



Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC)

MUNUC 34



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CHAIR LETTER

Hello delegates,

Welcome to MUNUC 34 and to the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC). I am incredibly excited to be your Chair and to lead fruitful, interesting, and substantive debate at conference this year.

My name is Moritz Reichert, and I will be serving as your DISEC Chair. To tell a bit about myself, I was born in Sydney, Australia before moving to New Jersey and attending school there, where I unfortunately lost my Australian accent (although my love for Vegemite remains intact). I am currently a third year at the University of Chicago, double majoring in Mathematics and Statistics. Within the Model UN sphere of activities, I also serve as a Crisis Director for ChoMUN, which is our collegiate Model UN conference, and I compete with UChicago's traveling competitive Model UN team. Outside of Model UN, I am a research assistant to professors in the UChicago math department, lead some of the finance-oriented clubs on campus, mentor children in Hyde Park in piano, and work as a teaching assistant for some courses. A large component of my free time is dedicated toward going on runs, cultivating my list of best Chicago restaurants, and extensively researching all of the backpacking travel that I will take on in the near future (next stop: Morocco). While I did not compete in Model UN in high school, my college experiences with the activity have made me incredibly excited to sit on the other side of the dais and facilitate a collaborative and exciting environment for every delegate to expand their horizons, debate with one another, and ultimately come to a robust resolution for one of the two topics laid out in the background guide.

I would like to share a few words of wisdom as to actions that will help put each of you in the best spot possible to prime yourself for conference. First and foremost, a superficial review of the problem areas for each topic will not suffice for true success in the committee room. The dais, which is comprised of myself, the moderator, and assistant chairs, will be looking for a rich debate of the nuances of these problems rather than surface-level solutions which are not feasible or practical. Secondly, solutions which have been sourced directly from previous actions taken by countries or the international community are of little significance within this committee. This does not mean that you

should not analyze what has previously been undertaken; rather, I am looking for solutions which build off of pre-existing actions and are creatively adapted to make them more attractive and effective ideas. Finally, I will remain adamant about maintaining a robust and substantial debate in the committee room – I will have little hesitation to pull delegates back into the room if I feel that each speech are words strung together just to hear the sound of your own voice. Similarly, debate where delegates are not engaging with one another but just attempting to promulgate and brute force their own ideas without respect for the other thoughts circulating the room will reflect poorly on yourself.

With that, I would like to finish by discussing some of my expectations for conference. I am holding each of you to the highest of standards—DISEC is a large committee with many delegates, meaning that each delegate must display both leadership and strong engagement with the nuances of the content. I have a particular fondness for General Assemblies, as they provide you with incredible flexibility regarding the position your delegation wishes to take, manners in which you can engage with your fellow peers, and opportunities to create memorable blocs and resolutions. I would much rather see ambitious attempts to create effective solutions and strong interpersonal dynamics than a string of small successes which do not culminate in anything significant. That being said, I am incredibly cognizant of how large of an undertaking it is to participate in such a large GA, and I commend each of you for participating. If at any point we can act as a resource in any capacity, either before or during conference, please do not hesitate to reach out to myself or any other member of the dais. While I am expecting a rigorous and intense few days in Chicago, my primary focus is to ensure that a positive environment is facilitated and that each of you feel that you can perform at your best.

If you have any questions or concerns leading up to the conference, whether it is about the substance of the topics, my expectations for committee, or any other area, please do not hesitate to send me a note.

Wishing you all the best with your research. I am incredibly excited to meet each of you in February and for an exciting couple of days debating topics which I think each of you will find fascinating.

All the best,

Moritz

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TOPIC A: ELECTORAL CONFLICT AND INTERFERENCE

Statement of the Problem

Defining Electoral Conflict

Electoral processes are events within systems of government that attempt to achieve some form of decentralized decision-making in governance. Over the course of history, elections have enabled societies to move away from violence as a means of determining the system of government and who sits atop that governmental hierarchy.¹ Elections can be seen as fair or corrupt, or somewhere in a continuum between those two absolute quantifiers. The public perception of elections can either strengthen or weaken its ability to “function as an umpire for social decision-making.”²

Electoral conflict generally emerges in one of two ways within any type of election. The first type of electoral conflict occurs during the course of an election. This type is a result of various players in an election (e.g., candidates, external government officials, third parties, etc.) using conflict and violence as a means to determine, delay, or otherwise influence the outcome of an election. Given that the aim of this type is undermining the existing electoral process, it often (but not exclusively) occurs within elections that are publicly perceived to be “fairer.”³ The chain of causality should be noted: it is not that the elections cause this type of violence, but rather that this violence causes elections to be undermined and broken down.

The second type of electoral conflict is one that emerges after an election occurs. In this case, any number of stakeholders in the election could be unhappy and leverage conflict and violence as a retaliatory act. Consider, for instance, a case wherein the general public deems an election to have been pre-determined and the ballots not properly counted. The public might, as a result, use conflict to rebel against the alleged result of the election. Conflict and violence can just as easily be used by government officials or other elites to express their discontent with a certain outcome of an election

¹ Jeff Fischer, “Electoral Conflict and Violence,” *IFES: Making Democracy Work*, February 5, 2002, <https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/econflictpaper.pdf>.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

process. This type of violence often (but not exclusively) occurs within elections that are publicly perceived to be more “corrupt.”⁴ In this case, the chain of causality flows in the opposite direction to the first type of electoral conflict: the violence directly stems from the election and the electoral process itself.

Defining Electoral Interference

As with electoral conflict, defining electoral interference presents its own set of troublesome considerations. The most concerning consideration is where the line can be drawn between run-of-the-mill ‘dirty’ politics and true election interference.⁵ Elections are designed for candidates to be able to persuade voters to vote for them, meaning that objectively outlining criteria against which to check for election interference can become difficult. Delegates should keep in mind this issue within the context of their resolutions and include clauses that target actions that can be thought of as true electoral interference rather than a result of potentially imperfect institutions in various countries.

Due to the difficulty in delineating domestic electoral interference, this committee will follow the generally accepted scholarly definition of electoral interference as “attempts by a foreign nation or outside group to manipulate opinion and sway results in another polity’s election.”⁶ A categorical definition of electoral interference (even foreign electoral interference, as this committee will adhere to) is impossible, as seen by the subjectivity in defining what it means to be an “outside group.”

This definition provides delegates with the opportunity to consider what should fall into the framework of electoral interference. For example, in 2017, a group of Macedonian youth executed “fake news” operations in other nations with the intention of generating advertising revenue for themselves.⁷ Inevitably, these operations swayed opinions and influenced, to some marginal extent, the choice of candidate that some voters chose. However, this group of external actors were not financed by any government entities. Delegates should consider whether such examples should be

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Samuel Spies, “Election Interference, V1.0,” MediaWell, Social Science Research Council, October 22, 2019, <https://mediawell.ssrc.org/literature-reviews/election-interference/versions/1-0/>.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Heather C. Hughes and Israel Waismel-Manor, “The Macedonian Fake News Industry and the 2016 US Election,” *PS: Political Science & Politics* 54, no. 1 (January 2021): 19–23, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096520000992>.

categorized as electoral interference, forcing them to be met with the same actions as other state-sponsored interference activities.

