While the entire impetus of our committee this weekend is the lack of action taken by the United Nations during the Biafran War, we still feel it's important to provide you with context on how the UN has reacted to violent civil wars in the past, especially in situations that stem from ethnic conflict. Outlined below are three examples of military conflicts that spiraled into humanitarian crises in Africa, and the UN's response to each of them. Even though many of these conflicts have since ended in a ceasefire, the actual impact that the UN's presence had in the region is still a hotly debated topic, and we strongly encourage delegates to discern which pieces of each solution were effective and which led to more chaos. While some nations feel that it is the responsibility of the Security Council to directly intervene in all conflicts that member states are party to, others believe the best course of action is simply immediate aid and then allowing the people of the affected nation to rebuild and reconstruct on their own. Each methodology has its own merits, and as a dais we will push delegates to think critically about which options are not only aligned with their country policy, but also which solutions they create that will lead to a better world in the present day.

United Nations Angola Verification Mission I—Angolan Civil War

The United Nations Angola Verification Mission, or UNAVEM, began in 1988 with the original purpose of just monitoring the withdrawal of the Cuban forces from Angola, in order to keep in line with the implementation of the Security Council resolution 435.¹⁰⁶ The subsequent resolution that formally established UNAVEM approved the presence of a military observer group to be present in the country for 31 months to ensure the complete withdrawal of the Cuban troops, however, this mission was extended twice more to assist in the process of verifying ceasefires, observing the electoral process, and humanitarian aid. This conflict marks the first time the United Nations has engaged in an extended mission on the African continent, and the Security Council has continually updated the mandate of its mission to fit the changing needs of the country.

¹⁰⁶ United Nations Security Council (UNSC). September 29, 1978. Resolution 435. Available at <https://peacemaker.un.org/namibia-resolution435>.

To better contextualize the relative success of this mission, one must understand the roots of the war. The Angolan Civil War began in 1975, and formally lasted until 2002, although there were periods of peace over the course of those 27 years. It started as a power struggle between the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) after the country won independence from Portugal.¹⁰⁷ There are a few striking similarities between the Biafran War and the Angolan Civil War. The first was the influence of foreign powers in the war since the MPLA was backed by Cuba and the Soviets while the anti-communist UNITA had the support of South Africa and the United States. The second was the ethnic divisions as a result of the differing positions of each ethnic group during colonialism, seeing as the MPLA's base of support were with the Mbundu and the Mestiguos, while UNITA drew its support from the Ovimbundu, an ethnic group that was far more integrated into colonial society. Finally, there were plentiful natural resources in Angola, including oil, which meant the funding of the war was easier for both sides and raised the stakes for international involvement, as countries were eager to gain a foothold in order to shape a better trade relationship for themselves.¹⁰⁸

While UNAVEM I was seen as a success since Cuban forces were withdrawn from Angola, UNAVEM II and III and the subsequent MONUA, United Nations Observer Mission in Angola, are largely seen as failures for a few key reasons. For one, there is a lack of commitment by member states to follow through on sanctions and commitments established in ceasefires. Another issue is that there is a lack of transparency in disclosure of violations of accords that were signed throughout the war. Finally, the missions are unable to integrate human rights in a manner that is comprehensive and builds out local capabilities, which severely undermines UN credibility in the region.¹⁰⁹ However, the success of UNAVEM I should not be undercut, as it represents the rare peaceful removal of a foreign military power from a nation. Additionally, the mission in Angola marks the first time that the UN included a Human Rights Division in a specific mission, and while it was met with little success, centering human rights is a useful strategy to pursue.¹¹⁰ From the mission in Angola, delegates should take

¹⁰⁷ "Angola - Independence and Civil War," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed August 24, 2021, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Angola>.

¹⁰⁸ "Project MUSE - The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Conflict (Review)," accessed August 24, 2021, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/50415/pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ "ANGOLA UNRAVELS," accessed August 24, 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/angola/Angl998-10.htm>.

¹¹⁰ "UNAVEM II," accessed August 24, 2021, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/Unavem2/UnavemIIB.htm>.

away the importance of a consistent mission with a clear mandate that emphasizes transparency, especially for those in the region that may have little access to information or may be receiving misinformation from violent sources.

United Nations Mission in South Sudan—Establishment of South Sudan

On July 8th, 2011, a day prior to the independence of South Sudan, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1996, establishing the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, UNMISS, and as of May 2019, the mission is composed of 15,000 military personnel, 1,800 police, and 2,800 civilian workers.¹¹¹ The original mandate of UNMISS was peace consolidation and government capacity building in the newly formed country, but like many other missions in the postwar period, the mandate changed rapidly to keep up to the complex situation. Prior to independence as South Sudan, the nation was involved in the First and Second Sudanese Wars, both occurring after independence from their colonial power—just as in Angola and Nigeria. South Sudan is the youngest formally recognized nation in the world, but has been plagued by the instability that accompanies the beginning of a new state. The disputed region of Abyei remains a big point of contention between South Sudan and Sudan, as well as the division of oil revenues. Worsening the problem, there are several active insurgent groups attempting to overthrow the government, and the inter-ethnic tensions that existed prior to independence have moved into full scale conflict.¹¹² These, as well as other actors, led to the onset of the South Sudanese Civil War which lasted from 2013–2020.

UNMISS has attempted to deal with the issues outlined above, but has faced extreme difficulty in carrying out its mandate and has not lived up to its potential. Elements such as a failure of leadership to coordinate forces during a crisis, a lack of cooperation from government and opposition forces, and lack of security measures at civilian protection camps lead to situations such as the Terrain Camp 2011 incident, where government forces violently broke up a UN camp for displaced persons.¹¹³ Most importantly, UNMISS had an ugly and debilitating abuse scandal that continues to

¹¹¹ “UNMISS,” UNMISS, accessed August 24, 2021, <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/>.

¹¹² “South Sudan Profile - Timeline - BBC News,” accessed August 24, 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14019202>.

¹¹³ Annette LaRocco and Nenad Marinkovic, “Breaking News: Sudan Bombs Yida Refugee Camp in South Sudan,” *The Enough Project* (blog), November 10, 2011, <https://enoughproject.org/blog/breaking-news-sudan-bombs-yida-refugee-camp-south-sudan>.

plague UN peacekeeping worldwide. In many troubling cases, some peacekeepers neglected to stop sexual violence occurring “in plain sight” and have used humanitarian resources for coercive purposes.¹¹⁴ UNMISS is a mission mired in scandal, with very few tangible positive impacts to date. Delegates should use this as a cautionary tale when deploying large numbers of peacekeepers and law enforcement personnel as a method of stabilization after a civil war. Additionally, it should serve to deepen consideration of how to best ensure accountability among peacekeepers and ensure they do not bring about more destruction to those that are suffering. While humanitarian aid was not as prevalent in our explanation of UNMISS, it is important to note the high volume of internally displaced persons that required attention, since displaced persons, refugees, and migrants will also be a highly relevant part of engagement with Biafra.

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo— Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Our final case study in UN peacekeeping takes place in the Democratic Republic Congo, and is the UN mission that best encapsulates the many pitfalls of peacekeeping missions. When the mission began in 1999, it was meant to focus on the peace progress of the Second Congo War, but peace has been extremely hard to find in the nation. The Ituri, Kivum, and Dongo conflicts that occurred after the war have all caused violence, often in excess of what occurred during the war itself.¹¹⁵ There were two primary goals of engagement in the Congo when MONUSCO first started. They were the peaceful withdrawal of troops of surrounding nations and adherence to the peace agreement and also ensuring that all ethnic groups in the Congo were included as part of negotiations. However, the mandate quickly shifted and military force increased in the region after a year to ensure that the authority of the state was being respected to transition the mission from that of simple observation into a ceasefire, and then into being the primary force of the order in the country.¹¹⁶ In recent years, the mission has expanded to give UN troops the power to carry out activities and enact different sanctions to encourage the compliance by various government and insurgent groups, and place

¹¹⁴ “Women in Yambio Speak out against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” UNMISS, December 11, 2019, <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/women-yambio-speak-out-against-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse>.

¹¹⁵ “MONUSCO | United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo,” accessed August 24, 2021, <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en>.

¹¹⁶ “Background,” MONUSCO, February 19, 2016, <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background>.

pressure on all parties to find a peaceful solution. After the Rwandan genocide, many Hutus fled to the DRC, specifically the Kivu region, which led to a government takeover by rebel groups.¹¹⁷ While some of these groups have been defeated, Kivu remains one of the most dangerous parts of the country, and became one of the first regions explicitly called out in a Security Council resolution. Kivu, and the other eastern Congo region, Orientale, became specific targets because of the prevalence of human rights and international law violations that were occurring in the region. However, in recent years, these tensions have continued to broil, and to date nearly 300 peacekeepers have died in the region due to instances where insurgent groups have specifically targeted peacekeepers for mass killing.¹¹⁸

There are several core controversies with MONUSCO that should be discussed to give the full perspective on success of the mission. The first is rampant disagreement between the Congolese Government and the UN troop commanders over UN engagement in the region at all. In 2011, then-president Joseph Kabila began a significant push for the mission to end by year's end.¹¹⁹ While that attempt failed and many believed it to be linked to Kabila's fears that his authority was not well-respected, it brought to the forefront of the international community the lack of success the mandate has had in the region, seeing as human rights violations and violence had only increased in the nation. Additionally, the role of the UN in peace in the region has been consistently questioned, as MONUSCO desires to be a coordinator—as opposed to a backseat observer—in bilateral partnerships, even though the United Nations has attempted to emphasize the importance of the DRC taking the lead.¹²⁰ Another serious controversy is the abuse that has been committed by the UN peacekeepers, just as in South Sudan. In the DRC, upwards of 2,000 claims of sexual abuse were filed from 2005–2017, and it was often remarked that there were dozens of instances where the UN failed

¹¹⁷ "Layered Insecurity in North Kivu: Violence and the Ebola Response - Democratic Republic of the Congo," ReliefWeb, accessed August 24, 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/layered-insecurity-north-kivu-violence-and-ebola-response>.

¹¹⁸ "DR Congo: 15 U.N. Peacekeepers Dead, Dozens Hurt in 'Huge Attack,'" accessed August 24, 2021, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/large-number-u-n-peacekeepers-killed-congo-n827681>.

¹¹⁹ "CONGO-KINSHASA: MONUC Exit Is Probable, but Premature - Democratic Republic of the Congo," ReliefWeb, accessed August 24, 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/congo-kinshasa-monuc-exit-probable-premature>.

¹²⁰ "U.N. Force in Congo, MONUSCO, Criticized as Ineffective - Los Angeles Times," accessed August 24, 2021, <https://www.latimes.com/world/la-xpm-2012-dec-22-la-fg-un-congo-20121223-story.html>.

to act even after sexual abuse had been reported.¹²¹ UN forces have been accused of human trafficking, smuggling, and sexual assault, severely undercutting trust in the mission and making many Congolese feel as though they have nowhere to turn, since the government, international community, and rebel groups are all factories for exploitation. The final, and perhaps largest, controversy to consider with respect to MONUSCO is the mission's inability to achieve its goals: violence in the region has been escalating, sexual abuse and human trafficking have grown, and the stark failure of the 2016 election is an indicator that shows that the government's capacity building has achieved next to nothing.¹²² Perhaps most worryingly, there are no plans to exit the DRC in the near future, nor significantly change the strategy of engagement in the nation. In examining this strategy and what can be used in Biafra, note that UN missions at large are far less prepared to deal with slow-broiling but consistent conflict over the span of several decades than small flare ups and conflict. Understanding this is a lynchpin to creating solutions that allow the UN to engage and withdraw without creating a power vacuum or re-entrenching existing abuse in the region.