Electoral interference can come in multiple shapes and forms, but it is particularly important to distinguish between analog and digital electoral interference. In an age of global technology advancement and adoption, it has never been easier to leverage technology to attempt to influence an election.⁸ Consider, for example, the alleged interference in the United States' 2016 election. This is not the only type of electoral interference: strategies that employ on-the-ground resources, such as intelligence assets, diplomatic ties, or even the threat of sanctions, can all also be considered to be electoral interference. During the drafting of working papers and resolutions, delegates should consider whether a set of actions should broadly be applied to both analog and digital electoral interference, or whether this committee should address the two types of interference in different manners.

Shortcoming of Electoral Systems

Delegates need to keep in mind that countries can have radically different systems of governance and electoral processes. For example, the United States uses the electoral college, a system which decides the victor through state electoral votes, rather than a national popular vote. Germany's Chancellor is nominated by the President of Germany and is then voted on by the legislative body.⁹ Other nations have top officials ushered in through blood lineage, religious institutions, or other factors. As such, there are multiple context-dependent shortcomings of different forms of electoral systems that this background guide is unable to address. The most important consideration to come from this discussion is that solutions cannot be universally implemented based on the fact that said solution can be successfully implemented in one (or a few) nations.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ "The Election of the Federal Chancellor," accessed July 25, 2021, <https://www.bundestkanzlerin.de/bkin-en/chancellery/the-election-of-the-federal-chancellor>.

One of the most glaring shortcomings of electoral systems is the lack of absolute protection from intimidation or pressure to vote for a certain candidate or party.¹⁰ The first type of electoral conflict, defined above, is particularly relevant vis-à-vis the intimidation of voters. Some nations have implemented their own safeguards against voter intimidation. One such protection is the restriction of the presence of federal agents (e.g., the national police or equivalents) at polling locations.¹¹ Voter intimidation comes in multiple forms and does not necessarily need to be explicit: consider the hypothetical example of many ardent supporters of one candidate gathering outside of polling locations during an election.¹² This type of pressure can make voters feel that they need to vote in a certain way for their physical safety.

Another shortcoming of electoral systems is the fallibility of individuals who are involved in the election. Consider electoral systems wherein legislators are responsible for submitting ballots for an elected office. Every legislator has their own personal incentives, particularly in systems of government where the legislators are not directly elected by constituents. Bribes, corruption, lobbying, etc., can all come into play in influencing the vote of these highly influential legislators. As such, elections can quickly be led astray from their original intent—choosing the best person for the position—by personal conflicts of interest.

A third example of electoral shortcoming comes in the form of the digital age. Societies across the world are adopting technological innovation at a pace that is unprecedented. As such, elections are moving toward greater technological innovation as well: voting machines, electronic registration, electronic ballots, and other technologies, are all becoming more prevalent in the electoral systems of countries across the globe.¹³ Unfortunately, this provides another avenue for electoral systems to be undermined, as by shifting elections online, there is a greater opportunity for cybersecurity threats to jeopardize the integrity of the election outcomes. This is particularly prevalent in the

¹⁰ Frank Bitafir Ijon, "Election Security and Violence in Ghana: The Case of Ayawaso West Wougou and Talensi By-Elections," *Asian Research Journal of Arts & Social Sciences*, January 11, 2020, 32–46, <https://doi.org/10.9734/arjass/2020/v10i130139>.

¹¹ Sean Morales-Doyle et al., "Voters Should Not Be Intimidated | Brennan Center for Justice," accessed July 25, 2021, <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voters-should-not-be-intimidated>.

¹² "Explainer: What 'Poll Watching' Really Means," MIT Technology Review, accessed July 25, 2021, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/10/08/1009960/explainer-poll-watching-us-election-2020/>.

¹³ Danielle Root and Liz Kennedy, "9 Solutions to Secure America's Elections," Center for American Progress, accessed July 25, 2021, <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2017/08/16/437390/9-solutions-secure-americas-elections/>.

evolution of electoral interference, wherein state-sponsored actors can now leverage their cybersecurity expertise to threaten the digital electoral infrastructure of nations.¹⁴

The digital age introduces other, more subtle, weaknesses into the electoral system. One influencing factor is the ability to influence voters on a broad scale. Social media has become a large part of everyday life for billions of consumers spread across every country. These platforms serve not only as a mechanism to connect with friends and families but also as a means to express opinions and gather information, such as news. Many examples of disinformation and social media influence operations in the context of electoral interference have been widely published and discussed.¹⁵ These types of issues begin to blur the lines between the private and public sectors within the discussion of elections. Delegates might want to consider whether public-private partnerships are effective, or if not, what other mechanisms can be used to reduce the threat of electoral interference in the face of digital elections.

Addressing Electoral Conflict

Solutions regarding electoral conflict need to consider the root of the conflict. In the definition provided above, the first type of conflict can be caused by a number of contributing factors. Many of these issues come in the form of imperfect institutions or governance mechanisms in a nation. In certain situations, a tradition of the involvement of military and/or law enforcement officials might enable opportunities for electoral conflict. Or, there might be some recent history of conflict and the election is hotly disputed by the various warring parties. Other types of conflict could just be a result of corrupt government officials that feel as though they can exert their power over legitimate voters.

In the second type of electoral conflict, wherein the conflict occurs after-the-fact, the cause is the election itself. As such, there are likely issues with the electoral system or how the elections are perceived by the public. There might be doubts about the legitimacy of an election outcome or acts

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Jean-Baptiste Jeangene Vilmer and Heather Conley, "Successfully Countering Russian Electoral Interference: 15 Lessons Learned from the Macron Leaks," n.d., 6.

of retaliation in the face of defeat. Solutions to this type of conflict should focus on developing confidence within electoral systems.

The other facet of electoral conflict to consider is the protection and safeguarding of citizens in the face of violence. Once conflict is initiated, the goal of minimizing casualties and finding a peaceful solution should be indisputable. This committee must consider in its resolutions how to protect citizens from the violence associated with electoral conflict. In addition, delegates must consider how to provide guardrails or a framework to ensure that a rapid adoption of a ceasefire and reconciliation can occur after a conflict. While trying to preempt electoral conflict by addressing the root causes is critical, the discussion of providing a robust set of reactionary solutions to electoral conflict cannot be overlooked.

Addressing Electoral Interference

The primary consideration for Electoral Interference is how to essentially “wall-off” elections from all types of foreign influence operations. This quickly becomes a difficult ideal to achieve, given how globalized the modern world is. As such, solutions should aim to address broad areas of vulnerability to electoral interference rather than becoming obsessed with how to perfectly achieve isolation from foreign influence.

Discussion of this topic must seriously consider how to prevent cybersecurity vulnerabilities. With the introduction of digital electoral infrastructure, there is an entirely new domain that state-sponsored actors can attack to achieve some electoral interference. Each nation is developing its own military and political cybersecurity capabilities to compete in the digital age. These resources and skills can just as easily be applied to foreign elections in an attempt to sway the outcomes.¹⁶ Delegates must consider how to minimize fraud and provide each nation with the ability to secure themselves in the digital playing field. Some potential solutions could include (but are most certainly not limited to) identity checks of voters, post-election audits, and cybersecurity standards for election infrastructure such as voting machines.¹⁷

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

History of the Problem

The first instances of voting in human history originated in early tribal societies, where the kings or leaders of the tribe would be elected. Typically, these leaders were elected by a council of elders. Given the small number of elders that were voting, all that could be done to influence the decisions was for other members of the tribe to persuade the various elders.

One of the most classic examples of voting was in Ancient Greek society. Under the Spartan Constitution in the 6th century BCE, the author Lycurgus enshrined a system of voting into Spartan society.¹⁸ In Athens, the de facto “home of democracy,” democratic voting was introduced in 574 BCE by the Greek statesman Solon.¹⁹ By the beginning of the 5th century BCE, most male Athenians were able to participate in the voting process, including on issues such as declarations of war and the election of generals.²⁰ Greek voting procedures became so commonplace that voting was allowed to ostracize those deemed to be a threat to the state.²¹ One of the most prevalent examples thereof is when the Athenians voted to exile Themistocles, who is a famous Greek soldier and philosopher.²² The voting process quickly became highly personal and featured many ad hominem attacks, leading to violence and corruption. In fact, corruption in the electoral process became so prevalent that many government positions were eventually filled through lottery rather than elections.²³

The other notable ancient empire to mention with respect to elections is the Roman Empire. Rome was initially created as a monarchy; however, after the expulsion of its last king, the Romans established the Senate.²⁴ The Senate formed a group of legislators who were indirectly elected. Over time, Roman society became increasingly more excited by the idea of elections, to the point where

¹⁸ “How Was Sparta Organised?,” *The Secret of Civilization* (blog), accessed September 28, 2021, <http://www.civilization.org.uk/greece/greece-extra/sparta/sparta-constitution/>.

¹⁹ “Solon | Biography, Reforms, Importance, & Facts,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed September 28, 2021, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Solon>.

²⁰ National Geographic Society, “Democracy (Ancient Greece),” *National Geographic Society*, March 15, 2019, <http://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/democracy-ancient-greece/>.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² “The Greeks - Themistocles’ Ostracism,” accessed September 28, 2021, http://www.pbs.org/empires/thegreeks/keyevents/471_c.html.

²³ “A Short History of Voting in the Ancient World | Classical Wisdom Weekly,” accessed September 28, 2021, <https://classicalwisdom.com/politics/a-short-history-of-voting-in-the-ancient-world/>.

²⁴ “Senate | Definition, History, & Facts,” *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed September 28, 2021, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Senate-Roman-history>.

nearly all local and federal officials were voted on.²⁵ As elections became more widespread in society, the Senators became worried about too much direct participation in those elected to government positions. The Senators had become accustomed to the amount of power that they could wield through their position and wanted to safeguard their interests.²⁶ As such, the Senators would oftentimes manipulate the results of the election to result in outcomes more favorable to their personal standing. This was largely done through a vote-buying process, wherein local eligible citizens would be paid to vote in a certain manner.²⁷ Alongside interference, Roman society saw a significant amount of electoral violence starting at around 200 BCE. Politicians would develop close ties with local gang leaders. In turn, the gang leaders would intimidate voters through the threat (and subsequent execution) of violence.²⁸

During the European Renaissance, Europe was reimagining its political and societal institutions. The period between 1300 and 1650 was a time of significant cultural development, largely based on classical traditions and culture. However, this time also saw a heightening of intra-European conflict, often related to the political workings of neighboring countries. One of the most prominent conflicts related to political leadership was the Hundred Years' War. At this point the monarchical tradition of passing leadership through heirs led to a variety of relevant succession-based conflicts. The Hundred Years War originated over disputed claims over the French throne when Charles IV, king of France, died in 1328 without any heirs.²⁹ The closest living relative of Charles IV at the time was his nephew, Edward III of England. While the French throne was claimed in the name of Edward III, the French nobility were dismissive of the claim due to the fact that Edward was not a native Frenchman.³⁰ Accordingly, the throne passed to the cousin of Charles IV, Philip, the Count of Valois. This tension led to a war that started on May 24, 1337 and spanned multiple generations before it ended on

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Andrew Lintott, "Electoral Bribery in the Roman Republic," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 80 (1990): 1–16, <https://doi.org/10.2307/300277>.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Anne Curry, *The Hundred Years War* (Macmillan International Higher Education, 2003).

³⁰ "Hundred Years' War," World History Encyclopedia, accessed September 28, 2021, https://www.worldhistory.org/Hundred_Years'_War/.

October 19, 1453.³¹ Historians estimate that between 2.5-3.5 million people died over the course of those 116 years.³²

More recently, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (“IFES”) conducted a survey in 2001 of all 57 states that were experiencing major electoral events. Of those 57 elections, 24 (42.1%) were classified as “Partly Free” or “Not Free” by the Freedom House rating process. Instances of conflict or violence were identified in a total of 14 out of the 57 countries (24.5%).³³ The survey was run again in 2002 with all countries experiencing major electoral events in that year. IFES determined that there were 32 countries that could be classified as having “Partly Free” or “Not Free” elections.³⁴ The election types for countries that do not have fully free elections vary from everything from legislative to parliamentary to presidential systems of government.

As a case study, IFES highlights the 2001 election that took place in Thailand. In the run-up to the elections, there was widespread knowledge of electoral interference. Candidates had been distributing packets of cash to voters in return for sworn allegiance, usually through those canvassing neighborhoods.³⁵ Money could also be sent to the local village fund rather than given directly to voters, so as to avoid the appearance of directly influencing individuals.³⁶ However, that money would then be distributed by the village to its citizens in return for their votes. Other types of interference included intentional misinformation, wherein voters were told that it was illegal for party members to not vote for their parties, or that rival candidates were disqualified by the Thai election commission.³⁷ In addition, candidates would sometimes find government officers involved in the election process to smuggle in ballot papers, allow for impersonation, or tamper with the ballot boxes.

³¹ “Renaissance Conflict and Rivalries: Cultural Polemics in Europe, c. 1300–c. 1650,” accessed September 28, 2021, <https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/ren/researchcurrent/conflictandrivalries/>.

³² Frederic J. Baumgartner, *France in the Sixteenth Century* (Palgrave Macmillan US, 1995), <https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780312158569>.

³³ Jeff Fischer, “Electoral Conflict and Violence,” *IFES: Making Democracy Work*, February 5, 2002, <https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/econflictpaper.pdf>.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ William F. Case, “THAI DEMOCRACY, 2001. Out of Equilibrium,” *Asian Survey* 41, no. 3 (June 18, 2001): 525–47, <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2001.41.3.525>.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

As the 2001 election progressed in Thailand, electoral violence became more commonplace. On the day of the election, vote counting was disrupted in multiple of the Southern provinces due to violent protests.³⁸ The protests were caused by voters believing that local election officials were rigging the counting procedures to favor certain candidates. In one protest, police vehicles were set on fire, and in others there were dozens, if not hundreds, of casualties.³⁹ The Asian Network for Free Elections (“ANFREL”) noted that violent acts, particularly in the form of assault and murder, were often used as an act of desperation against rival candidates and canvassers.⁴⁰ Tensions were at an all-time high on election day, where over 300 policemen were assigned to each constituency, 40 bomb squads and 37 border patrol police units were on standby, and 805 state hospitals had been told to prepare for victims of electoral violence while also arranging for mobile medical units.⁴¹

One of the most recent examples of electoral interference was during the 2016 United States presidential elections. The United States government states that there is definitive proof that Russia interfered with the 2016 elections.⁴² The first manner in which the interference was conducted was through the Russian Internet Research Agency (“IRA”), which is a troll farm linked to the Kremlin.⁴³ Their purpose was to “wage a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.”⁴⁴ The IRA would use social media to disseminate propaganda according to the aforementioned purpose to skew votes in favor of Donald Trump. Another form of interference that occurred was through the GRU (the Russian intelligence service). The GRU hacked into the email accounts of employees for the Clinton campaign, as well as the email accounts of the Democratic National Committee (“DNC”). Through the infamous

³⁸ James Ockey, “Change and Continuity in the Thai Political Party System,” *Asian Survey* 43, no. 4 (August 1, 2003): 663–80, <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2003.43.4.663>.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ “Thailand Final Report Parliamentary Elections,” accessed September 28, 2021, <https://aceproject.org/en/regions/asia/TH/thailand-final-report-parliamentary-elections>.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² “Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measure Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election,” accessed September 28, 2021, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume1.pdf.