¹²¹ "DR Congo: UN Peacekeepers Face Fresh Sexual Abuse Claims," *BBC News*, April 28, 2017, sec. Africa, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39745357>.

¹²² "U.N. Force in Congo, MONUSCO, Criticized as Ineffective - Los Angeles Times," accessed August 24, 2021, <https://www.latimes.com/world/la-xpm-2012-dec-22-la-fg-un-congo-20121223-story.html>.

Possible Solutions

Possible Solutions: Oil Sanctions

Great Britain had significant oil investments in Nigeria and because of the oil shortfalls caused by the Six Day War in the Middle East, it was important for them to have a source to maintain their own domestic oil supply.¹²³ However, if Great Britain had taken another approach and decided to impose oil sanctions on the government of Nigeria, a less tragic outcome to the war might have been achieved. The United States officially chose to remain neutral, but US oil companies also contributed to the oil conflict in the country.¹²⁴ If these important members of the UNSC along with other members of the United Nations had enforced sanctions on the Nigerian government, they could have secured for themselves more power in controlling the actions of the Nigerian government. This could be in the form of tariffs or embargoes. Examples to consider can be seen in the United States sanctions on Cuba¹²⁵ or European Union's Sanctions on Iran.¹²⁶ Ultimately, these sanctions were used to try and force a country to alter its behavior. With these sanctions, it is important for delegates to consider what they want the Nigerian government to change with its actions in the Biafran War. One option is that sanctions could open the door for treaties with the Nigerian government to discuss ending the blockade on Biafra, which could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Additionally, this option would promote working with both parties involved in the war, as the Nigerian government would be forced into a position where it cannot disregard the requests of the UNSC, unless they can handle all of the negative effects of a completely stalled trade of their most valuable resource.

¹²³ Uche, 114.

¹²⁴ Klieman, Kairn A. "U.S. Oil Companies, the Nigerian Civil War, and the Origins of Opacity in the Nigerian Oil Industry." *Journal of American History* 99, no. 1 (2012): 155–65. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jahist/jas072>. 161.

¹²⁵ "Cuba Sanctions - United States Department of State." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, August 20, 2021. <https://www.state.gov/cuba-sanctions/>.

¹²⁶ "EU Restrictive Measures against Iran." Consilium. European Council of the European Union, April 9, 2019. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/iran/>.

This solution has several disadvantages. For one, these major countries would gain little—if anything, as sanctions could cause oil shortages which would inflate gas prices and hurt the economy—from the oil sanctions. To counter this, other solutions would need to be melded together along with the sanctions to ensure that the member countries of the UNSC are receiving resources and benefits that can make up for any negative consequences of sanctions. It is also important to examine if these sanctions could cause a humanitarian crisis itself—an occurrence that would mark the entire intervention a failure. Could the economic consequences leave civilians in other regions of the country to a disastrous fate, as a result of a stalled economy? Will these treaties written due to the sanctions solve the issues of the war permanently, or will the Nigerian government revert back to its initial course as soon as the sanctions are lifted? Delegates must consider all positives and negatives that can emerge as a result of sanctions before deciding if they are the best solution.

Possible Solutions: Separate Countries

When the Igbo attempted to secede from Nigeria and form Biafra, if the UNSC had supported the seceding nation, then there might have been a possibility to end the conflict. Before the colonization of what is now Nigeria, the three major ethnic groups were living in separate nations, forced together for the benefit of Great Britain. One thought proposes returning to this original system.¹²⁷ At the time of the conflict, there were five UN members who acknowledged Biafra as an independent state. Biafra also gained military support from several other countries, including France. This shows that there was some international support for the movement.

However, there would have been many steps taken by the Security Council to make this a successful solution. What stops Nigeria from continuing the blockade? What economic resources do both of these areas contain? Will both countries have the ability to be successful in the world economy with what they have? How will the UNSC divide the land between the two nations, such that future conflict will be minimized? The country is estimated to be made up of over 250 different ethnolinguistic groups.¹²⁸ So, in addition to answering the question of whether Biafra should become

¹²⁷ "Nigeria Turns 60: Can Africa's Most Populous NATION Remain United?" BBC News. BBC, October 1, 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54357810>.

¹²⁸ The Biafran War | The Lasting Legacy of Nigeria's Tragic Civil War. YouTube. YouTube, 2021. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=meAmQf31Te8>.

an independent country, delegates will need to consider if this is the best course of action for other ethnic groups and whether or not further ethnic conflicts may arise as a result of creating two separate countries. In addition to these ethnic conflicts, it is also important to think of different solutions to ensure that Biafra and Nigeria do not continue to engage in war. If this were to happen, even more refugees would spill into surrounding countries, creating a regional crisis.

Possible Solutions: Peacekeepers

The Security Council is responsible for establishing UN peace operations to maintain international peace and security. Historically, peacekeeping has been a vital instrument in pursuing its mission. Since they were first deployed in 1948 to Israel to monitor the Armistice Agreement, peacekeepers have been deployed in over 70 missions.¹²⁹ In this conflict, the peacekeepers could only have been used to keep the peace, either by supporting the organization of elections or promoting human rights which could have helped to stop the Civil War before it began.

This is a possible solution, and while ensuring that the election was legitimate could have played a large role in diminishing this conflict, considering the tensions that were rising in the country, peacekeepers could not be the only solution to this crisis. Though it is likely that further conflict would arise, peacekeepers may allow the UNSC valuable time to discover a longer-lasting solution like those mentioned previously. Delegates should particularly consider regional history with peacekeeping forces and the reception such forces would receive by the region, given peacekeepers' problems. Although Past Actions describes peacekeeper failures after the Nigerian Civil War, similar problems would likely exist if deployed, and so delegates must consider the potential shortcomings.