⁴³ “Assessing the Russian Internet Research Agency’s Impact on the Political Attitudes and Behaviors of American Twitter Users in Late 2017 | PNAS,” accessed September 28, 2021, <https://www.pnas.org/content/117/1/243>.

⁴⁴ Dmitry Volchek, “Inside The ‘Propaganda Kitchen’ -- A Former Russian ‘Troll Factory’ Employee Speaks Out,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 17:14:21Z, sec. Russia, <https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-troll-factory-hacking/31076160.html>.

WikiLeaks website, the GRU then disseminated those hacked documents (which totaled over 25,000 documents).⁴⁵

To this day, electoral interference and violence can be found in multiple countries across the world. Many nations will have voting procedures in place as part of their system of government, wherein the elections are manipulated to grossly favor a certain candidate. Delegates must consider the history of electoral interference and violence that spans back to the early tribes of human civilization in order to glean appropriate insights for effective resolutions.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

Past Actions

Previous discussions illustrated the radical ramifications that electoral conflict and interference can have on political systems and society at large. When analyzing the various pieces of electoral conflict and interference, not only are the historical influences important to recognize, but also the manner in which various methods for stabilization have (or have not) been implemented. The approach to understanding effective and ineffective solutions to electoral conflict and interference revolve around two core considerations. First, delegates must validate hypotheses across geographies to eliminate the influence of cultural differences. Any actions that are meant to be utilized on a global scale to address this topic must be generalizable enough such that they are not reliant on the cultural niches of a certain country or geography. The other consideration needs to be a thoughtful exploration of the short-term and long-term consequences of each action. Considering areas throughout the world that have experienced some form of electoral conflict or interference, and cross-checking the validity of potential solutions, helps inform a more robust set of potential actions. For example, suggesting each nation to spend a certain percent of GDP on cybersecurity for elections might have helped countries such as the U.S. in 2016; however, in more rural societies that still rely on paper ballots, such a requirement would amount to nothing more than frivolous spending. Understanding the past actions of players in the space can also enable greater insights into what has historically been successful, and how new ideas can be engineered to improve or reimagine old concepts.

One particularly prevalent strategy that has been implemented against electoral conflict is peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies. These types of strategies often encompass youth programs, election observations, police training, and civic education, among others. To take youth programming as an example, the youth are often excluded from the political process. Given their malleability and naïveté, the youth are often vulnerable to recruitment by political actors that are looking to instigate electoral conflict.⁴⁶ The success rate of such exploitation is increased due to the fact that the youth typically experience high levels of unemployment. By setting out programming

⁴⁶ "Youth Engagement," accessed September 28, 2021, <https://www.ifes.org/issues/youth-engagement>.

that engages the youth and teaches them about the election process, they can theoretically be convinced to stay away from electoral conflict.⁴⁷

Youth programming has been implemented in Liberia, a country with a significant youth population.⁴⁸ Children were recruited during the Liberian civil wars as fighters and can be easily mobilized by political parties for violent purposes. NAYMOTE, a Liberian organization, has used youth programming to train young populations to avoid being exploited for electoral conflict.⁴⁹ It should be noted that youth programming, among other peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies, has yet to have its value empirically proven. As such, the success of implementing this type of programming cannot be fully relied upon.⁵⁰

Another solution that was implemented during the Liberian elections was the revamping of the relevant security forces. This was a solution that was driven by the Liberian government and domestic institutions and was focused on ensuring the performance of security forces throughout the electoral cycle.⁵¹ The idea is that security forces, such as the police and military, can provide a guarantee for election security if they are well-equipped, well-trained, and well-intentioned.⁵² The police in particular can help mitigate violence by acting in a nonpartisan and visible manner; however, when not aligned or ill-equipped, the police might instead serve as passive bystanders or even active perpetrators of crime. In Liberia, the Liberia National Police (“LNP”) were responsible for securing the elections, with some levels of international assistance. However, the LNP found that they had significant shortages of properly trained officers and not enough financial and logistical resources to rise to the challenge.⁵³ Although underfunded and understaffed, with over 1/3 of Liberian voters saying that they did not see any LNP officers present at the polling station, the police were nonetheless well-trained and deployed. The Economic Community of West African States

⁴⁷ “Youth and Politics in Conflict Contexts | Wilson Center,” accessed September 28, 2021, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/youth-and-politics-conflict-contexts>.

⁴⁸ “What Works in Preventing Election Violence: Evidence from Liberia and Kenya,” accessed September 28, 2021, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/pw143-what-works-in-preventing-election-violence-evidence-from-liberia-and-kenya.pdf>.

⁴⁹ “NAYMOTE,” Peace Insight, accessed September 28, 2021, <https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/organisations/naymote/>.

⁵⁰ “The Sad Irony of Youth Participation in Election Violence,” Young African Leaders Initiative, June 24, 2016, <https://yali.state.gov/the-sad-irony-of-youth-participation-in-election-violence/>.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ursula E Daxecker, “The Cost of Exposing Cheating: International Election Monitoring, Fraud, and Post-Election Violence in Africa,” *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 4 (July 1, 2012): 503–16, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312445649>.

⁵³ Ibid.

("ECOWAS") and United Nations Mission in Liberia ("UNMIL") helped train LNP officers and improve their professionalism and crowd control. In addition, the UNMIL deployed 300-400 additional officers to assist with the security of the elections.⁵⁴

Another strategy that has been widely implemented is election monitoring. This process involves having independent parties observe and evaluate the electoral process in a country. These observers can also hold the electoral process to the domestic and international standards set out for democratic elections.⁵⁵ By bringing the reports of the observers together, election monitors can help substantiate legitimacy and confirm victory or defeat, as well as comment upon the veracity of any fraud allegations.⁵⁶ Election monitoring is largely dependent on cooperation from the host government. One major risk to note with election monitoring is that, although they do help evaluate the nature of the electoral process, their role is largely passive. As such, it can be easy to rely on the monitors too heavily and buy into a false sense of security and integrity.

Election monitoring was implemented in Kenya during the 2017 elections, albeit with significant difficulties and headwinds. Election monitors were present on election day, originating from nine international missions including the Carter Center, the African Union, the European Union, and the Commonwealth.⁵⁷ The consensus of these nine missions was that the election that was held had been peaceful, free, fair, transparent, and credible. However, slightly after the August 8 election, the Kenyan Supreme Court declared that the election was illegitimate and void due to ballot irregularities. As a result of these opposed stances, the international election monitors faced significant backlash from the Kenyan political institutions and Kenyan society broadly.⁵⁸ During the make-up election, international and domestic observers were unable to adequately execute their job due to security concerns.⁵⁹ In fact, in several areas of the country, observers were denied access to

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Andrew T. Little, "Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 7, no. 3 (June 13, 2012): 249–83, <https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00011078>.

⁵⁶ Jørgen Elklit and Palle Svensson, "The Rise of Election Monitoring: What Makes Elections Free and Fair?," *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 3 (1997): 32–46, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1997.0041>.

⁵⁷ "International Observers and the Kenya Election," Council on Foreign Relations, accessed September 28, 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/international-observers-and-kenya-election>.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ "Chief Observer Presents EU EOM Final Report on 2017 Kenya Elections, 10 January 2018," Text, EEAS - European External Action Service - European Commission, accessed September 28, 2021, https://eeas.europa.eu/election-observation-missions/eom-kenya-2017/38107/chief-observer-presents-eu-eom-final-report-2017-kenya-elections-10-january-2018_en.

the polling stations and sometimes even outright attacked. This should serve not as a deterrent from any sort of election monitoring system, but as a reminder that the realities of each potential solution should be thoroughly considered.

Another action that has been previously implemented to mitigate electoral conflict and interference has been to leverage the expertise of international institutions on a case-by-case basis. Through organizations such as the United Nations and other international working groups, some of the foremost academics, researchers, and thought leaders have been brought together to convey economic and political ideas for reform. During previous periods of electoral violence, bodies such as the United Nations Development Program (“UNDP”), the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (“International IDEA”), the United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”), the IFES, and the United States Institute for Peace (“USIP”) have been leveraged to specify the risk factors for electoral violence.⁶⁰

To mitigate the effects of electoral interference, many developed nations have strengthened their election cybersecurity strategy. This has been particularly reinforced after the 2016 US presidential election interference occurred. In the United States, government bodies such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”) and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission help each state adequately prepare cybersecurity platforms for elections.⁶¹ In the European Union, the domestic cybersecurity and election bodies of each member state work with the larger European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (“ENISA”) to properly secure elections.⁶² In addition to these cybersecurity protocols, many governments that have formerly embraced digital voting technology are advocating for a return to analog systems.⁶³ These paper-based processes are not prone to the same level of cyber threat that correspond to digital voting processes.⁶⁴

Electoral interference can also be mitigated through interagency and international cooperation. Being able to shift resources between various agencies and departments within a nation provides

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ QUENTIN E. HODGSON, MARYGAIL K. BRAUNER, and EDWARD W. CHAN, “Securing U.S. Elections Against Cyber Threats: Considerations for Supply Chain Risk Management” (RAND Corporation, 2020), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26524>.

⁶² Konstantinos Voudouris, “The European Networks and Information Security Agency - ENISA,” n.d., 4.

⁶³ Lawrence Norden and Ian Vandewalker, “Securing Elections from Foreign Interference,” n.d., 42.

⁶⁴ Michael Ian Shamos, “Paper v. Electronic Voting Records – An Assessment,” n.d., 23.

greater flexibility to secure an election from any interference. For example, in 2014, Moldova introduced a digital voter register that recorded voters' presence at polling stations as a verification mechanism. However, the Moldovan Election Commission did not secure an appropriate number of servers, causing the entire system to crash and leading to public perception that interference was underway.⁶⁵ The Moldovan Election Commission had previously developed a robust connection with the Moldovan Security Services. As such, they could leverage that interagency relationship to secure additional servers and promptly return the election to the commission's control.⁶⁶ International cooperation is slightly more difficult to achieve, given matters of proprietary and confidential information, as well as sovereignty. However, partnerships such as the Five Eyes intelligence alliance between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States has pushed the boundaries of transparency across allies.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Sam von der Staak Wolf, Peter, *Cybersecurity in Elections: Models of Interagency Collaboration*, 2019, <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/cybersecurity-in-elections-models-of-interagency-collaboration.pdf>.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Corey Pfluke, "A History of the Five Eyes Alliance: Possibility for Reform and Additions," *Comparative Strategy* 38, no. 4 (July 4, 2019): 302–15, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2019.1633186>.

Possible Solutions

One broad approach to take when tackling electoral interference and security is the centralization of power and legitimacy in Electoral Management Bodies (“EMBs”). An EMB serves as the national center for managing and securing the electoral process. There is empirical evidence that by possessing credibility, EMBs significantly increase election security.⁶⁸ EMBs can be empowered to take control of the electoral process through: (i) obtaining the necessary technical skills and (ii) obtaining the necessary capacity to appropriately manage all voting streams. When properly staffed, trained, and resourced, EMBs can function within any system of government and centralize all decision making.⁶⁹ Assuming that the EMB possesses the necessary credibility in the eyes of the populace, an election can *de facto* be run through the EMB and all legitimacy will be conferred to the winner. This greatly reduces the chance of any electoral conflict from other political candidates that did not succeed. The added benefit of EMBs is that a centralized, stable electoral process is one that naturally attracts less electoral interference from foreign and domestic actors.⁷⁰

The role of security services, such as police and military, are also to be considered. In every society, but particularly within developing nations, it is critical that security services find the right balance between deterrence and confidence-building during times of elections.⁷¹ However, it should not be assumed that a well-trained and well-equipped security service will single-handedly suffice with respect to confidence building. Especially in countries where there is significant mistrust in the electoral process, security services should work with local leaders and the judiciary to effectively combat impunity while serving as an additional source of legitimacy for the elections.⁷² Delegates may consider new pathways for security services to engage with local actors to uncover networks of those instigating electoral conflict. Other potential solutions in this space include encouraging interagency collaboration between national and local security forces, as well as peace workers. It

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ “Strategic Planning of Electoral Management Bodies,” accessed September 28, 2021, <https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/em/eme/emeo5>.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Kristine Höglund and Anna K Jarstad, “Strategies to Prevent and Manage Electoral Violence : Considerations for Policy,” n.d., 5.

⁷² Ibid.

could also be suggested that security forces should be trained in electoral laws and the codes of conduct.⁷³

Another potential way to address electoral conflict is through pacts and pledges between the various political parties and candidates. The thought process behind these approaches is that political parties will feel less compelled to contest elections through violence if they can be assured that other parties will also not contest the elections through violence. The empirical evidence on the categorical use of such codes of conduct is still controversial among scholars.⁷⁴ However, some approaches following this method have proven to be extremely useful in reducing electoral conflict. For example, the Ghanaian code of conduct, spearheaded by the Ghana Political Parties Program (“GPPP”), is considered a model framework for codes of conduct. The code requires party leaders to meet once a month at the EMB to review compliance with the code, with a national body overseeing the compliance.⁷⁵ The code contains no legal retributions for those that violate the code, but there may be backlash by being publicly called out by the GPPP, their peers, or the EMB.⁷⁶ As such, delegates may consider what type of framework, if any at all, would allow such codes of conduct to become broadly effective.

In order to combat cyber electoral interference, one approach to take is to consider the equipment that is being used to enable such systems. Oftentimes, countries with digital voting procedures will have antiquated voting machines and technology stacks. For example, the Brennan Center estimates that 42 states are using voter registration databases that were initially created over ten years ago.⁷⁷ These systems will run discontinued software such as Windows XP or Windows 2000, which is greatly more exposed to cyberattacks relative to more modern software that is vendor-supported.⁷⁸ Post-election audits may also be useful in preventing cyberattacks on digital voting equipment. Many digital voting systems will track votes with a paper record of the votes. As such, employees of an

⁷³ Nahomi Ichino and Matthias Schündeln, “Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana,” *The Journal of Politics* 74, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 292–307, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381611001368>.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ransford Gyampo, “The Voluntary Code of Conduct for Elections in Ghana,” 2019, 99–102.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ D. Ashok Kumar and T. Ummal Sariba Begum, “Electronic Voting Machine — A Review,” in *International Conference on Pattern Recognition, Informatics and Medical Engineering (PRIME-2012)*, 2012, 41–48, <https://doi.org/10.1109/ICPRIME.2012.6208285>.