¹²⁹ "What is Peacekeeping?" United Nations Peacekeeping. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping>

Bloc Positions

United States

The United States took an official stance of neutrality when it came to the Biafran War. The US government created a four-part policy to address the conflict. The first part was a declaration “not to interfere in the internal affairs of Nigeria.”¹³⁰ The second part was “a desire to promote a peaceful, and hence more durable, resolution of the conflict between Biafra and the FMG.”¹³¹ The third and fourth parts of this policy went hand-in-hand with “a reluctance to follow any course which might lead to an increase in our international commitments; and a desire to maintain the best possible relationships with all the major ethnic groups in Nigeria, particularly those which might have emerged as independent states.”¹³² Ultimately, despite trying to remain impartial, the United States was still involved in the conflict. In fact, in an information memorandum from the Western Africa Country Director, Bureau of African Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in April of 1968, it was stated that “non-involvement” is a misnomer but it has been used to describe the policy due to the lack of a better word.¹³³

The United States, under the Nixon administration, rendered humanitarian support to the victims of the conflict, especially those within the Biafran enclave.¹³⁴ The reasoning behind the aid was to take steps toward ensuring global peace and promoting human security, however, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria (FMG) was against these activities.¹³⁵ The United States intelligence community seemed to have a preference for Biafra, despite not having a concrete ability to sway the administration to actively help the Igbo people win the war.¹³⁶

¹³⁰ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, eds. Alan M. Hardy (Washington: Department of State, September 11, 1967), Document 396.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Judd Devermont, The US intelligence community's biases during the Nigerian civil war, African Affairs, Volume 116, Issue 465, October 2017, Pages 705–716, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adx032>

¹³⁵ Bello, Taiwo. The Evolution of US-Biafra/Nigeria Policy during the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, The International History Review (2021), DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2021.1876136.

¹³⁶ Devermont, 2017

On the other side of the conflict, the United States government felt that, while being neutral, none of their activities were actively hurting the FMG. The United States considered the FMG to be the only legal government in Nigeria.¹³⁷ The US also continued to make positive economic contributions to Nigeria so long as that did not mean taking sides in the civil war.¹³⁸

However, the FMG greatly resented the US refusal to license the sale of arms and the US statement of August 21, 1967, deploring its purchase of Soviet arms.¹³⁹ Because of the US arms embargo on Nigeria and Biafra and the US' moves against Nigeria's blockade on Biafra with humanitarian aid, the relations between Nigeria and the US throughout the civil war were tense. US policy, due to its flexibility, generated constant doubts among the Nigerians and Biafrans about the actual position or stance of the nation, which helped the US to continue to claim neutrality.¹⁴⁰ Given its position as the leader of the Western Bloc, the USA hopes to maintain a Western-alignment in this region. Whether this means more "pro-democracy" or "pro-capitalism" is up to the delegates of the USA.

United Kingdom

As the former colonizer of Nigeria, the United Kingdom's role in creating the situation was outlined in the *History of the Problem*; at the outset of the war, most of the leaders on both sides were British-educated, and the military had been trained by British forces. Before the conflicts actually broke out, Britain had hosted peace talks between the two sides in Ghana, but this agreement had fallen apart and the British government did little to nothing to enforce the terms. The United Kingdom had a vested interest in keeping the state of Nigeria stable and intact, as Britain's former colony's oil fields promised great profit to its former colonizer under the Federal Nigeria system of governance and trade associations.¹⁴¹ The civil war had broken out days before the Suez Canal was blocked; Nigerian oil was now vastly cheaper than Middle Eastern oil to the British, and by 1967, 30 percent of the oil

¹³⁷ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Bello, 2021.

¹⁴¹ Ignatus, Onianwa Oluchukwu. Britain's Injurious Peace Games in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970. Bethesda: Academica Press, 2018. 115.

coming into Britain was from Nigeria.¹⁴² As such, the British government supported Federal Nigeria on the strict condition that its forces did not damage the oil fields in Biafran territory (which were most of them). However, as previously mentioned in the *Statement of the Problem - The Role of Oil in the Civil War*, under pressure from the British and Federal Nigerian governments, Shell-BP suspended operations in Biafran territory at the war's outset, believing that Federal Nigeria was more likely to win the war quickly and was more likely to protect British oil interests. In fact, at the time, the ruling party's commonwealth minister noted that "The sole immediate British interest in Nigeria is that the Nigerian economy should be brought back to a condition in which our substantial trade and investment in the country can be further developed, and particularly so we can regain access to important oil installations."¹⁴³

By late July of 1967, a couple of months after the UK government clearly backed Federal Nigeria, Britain began covertly supplying Nigerian troops with military equipment and expertise. Shell-BP quietly provided financial support for Nigerian troops as well.¹⁴⁴ The British government did initially refuse to provide any equipment other than anti-aircraft guns, but soon the British prime minister made an "agreement to supply patrol boats in 1967 [that] was done in the knowledge that this would help the government maintain the sea blockade against Biafra."¹⁴⁵ While the British government never fully disclosed the extent of their aid due to bitterly divided public opinion of the war in their own country, they had "supplied 15 million rounds of ammunition, 21,000 mortar bombs, 42,500 Howitzer rounds, 1,950 rifles with grenade launchers, 15,000 lbs of explosives, 500 submachine guns, 4,000 rifles and four helicopters"¹⁴⁶ for Federal Nigeria by 1968. The party line was that these exports had not changed in purpose or capacity since before the war and despite public pressure, the UK continued to push this misinformation and its military support to protect these oil interests. In November of 1968, the UK directly provided Federal Nigerian troops with aircraft for the first time

¹⁴² Stremmlau, John J. *The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977. Accessed August 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13x129n>. 66.

¹⁴³ Curtis, Mark. "How Britain's Labour Government Facilitated the Massacre of Biafrans in Nigeria – to Protect Its Oil Interests." *Declassified UK*. Daily Maverick, April 29, 2020. <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-04-29-how-britains-labour-government-facilitated-the-massacre-of-biafrans-in-nigeria-to-protect-its-oil-interests/>.

¹⁴⁴ Uche, 130.