EMB or other governmental body could sample a sufficiently large enough number of ballots to catch and prevent a hack or software error from changing the results of elections. These post-election audits can also assure voters that regardless of what type of attack may be launched, the ultimate vote tallies can be confidently relied upon.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Lawrence Norden et al., "POST-ELECTION AUDITS: RESTORING TRUST IN ELECTIONS," n.d., 90.

Bloc Positions

Electoral conflict and interference have broad impacts across the globe. To be sure, the nuances of such violence and interference are generally more dependent on a case-by-case and country-by-country basis. That being said, certain regions might experience more digital interference, and are subsequently more focused on the cybersecurity and deterrence aspects of the topic, whereas other regions and countries are more focused on combating electoral conflict. As seen in the graphic below, there is no one region in which electoral conflict and interference are localized. Even with regard to technological disruptions to elections, countries in almost every continent have experienced their own troubles.




Figure 1: From Freedom House <https://freedomhouse.org/article/report-digital-election-interference-widespread-countries-across-democratic-spectrum>

New Democracies

"New Democracies" would include countries that established their democratic systems within the past 50 years or so, and are still developing their electoral infrastructures. One issue is the influence

of fake social media. For example, the 2018 Brazilian election saw large-scale misleading propaganda distributed through WhatsApp to Brazilian voters in favor of a candidate. Similarly, the 2017 Presidential election in Honduras was subject to hundreds, if not thousands, of fake accounts supporting some candidates. Another issue is when the citizens of a New Democracy do not have trust in the election system. The 2017 Kenyan election and the 2018 Zimbabwe election both had large-scale protests in response to the results. In these cases, participants of these protests were often met with police violence. Finally, New Democracies can also be fraught with corruption. The 1988 Mexican election was blatantly fraudulent; even the former president Miguel de la Madrid admitted that the PRI party tampered with results, when it became obvious that the PRI candidate would lose. So, New Democracies have to consider foreign influence, trust in the system, peaceful election results, and anti-corruption, in order to prevent electoral conflict.

Full Democracies

Even in countries with longstanding democratic traditions, there are still threats of electoral conflict. After the Russian government interfered in the 2016 American election, democratic nations around the world placed a significant emphasis on the cybersecurity and digital privacy of their elections.⁸⁰ The European Union in particular has focused heavily on providing their member states with the necessary toolkit to secure their elections from any interference. For example, the European Union will often deploy its own personnel to help with election observation in member states and across the world to ensure that elections are free and fair. However, with the growing split and polarization of politics, especially with populist movements taking root in many European countries, tension with regard to elections is increasing. As these nations have led the democratic world order since post-WWII, they can help forge solutions in substantive mechanisms to prevent different forms of electoral conflict around the world.

⁸⁰ Mueller, Robert S., Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election § (2019).

Hybrid Regimes

Hybrid regimes have elements of democratic and authoritarian regimes, and typically emerge from an incomplete transition to a democracy.⁸¹ Hybrid regimes may have a variety of democratic institutions, but these systems are usually under the control of one political entity, and therefore do not lead to significant change. After the end of the USSR, Russia could be considered a hybrid regime, as multiple parties competed in elections, but the political system was still heavily influenced by powerful oligarchs. This structure allowed for the United Russia party to essentially transform Russia into a one-party system. An example of electoral conflict in hybrid regimes is noted in the earlier graphic; some Southeast Asian countries impose restrictions on digital campaigning for opposition parties. Delegates representing these nations should be concerned about how parties might try to consolidate political power, as this can lead to conflict. It is critical for hybrid regimes to protect their democratic systems, if they wish to maintain trust in election results.

Authoritarian Regimes

Many nations around the world simply do not have traditions of elections. Authoritarian regimes are still affected by electoral conflict. To begin, all governments must have a plan for who will succeed the current leader. Democracies host elections, while a monarchy usually passes leadership to a royal family member. With this in mind, regimes without democratic systems should be concerned about ways to protect the legitimacy of succession; this can include solutions on how to integrate democratic systems into authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, cyber attacks on elections have often been based in authoritarian countries. It's the responsibility of these countries to cooperate on this new security threat, and work to prevent electoral conflict caused by cyber attacks. Finally, it should be noted that **no delegate should take an aggressively anti-democracy stance in this committee.** Debate in committee will revolve around ways to reduce conflicts that stem from elections, and every nation can provide help in this matter.

⁸¹ Ekman, Joakim. "Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analyzing Hybrid Regimes." *International Political Science Review* 30, no. 1 (2009): 7–31. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512108097054>.

TOPIC B: STATE FRAGILITY

Statement of the Problem

Significance of State Fragility

The recent development and prevalence of globalization has connected every country in ways previously unimaginable. Nations and people are connected through trade, politics, transportation, technology, and a whole host of other mechanisms. The subsequent ramifications of such an interconnected society include that the pressures on one fragile state can radically impact not only its own citizens and institutions, but its regional neighbors and countries thousands of miles away. For example, recent Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) into very fragile states means that the economic activity and well-being of many countries, even those that are considered to be developed, partially hinges on the stability and flourishing of the fragile states.⁸² It is also important to note the regional implications of having a fragile state that falls into disarray. Countries depend on the stability of their neighbors and the broader region in which they sit to ensure that there can be effective governance and security for their citizens.⁸³ However, when a nation falls into disarray, issues such as refugee influx and cross-border violence can cause a disruption to the regional status quo.⁸⁴

A nation’s borders are oftentimes arbitrarily drawn and do not necessarily reflect a total isolation and demarcation between people and cultures. For example, the 1885 Berlin Conference is infamously known as a quintessential example of when the European leaders met and decided to arbitrarily draw up borders for African nations, many of which exist to this day.⁸⁵ In such situations, where borders were the result of colonialism, these state boundaries are often challenged. While violence is

⁸² Alexandros Ragoussis and Heba Shams, “FDI in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations,” in *Global Investment Competitiveness Report 2017/2018: Foreign Investor Perspectives and Policy Implications* (The World Bank, 2017), 135–59, https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1175-3_ch5.

⁸³ “Bad Neighbors: Failed States and Their Consequences,” GSDRC, accessed October 23, 2021, <https://gsdrc.org/document-library/bad-neighbors-failed-states-and-their-consequences/>.

⁸⁴ Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich, “No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons, and Child Soldier Recruits,” *Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States*, 2010, 55–76.

⁸⁵ “Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 - Oxford Reference,” accessed October 23, 2021, <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195337709.001.0001/acref-9780195337709-e-0467>.

one outcome of border disputes, there are other cross-border implications of instability. The financial and economic volatility that can result from a fragile state to the neighboring countries and the larger region could be just as impactful. This is additionally by no means limited to the African nations: every country is influenced by neighboring and regional matters. Consider the European Union (“EU”), which is considered to be a regional partnership of developed nations. When one EU member state has issues, the ramifications are widespread across the entire system. One can simply consider the 2009 debt crisis in Greece to understand how even financial fragility can radically upend a region.⁸⁶

While considering fragile states, so-called developed nations should not consider themselves as free from the issue and threats of state fragility. Consider first the fact that, as previously emphasized, the negative implications of a fragile or failed state are not limited to that state itself, or even the region in which it sits. Due to rampant globalization and cultural connections throughout the world, the ramifications of state fragility can impact the security, safety, and status quo for citizens across the globe. In addition to the threat of very fragile states impacting the nation, there is no country that is truly free from state fragility. State fragility will be defined later in this section; however, state fragility does not necessarily mean a state that is near failure or cannot in any way protect its citizens. State fragility refers to aspects of a nation that are insufficient to adequately and effectively ensure proper governance and safety for its citizens. When considered from this angle, every nation can be considered a fragile state, and state fragility quickly transforms from a binary demarcation to a spectrum.

On the topic of state fragility being an index, it would be worthwhile for delegates to consider the Fragile States Index (“FSI”), published by the Fund for Peace.⁸⁷ In this index, each nation is ranked in terms of how fragile the state is relative to other nations across the world. Factors that are considered include (but are not limited to) the security apparatus, economic decline, state legitimacy, and refugees. This source is not meant to be a comprehensive guide for how to approach

⁸⁶ “Greece’s Debt Crisis Timeline,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed October 23, 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/greeces-debt-crisis-timeline>.

⁸⁷ “Methodology | Fragile States Index,” accessed October 23, 2021, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/methodology/>.

the issue of state fragility. Rather, the FSI serves to prove that no state is truly free from fragility and imperfect institutions.

Defining State Fragility

The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development ("OECD"), an international Non-Governmental Organization ("NGO") that works with countries across the globe to foster economic development, published a definition for state fragility in their article *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations* ("Principles").^{88 89} The OECD defined state fragility in Principles as "when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations."⁹⁰ This is a commonly used definition that encompasses the consequences of a fragile versus non-fragile state. Note that the definition relies heavily on the end results of a "stable" state, i.e., the goals of safeguarding security and human rights, poverty reduction, and development. The means through which this can be accomplished is left vague beyond the need for the ends to be secured through some sort of political process and/or institution. This highlights a key point of the discussion of state fragility: each nation has their own systems, institutions, and political processes. The international community, in its effort to find a framework for mitigating state fragility, cannot infringe on the sovereignty and political systems that are in place.

While this is a very commonly used and well-cited definition of state fragility across the academic and political literature, there are natural criticisms that have been highlighted as well. One such critique is that the definition can in no way distinguish between fragile states and underdeveloped states.⁹¹ It is critically important that delegates do not synonymize fragility and underdevelopment. As mentioned before, each state has its own form(s) of fragility and underdevelopment does not imply fragility (nor vice versa). For example, some underdeveloped states can be considered to be

⁸⁸ "About the OECD - OECD," accessed October 23, 2021, <https://www.oecd.org/about/>.

⁸⁹ "Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States & Situations," accessed October 23, 2021, <https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/38368714.pdf>.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ James Putzel, "Why Development Actors Need a Better Definition of 'State Fragility,'" Monograph (London, UK: London School of Economics and Political Science, Crisis States Research Centre, September 2010), <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/Home.aspx>.

quite fragile, while others (such as Tanzania and Zambia⁹²) have been able to achieve significant periods of peace and safety for their citizens despite being underdeveloped. These two categories of countries lie in different points along the spectrum of fragile states.

Underdeveloped states, by definition, have limited ability to reduce poverty, promote development, and install the appropriate security apparatus to safeguard their citizens.⁹³ To develop a more robust definition of state fragility, it could be useful to consider why some states, such as Somalia⁹⁴ and Haiti⁹⁵, are more fragile than other states, such as the aforementioned examples of Tanzania and Zambia, even though all such countries are considered to be economically underdeveloped.

Finally, the definition of “state fragility” which is most suitable for this committee, was put forth by the Conflict Studies Research Centre (“CSRC”), which is a research arm of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense. The CSRC lists four key factors against which state fragility should be measured: (i) the failure of the state to exercise a monopoly over the legitimate use of force; (ii) the failure of the state to develop basic bureaucratic capacity; (iii) the failure of the state to overrule edicts from non-state institutional systems; and (iv) the failure of the state to control its territory.⁹⁶ These characteristics are observable and measurable, to some extent, and can help distinguish fragile states from underdeveloped states broadly.

Security Issues of Fragile States

When considering security issues in fragile states, one must consider the societal and political backdrop of these problems. Violence, especially as it relates to fragile states, typically arises more often in states that are further along in the aforementioned fragility index.⁹⁷ In these contexts, the state itself is largely nonexistent and cannot properly address conflict that arises within its borders.

⁹² “Eastern Africa: Security and the Legacy of Fragility,” GSDRC, accessed October 23, 2021, <https://gsdrc.org/document-library/eastern-africa-security-and-the-legacy-of-fragility/>.

⁹³ “Underdeveloped Countries 2021,” accessed October 23, 2021, <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/underdeveloped-countries>.

⁹⁴ Ignacio Fuente Cobo, “Somalia: Picturing a Fragile State. The Existential Crisis of the Somali State.,” n.d., 10.

⁹⁵ “Is Haiti a Failing State?,” accessed October 23, 2021, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/haiti-failing-state>.

⁹⁶ “Topic Guide on Fragile States,” accessed October 23, 2021, <http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/con86.pdf>.

⁹⁷ Robin Geiß, “Armed Violence in Fragile States: Low-Intensity Conflicts, and Sporadic Law Enforcement Operations by Third Parties,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 91, no. 873 (March 2009), <https://corteidh.or.cr/tablas/R32030.pdf>.

The actors who can enact violence are often supported by trans-national networks or other criminal and political connections, which makes them all the more elusive and powerful.⁹⁸ The rise of populist ideologies and propaganda makes it more appealing for everyday citizens to become more involved in bouts of conflict.⁹⁹ As such, the “Agent Zero” of the conflict becomes difficult to identify and can quickly morph into ideologically or politically motivated violence.

There are two common events that occur vis-à-vis violence in fragile states: (i) territorial spillover of conflict and (ii) law enforcement operations conducted by third parties. It should be noted that while these two effects are common in the context of very fragile states, they are not a necessary consequence of a very fragile state. Beginning with territorial spillover, one of the most recognizable differences between violence in fragile states and civil wars is the desire for economic gain rather than taking control of the government or changing regimes.¹⁰⁰ The political institutions in very fragile states do not have much impact, meaning that striving to take them over is not worthwhile for such actors. The more important objective for third-party actors is being able to economically prosper.¹⁰¹ This differing motivation makes territorial spillover all the more attractive: there is no reason to remain confined within the borders of one state when there is so much more value that can be unlocked when conducting transnational operations. This spillover effect can be incredibly dangerous to neighboring states, especially in regions with a multitude of particularly fragile states.¹⁰²

The other common event that takes place with respect to security issues in fragile states is third-party actors taking over the role of law enforcement. In very fragile states, as has been mentioned, the political and security apparatuses do not have the ability to serve the law enforcement role. This means that the state has no way to actually maintain peace within its borders. It might seem trivial that criminal networks and other violent actors would want there to be no law enforcement and to let the region run rampant, but this is actually counterproductive to what these actors are looking to

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Sibylle van der Walt, “Populism and the Yearning for Closure: From Economic to Cultural Fragility,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 23, no. 4 (November 1, 2020): 477–92, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431019866338>.