¹⁴⁵ Curtis, 2020.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*.

under a secret agreement to help break the bitter stalemate; by this point, they had also provided military intelligence and possibly funding to hire mercenaries. With this support that continued through 1969, Federal Nigeria was able to launch its final offensive in 1969–1970, officially defeating Biafra.

Nigeria rebuilt quickly after the war, in no small part due to the British government's and Shell-BP's vested and continued oil interests in the region; oilfields held by the Federal Nigerian government stayed in business throughout the war due to British demand. Additionally, as Federal Nigerian troops captured Biafran oil fields, Shell-BP worked with the Nigerian government to rebuild the facilities before the war was even over.¹⁴⁷

While British public opinion was split, British media largely sided with Federal Nigeria as well. Some pro-Biafra British correspondents accused the British government and media of pushing Nigerian propaganda, saying that organizations like the BBC were expressly siding with Federal Nigeria by obscuring its war crimes.¹⁴⁸ However, other media organizations and humanitarian organizations based in the UK supported Biafrans.¹⁴⁹ Given its new "post-empire" status, the UK hopes to take a benevolent role in this issue. Western media, humanitarian aid, and diplomatic guidance are all powerful tools which can help shape the future of Nigeria.

China

The Biafran War occurred at the height of the Sino-Soviet Split, and during a critical juncture for China's emergence as a world power. Due to the Soviet Union's strong support of the Nigerian government, the People's Republic of China chose to support the Biafran government and released a statement saying they supported liberation against "Anglo-American imperialism and Soviet revisionism."¹⁵⁰ In routes through Tanzania, China gave Biafran soldiers small arms and ammunition

¹⁴⁷ Uche, 118.

¹⁴⁸ Akinyemi, A. B. "The British Press and the Nigerian Civil War." *African Affairs* 71, no. 285 (October 1, 1972): 408–26. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a096282>.

¹⁴⁹ O'Sullivan, 314.

¹⁵⁰ Stremlau, 1967-1970.

totaling to \$2 million, to support liberation efforts.¹⁵¹ Another factor in China's ardent support for Biafra was the perception that the Nigerian government was pro-British and pro-West and had no room to engage or support a relationship with Communist China.¹⁵²

Prior to Nigerian independence, China did not hold any relationship with the colonial government, instead choosing to deal exclusively with the British government when it came to economic and diplomatic matters. When Nigeria did become independent in October of 1960, the ruling government was conservative, democratic, and pro-Western and was perceived as hostile toward the few Chinese contacts that were in Africa at the time. An ideological split from the Soviet Union in 1963, along with the Cultural Revolution in China starting in 1966, pushed the Chinese government to support smaller groups in Africa that were anti-colonialist and supported Maoism. However, even though China gave the Biafran government arms, it never formally supported the Biafran government or recognized them.¹⁵³ After the end of the Nigerian Civil War in 1970, Beijing and Lagos established a far closer relationship and in February, 1971, China and Nigeria officially recognized each other, and have since signed several economic and social agreements with one another.¹⁵⁴ Much of China's interest in Nigeria and Africa at large since the 21st century has been focused on deepening China's foothold in the continent through trade via exports and imports and loans, alongside infrastructure and diplomatic projects to tie China and Africa closer together. In this committee, China will be keen to gain key allies in Western Africa, as China hopes to become a true world power.

Soviet Union

The support for the Nigerian government by the Soviet Union during the Biafran War was markedly strong, yet initially unexpected. Far before the conception of the civil conflict, the Soviet Union

¹⁵¹ "Fifty Years, Five Problems - and How Nigeria Can Work with China in Future." *The Conversation*, April 13, 2021. <https://theconversation.com/fifty-years-five-problems-and-how-nigeria-can-work-with-china-in-future-157254>.

¹⁵² Oshodi, Abdul-Gafar Tobi. "Nigeria and China: Understanding the Imbalanced Relationship." *The Africa Report.com*. The Africa Report, June 1, 2020. <https://www.theafricareport.com/29060/nigeria-and-china-understanding-the-imbalanced-relationship/>.

¹⁵³ Ndour, Pape Abdou. "Two Distant Giants: China and Nigeria Perceive Each Other." *WATHI. JEMEEA*. Accessed August 21, 2021. <https://www.wathi.org/two-distant-giants-china-and-nigeria-perceive-each-other/>.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*.

made several attempts at becoming closer to the leaders of the West African state, yet Nigeria “refused offers of Soviet political and economic contacts” due to its foreign policy being generally pro-Western.¹⁵⁵ One of Nikita Khrushchev’s main goals was to develop lucrative relations with African nations, which only came to fruition towards the late 1960s after Tafawa Balewa’s tenure as the leader of Nigeria came to an end via military coup in January 1966.¹⁵⁶

The Soviet Union began to involve themselves more in Nigerian politics following the mixed sentiment towards this military coup. A counter-coup ensued in July 1966 in which the new leader, General Ironsi, was overthrown by Lieutenant Yakubu Gowon, the leader of the new Federal Military Government.¹⁵⁷ The Soviet press soon grew to praise Gowon towards the end of 1966, which eventually led to a Soviet team of economists visiting Nigeria to “undertake a study of the possibilities for developing an iron and steel industry” in January of 1967.¹⁵⁸

When the Biafran War began, the USSR quickly shifted their stance of neutrality regarding the Nigerian administration to strongly supporting the Federalist party. While the Nigerian military were initially anxious to accept resources from the Soviet Union by virtue of them being trained by the British military (another strong supporter of Nigerian forces), the Soviet ambassador, Alexander Romanov, was able to convince the Nigerian army that accepting weapons would be vital for success in the Civil War.¹⁵⁹ As a result, members of the Russian and Nigerian administrations developed a formal alliance in autumn of 1967, in which the weapons that the USSR provided to the Nigerian government were “strictly for cash on a commercial basis.”¹⁶⁰

As a result of the support for the Nigerian Federalists by the Soviet Union all throughout the course of the Biafran War, there existed some slight tension between the Soviet Union and Great Britain—

¹⁵⁵ Posibi, A. Preye “The Nigerian Civil War and the Soviet Union's Involvement into the Conflict.” *Asia and Africa Today*. 5 (2019):48-52. DOI: 10.31857/So32150750004750-7

¹⁵⁶ Matusevich, Maxim. *Strange Bedfellows: An Unlikely Alliance between the Soviet Union and Nigeria during the Biafran War*. (2017) 10.4324/9781315229294-9.

¹⁵⁷ Posibi, 2019.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Stent, Angela. “The Soviet Union and the Nigerian Civil War: A Triumph of Realism”, *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 3.2 (Summer 1973).

¹⁶⁰ *The New York Times*, 24 August 1967. P. 15; *The Times*, 9 March 1969. P. 5.

both were ardent supporters of the Nigerians. Once the Soviet Union started to become a supplier of arms, Britain made it a priority to maintain their influence in Lagos by increasing the number of weapons they were providing to Nigeria. This type of relationship caused Soviet media outlets to cynically accuse the British of supporting the secession, among other small, media-related conflicts.¹⁶¹ As the leading nation of the Eastern Bloc, the Soviet Union can determine how other socialist and communist nations should address the issues of this committee.

France

France's history of interventionism in Africa is well-documented, and its involvement in the Biafra-Nigerian Civil War is no exception to this; under de Gaulle, France was among Biafra's most prominent allies, funneling military support to Ojukwu's Biafran regime. The motivation behind the French support of Biafra was tripartite: France sought to insulate its former colonies—where they continued to wield a certain degree of power—from Nigerian influence (and, by extension, British influence), slow the Soviet Union's "subversion" of their regional foothold, and establish a sphere of influence in the Niger Delta, whose primary commodity was one more valuable than gold: oil.¹⁶²

Despite the considerable advantages of supporting Biafra, however, France was also forced to contend with the very real possibility of backing the losing side—fears that were ultimately substantiated by the outcome of the war. Throughout the Civil War, de Gaulle's administration took great care to keep France's level of involvement low; France, for instance, is unique among Biafra's allies for never recognizing it diplomatically to be a sovereign state. The extent of French support for Ojukwu's regime was de Gaulle's characterization of it as a "just and noble cause"—indisputably strong words, but fairly noncommittal compared to diplomatic recognition.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ Stent, 1973.

¹⁶² Griffin, Christopher. "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 26:1, 114–135 (2015). DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2014.959766.
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/14623528.2015.1027073?scroll=top&needAccess=true>

¹⁶³ Arseneault, Michel. "How France Armed Biafra's Bid to Break from Nigeria." RFI. RFI, May 25, 2017.
<https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20170525-how-france-armed-biafras-bid-break-nigeria>.

This incongruity between France’s tacit support of Biafra and its stated pseudo-neutrality resulted in a distinctive form of diplomatic and military support—one which was largely performative in nature. France provided Biafra with “mercenaries and obsolete weaponry,” but stopped short of putting French boots on the ground.¹⁶⁴ In early 1969, France sent seventy-five metric tons of munitions—including rifles, grenades, and cannons—to Biafran forces by smuggling shipments through Uli airport. The operation was a highly secretive one, with clearance provided on a strictly need-to-know basis. This set the tone for much of France’s later support to Biafra, which grew in magnitude but remained as opaque as ever. In October, 1969—a few months after France’s first major munitions shipment to Ojukwu’s forces—France’s special advisory committee on African affairs determined that another “600 tonnes of arms and munitions” were necessary for Biafra to retake lost territory.¹⁶⁵ In response, France delivered 28 helicopters to Biafra, as well as two B26 bombers. Though the French were initially wary of sending aircraft to the rebel forces, the discovery of high-quality oil in Biafra-controlled territory spurred French interest in the region, and reignited their efforts to ensure a Biafran victory. Over the course of the war, France sent 3,000 mercenaries into the region as part of the French Foreign Legion, renowned for their ruthlessness and brutality.¹⁶⁶ Most left Nigeria before the conclusion of the war, but their presence was felt—and symptomatic of French foreign priorities. France’s reluctance to provide the Biafran forces with unconditional and public support proved prudent; by 1970, the conflict was over, and the Biafrans had lost. France’s hopes of establishing a proxy state in the region were quelled by this outcome, but their involvement in the conflict—and how protracted it became—is undeniable. In this simulation, perhaps France will use a new approach to accomplish its goals. In any case, France is willing to provide substantial military support to the allies it chooses.

Mali

There’s very little known about Mali’s involvement in the Nigerian-Biafran War. Mali had only achieved full independence in 1960, and was still very much a nascent country at the outbreak of the Biafran War. During the Biafran War, Mali faced a host of domestic crises of its own. In 1967,

¹⁶⁴ Griffin, 2015.

¹⁶⁵ Arseneault, 2017.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

suffering from a flagging economy, Mali “entered into monetary negotiations with France” in an effort to support the nation.¹⁶⁷ In 1968, Mali’s first president, Modibo Keita, was overthrown in a nonviolent coup helmed by Moussa Traoré.¹⁶⁸ While Traoré’s reclamation of Mali was successful, his administration was decidedly less so. Plagued by a debilitating drought that started in 1968 and lasted 6 years, which in turn resulted in death, hysteria, discontent, and political upheaval, Traoré’s time in the presidency was marked by turbulence. As dissent swelled, the government only grew more repressive.¹⁶⁹ The Traoré administration spent much of its energy managing an emerging country on the brink of collapse; naturally, participation in another nation’s civil war was among the least of Mali’s priorities.

That being said, it’s not impossible to believe that Mali did have vested interests in the outcome of the war; as a fledgling country looking to establish itself, the effects of a conflict of global consequence were almost certainly on the minds of Mali’s citizens and statesmen. This could be an excellent opportunity for Mali to bring more international efforts into Africa, subsequently helping Mali as well. Furthermore, by choosing a side, Mali has the chance to build a powerful new ally at the conclusion of the conflict.

Nigeria

When it comes to Nigeria’s stance on the Biafran War from a foreign policy perspective, there are undoubtedly many moving parts due to various alliances. At a high level, both the Soviet Union and Great Britain were the main supporters of the Federal Nigerian government, whereas countries such as Israel and France were on the other side of the equation. One of the main causes of the Biafran War in the first place was widespread anti-Igbo sentiment which was a residual effect of British colonization. This “widespread suspicion of Igbo domination was aroused in the north among the Hausa-Fulani Muslims, many of whom opposed independence from Britain.”¹⁷⁰ Feelings such as these were the main rationale behind Britain’s strong support of the Nigerian government.

¹⁶⁷ Encyclopedia Britannica Online. “Mali.” <https://www.britannica.com/place/Mali/Independent-Mali>.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Hurst, Ryan. “Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970).” BlackPast, May 9, 2019. <https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/nigerian-civil-war-1967-1970/>.

Many of the foreign allies and enemies of Nigeria were integral in the exacerbation of internal problems as well. Military coups were markedly common in the years leading up to the war, which caused surrounding states to become accustomed to the action. Once neighboring countries began to understand Nigeria's internal issues, more relationships were crafted (or destroyed); the new republic of Biafra was recognized by Tanzania, Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Zambia, and Haiti.¹⁷¹ As for the side of Nigeria, they received assistance from the Egyptian Air Force via the use of fighter jets to bomb Biafrans.¹⁷² Further examples of international prowess on Nigeria's domestic issues included British company Shell-BP's influence on petroleum extraction within the region.¹⁷³ The main issue that Nigeria had to face was the scrutiny of the United Nations and Western member states, such as Canada, regarding Biafran claims of genocide of the Igbo people. ***For the purposes of this simulation, the delegates representing Nigeria should not engage with any form of genocide or ethnic conflict. You may propose humanitarian solutions, but you should not promote the civilian-targeted violence of the war. When it comes to plans for the crisis elements, we encourage you to think of creative solutions which can promote Nigeria's interests. This could be a two-state solution, peaceful reunification, creating a smaller or larger state, and more. We hope this note can provide you with more direction, as much of the committee demands Nigeria's input.***

Uganda

Though the Nigerian Civil War lasted 33 months in total, it took ten months for the international community to look for a peaceful resolution to the crisis, which led to both sides of the war meeting in London. It was decided that peace talks would be had at this meeting in order to end hostilities. When asked where the parties would prefer to have these talks take place, the only capital which they could both agree on was Kampala, the capital of Uganda.¹⁷⁴ While the talks eventually broke down, it was internationally recognized that Uganda was a neutral party in the conflict, as the current head of state at the time, Dr. Apollo Milton Obote, did not show any hostility towards

¹⁷¹ Uche, 113.

¹⁷² Stremlau, 333.

¹⁷³ Uche, 115-116.

¹⁷⁴ "Uganda: Biafra-Nigeria Peace Talks Open in Kampala." Reuters Archive Licensing. ScreenOcean, May 23, 1968. <https://reuters.screenocean.com/record/237603>.

Biafra's position, nor actively against the Nigerian government by acknowledging Biafra as a republic, as several other countries did at the time. As an African voice on the Security Council, Uganda can readily direct how other African countries should address the situation.

Japan

Japan's rise to international prominence was a meteoric one. Though Japan's fledgling imperial ambitions came to an end with the end of the Second World War, the State of Japan was arguably far more successful in pursuing international influence than the Empire ever was. After surrendering to Allied powers in 1945, Japan adopted a new, democratic constitution in 1947, and was subsequently granted United Nations membership by 1956. From here, Japan exploded onto the world stage as a major economic power—and a growing threat to the financial, economic, and industrial dominance of the West. A period of extraordinary and unprecedented growth, dubbed the "Japanese Economic Miracle," began in the 1960s; soon, Japan was the world's second-largest economy.¹⁷⁵

This sudden rise in power and agency came as a shock to the West, and played a significant role in influencing policy decisions surrounding the Biafran War. Biafra was frequently called "another Japan"—an epithet born of a fear that Biafra would grow into an international powerhouse, much like Japan did, if Ojukwu's rebellion was successful.¹⁷⁶ European powers, in particular, took issue with the Biafran rebels, arguing that supporting Biafra would create another world power, another competitor, and another potential aggressor. The Nigerian administration, on the other hand, was considered far more pliable and manageable than the Biafrans. Ultimately, while Japan's direct role in the Biafran War was negligible, its transitive effect on Biafran-centric policy decisions was massive. Perhaps it is time for Japan to live up to the suspicions, and guide the development and success of "another Japan."

Jordan

¹⁷⁵ "Understanding the Japanese "Economic Miracle"." *The Brookings Bulletin* 13, no. 1 (1976): 4-7. Accessed August 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23780983>.

¹⁷⁶ Adefaka, Bashir. "How Fear of Japan Diminished Biafra - Nwokedi." *Vanguard News*, December 7, 2011. <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/12/how-fear-of-japan-diminished-biafra-nwokedi/>.

While the nation of Jordan was not directly involved with the Biafran War, it is important to note that Jordan was engaged in its own civil war at around the same time. One of the players in the Jordanian Civil War also happened to be a major player in the Biafran War: Israel. Many of the issues surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict affected Jordan negatively, especially since the Palestine Liberation Organization had a strong presence within Jordan.¹⁷⁷ At first, Israel gave the Nigerian Federal Military Government hefty sums of money to support arms dealing, yet soon shifted their support to the Biafran secession. This was due to the fact that "A major goal of Israeli diplomacy was to wean the African states away from the Arab states, and given the way that the majority of African nations supported Nigeria, Israel was loath to antagonise them by supporting Biafra too overtly."¹⁷⁸ As a result, Jordan shares similar views to Israel regarding the two groups involved in the Biafran War, especially since the PLO also provided support for the Nigerian Federalists following 1968. Jordan can also help influence the opinion of its neighbors in the Middle East, opening the door for more post-colonial countries to weigh in on this issue.

Argentina

As Argentina itself was going through its own period of civil unrest, its focus had turned inwards and did not have an official position on the Biafran War. It was largely self-sufficient in oil production by the early 1960s,¹⁷⁹ and therefore was largely unaffected by the squeeze of Nigerian oil and the crisis at the Suez Canal. The Biafran government sent a delegation to Argentina in an attempt to gain international recognition of their state, but failed to secure such acknowledgement.¹⁸⁰ In June of 1966, General Juan Carlos Onganía became the president of Argentina following a military coup in favor of a blend of liberal economic and corporatist policies under an authoritarian regime. NGO work was controlled by the government and was somewhat limited during this time. Religion did play a significant factor in humanitarian aid for Biafra, given that the Igbos were predominantly

¹⁷⁷ "1970: Civil war breaks out in Jordan". BBC Online. 1 January 2010. Archived from the original on 26 June 2006. Retrieved 9 August 2017.

¹⁷⁸ Stremlau, 236

¹⁷⁹ Vasquez, Patricia I. "Argentina's Oil and Gas Sector: Coordinated Federalism and the Rule of Law." Wilson Center. Accessed August 21, 2021. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/argentinas-oil-and-gas-sector-coordinated-federalism-and-the-rule-law>.

¹⁸⁰ Fury Childs, Samuel. A History of the Republic of Biafra. S.I.: CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS, 2021.

Christian. About 90% of the Argentine population identified as Catholic in 1960,¹⁸¹ but the state held religious institutions at arm's length, while the clergy itself was deeply divided on ideology. Providing primarily diplomatic and humanitarian support on this conflict, Argentina can take a more “soft power” stance on the issues that arise..

Uruguay

Like many other South American countries at the time, Uruguay was in a period of internal conflict at the time of the Biafran War, as there was deep unrest between conservatives and liberals in the country. In the decade prior, Uruguayans had seen the stagnation of several key industries, such as agriculture and manufacturing, spur the loss of economic well-being of citizens and lead to high inflation and deficit rates of the late 1960s.¹⁸² The authoritarian president of the time, Jorge Pacheco Areco, declared a state of emergency in the country in 1968 due to unrest from several paramilitary groups, and one in particular named the Tupamaros that were robbing banks, kidnapping, and killing citizens in an attempt to overthrow the government. While the Uruguayan government engaged in very little large-scale foreign policy during this time of unrest, the presence of an insurgency group within their own nation caused the government to restrict civil liberties, much like the Nigerian government did during the Biafran War. Historically, Uruguay has been guided by the principles of nonintervention, multilateralism, and respect for national sovereignty to guide its decisions. With this in mind, Uruguay may advocate for other countries to follow its lead by not intervening much. Or perhaps, the delegates will decide that this is the time for Uruguay to choose a side.

Netherlands

While the Dutch remained neutral on a public scale regarding the Nigerian Civil War, many European nations—such as France, West Germany, Portugal, Spain, and more—shared similar views on the

¹⁸¹ Lima, Eduardo Campos. “Argentina's Catholic Numbers in Sharp DECLINE, Following Latin American Trend.” America Magazine. America: The Jesuit Review, March 9, 2020. <https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2020/03/09/argentinas-catholic-numbers-sharp-decline-following-latin-american-trend>.

¹⁸² “History of Uruguay.” Mother Earth Travel. Accessed August 21, 2021. <http://www.motherearthtravel.com/uruguay/history.htm>.

War on a more private level because only a handful of countries actually recognized Biafra diplomatically. In general, European nations exhibited support for the Biafran forces and furthered the narrative that the situation within Nigeria was, in fact, a genocide. France's Charles de Gaulle heavily supported the Biafran cause, stating that it was a noble secession.¹⁸³ Due to this, many other European nations, with the notable exception of the United Kingdom, followed suit. The Netherlands can be considered a member of this European school of thought via domestic sympathy, yet they remained neutral (both vocally and financially) at an international level. It is up to the delegates of the Netherlands to decide whether this is the correct approach, or if further involvement is necessary.

New Zealand

Having secured full independence in 1947, New Zealand—a relatively new sovereign state—was ill-equipped to boast any real involvement in the war. Geographically remote, politically nascent, and demographically fragile, New Zealand had no real bearing on the course or outcome of the Biafran War. That's not to say, however, that New Zealand's role in global affairs was insignificant—or that they had no interest in the Biafran War. It stands to reason that, having only recently broken free of the shackles of imperial rule, New Zealand had some degree of interest in the liberation of another state. New Zealand was also no stranger to domestic demographic tensions; the genocide—orchestrated by Ngāti Mutunga and Ngāti Tama iwi, or tribes—that devastated the Moriori people throughout the mid-19th century lingered in New Zealanders' collective consciousness, despite having occurred well over a century before the Biafran War.¹⁸⁴ With this perspective, New Zealand will advocate for a swift, just, and humanitarian resolution to the conflict.

Bulgaria

Between 1946 and 1990, Bulgaria (or the People's Republic of Bulgaria) was structured as a socialist republic, notable for its extreme loyalty to the Soviet Union. Under Todor Zhivkov, the Bulgarian

¹⁸³ Olawoyin, 1971.

¹⁸⁴ Itakura, Gen'Ichiro. *Fearful and Shameful: Affective and Ethical Reactions to Modernity in David Mitchell's Cloud Atlas*. Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction 0:0 (2021).

Communist Party politician, Bulgaria strengthened its ties with the Soviets, supporting them both in a political and a military capacity. This was most apparent during 1968's Operation Danube, where the Zhivkov administration supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia with troops, munitions, and tanks.

It stands to reason, then, that Bulgaria's position on the Biafran War aligned extremely closely with the Soviet Union's aims and ends. While Bulgaria did not play a significant military role in the conflict, it's entirely possible that they would if the Eastern Bloc finds that it is in its interests to do so.

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