¹⁰⁰ Olivier Nay, “Fragile and Failed States: Critical Perspectives on Conceptual Hybrids,” *International Political Science Review* 34, no. 3 (June 1, 2013): 326–41, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512113480054>.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

accomplish: they want to maintain power and ensure that their illicit activities can be effectively streamlined. Violent and illicit actors are also constantly looking to mitigate any threats to themselves and their activities. As such, third parties will often seek to take over the role of law enforcement and set their own rules and punitive measures. The consequences of this are two-fold: (i) the state effectively loses all legitimacy to control anything occurring in the region, as they have no enforcement mechanism, and (ii) the norms and rules can be entirely rewritten to the desires of these insurgent networks.¹⁰³ The safety and security of citizens under third-party law enforcement structures can (and very often will) very quickly become jeopardized and infringed upon.

Economic Issues of Fragile States

There are two broad categories under which economic issues relating to state fragility can fall: (i) fiscal capacity and (ii) legal capacity.¹⁰⁴ Fiscal capacity here refers to functions that are normally carried out by the state that relate to revenues and fiscal policy. Such topics can include (but are by no means limited to) the ability to tax its citizens, generate additional revenues, attract FDI, invest funds into infrastructure and other public works projects, and appropriately redistribute wealth.¹⁰⁵ Legal capacity in an economic context refers to the legal ability to support markets and enforce economic actions. Such topics can include forming reliable credit markets, tax collection strategies, ensuring fair trade terms between parties, enforcing contracts, and protecting the property of citizens.¹⁰⁶ Particularly fragile states cannot adequately satisfy their responsibilities regarding one or more of these topics. As such, this leaves citizens without any sort of economic security and safety over their belongings, as well as no central authority which can improve the economic well-being of the state.

¹⁰³ Robert B. Zoellick, "Fragile States: Securing Development," *Survival* 50, no. 6 (December 2008): 67–84, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330802601859>.

¹⁰⁴ Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, "Fragile States and Development Policy," *Journal of the European Economic Association* 9, no. 3 (June 1, 2011): 371–98, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01022.x>.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

History of the Problem

This section will cover the past 20-50 years of history to remain relevant and provide delegates with a more contemporary understanding of state fragility. The section will cover three geographical case studies: (i) Sub-Saharan Africa; (ii) Latin America / Caribbean; and (iii) Europe.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Within the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, four countries will be analyzed to understand fragile states within the region: (i) Rwanda, (ii) Mozambique, (iii) the Democratic Republic of Congo (the "DRC"), and (iv) the Central African Republic (the "CAR"). These four states can be thought of as positioned at different points along the fragility index. Rwanda and Mozambique were mired in conflict until about the mid-1990's.¹⁰⁷ Since that point, they have managed to establish peace and rebuild the necessary institutions for their governments to serve their citizens properly.¹⁰⁸ However, the DRC and CAR have not been as fortunate with their ability to establish properly functioning governmental institutions. The DRC had a major period of violence end in 2001, at which point a peace treaty was signed, and held elections in 2003.¹⁰⁹ However, its development has not been sufficient to really implement the necessary capabilities to serve and protect its citizens. The CAR has experienced periodic conflict since it gained its independence from France in 1960. The conflict briefly ceased between 2007-2012 when a peace treaty was signed and observed; however, the country subsequently fell back into a trend of violence.¹¹⁰ What is particularly interesting about these countries is the fact that Mozambique and Rwanda are both resource-poor countries, while the DRC and CAR are resource-rich countries.¹¹¹ As such, access and wealth of natural resources is, if anything, negatively correlated to state fragility within this sample of countries.

¹⁰⁷ "East Africa Living Encyclopedia," accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.africa.upenn.edu/NEH/rwhistory.htm>.

¹⁰⁸ Enrique Gelbard, "Building Resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa's Fragile States," *International Monetary Fund*, n.d., <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dp/2015/afr1505.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ heidirmnp, "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Case Study of War and Failed Peace," Text, Beyond Intractability, June 26, 2020, <https://www.beyondintractability.org/casestudy/chestnut-DRC>.

¹¹⁰ "36. Central African Republic (1960-Present)," accessed October 29, 2021, <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/central-african-republic-1960-present/>.

¹¹¹ "Mapping Africa's Natural Resources | Maps News | Al Jazeera," accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/2/20/mapping-africas-natural-resources>.

The IMF put together of factors in 2015 about the factors that influenced the resiliency and fragility each state, as well as it had developed over recent years.¹¹² A summary graphic on results is shown in the graphic. The most relevant “outcome” this committee is the security, political stability, and



a list of how the for

governance component. As can be seen, even with different geographies, political institutions, and levels of resource access, there is no guarantee that a state will be more or less fragile.

As an aside, the figure above could provide a starting point for delegates to consider different facets of the problem. While the list is by no means exhaustive or the only way to approach finding frameworks and solutions, it could be considered as a launching point for any research and ideation.

Latin America / Caribbean

As an example of state fragility within the Latin America and Caribbean region, Haiti will be considered. Haiti’s transition to democracy became full-fledged in 1986 after Jean-Claude Duvalier, the former President of Haiti and a brutal dictator, went into exile.¹¹³ During Duvalier’s reign, a

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ “Obituary: Jean-Claude ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier, Haiti’s Former ‘President for Life,’” *BBC News*, October 4, 2014, sec. Latin America & Caribbean, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-29493170>.

military division called the Tontons Macoutes would go around the country and enforce the laws in incredibly punitive manners.¹¹⁴ Duvalier's time in power left Haiti scarred and untrusting of the state.¹¹⁵ As such, the democratic institutions that were put into place after 1986 were not properly built up and remained dysfunctional.¹¹⁶ This has led to imperfect institutions and significant amounts of corruption within the Haitian government and political arena. Over the past 20-30 years, Haiti experienced fraudulent and illegitimate elections, military coups, and the threat of violence across all political parties.¹¹⁷

One of Haiti's core vulnerabilities is its economic system and structure of its foreign trade within the region. Haiti has two core export industries: apparel and agriculture.¹¹⁸ Most of Haiti's economic activity is driven around these two industries, which means that exports remain the only true stimulus of economic growth. However, the apparel market (which comprises 67% of Haiti's exports) only goes to the United States. In addition, the United States accounts for about 80% of Haiti's total exports. As such, the economic well-being of Haiti is incredibly dependent on the fluctuations of the US economy. To make matters worse on the foreign trade side, Haiti's imports are three times larger than their exports on an annual basis. This very significant trade deficit causes their financial system to become increasingly more indebted and burdened by the cost of that debt.¹¹⁹ In addition, the imports are largely food and fuel, which leaves Haiti incredibly susceptible to price fluctuations in these two core markets across the globe. As an example, the price of food in Haiti between 2005 and 2008 increased in aggregate by 83% (equating to a 22.3% compound annual growth rate).¹²⁰

Another major vulnerability of Haiti is its location and geography. Due to its position in the Caribbean, Haiti is prone to significant damage from tropical storms and hurricanes that originate in the Atlantic. The country also sits on top of the Caribbean tectonic fault line, which means that shifts

¹¹⁴ Michel S. Laguerre, *Voodoo and Politics in Haiti* (Springer, 2016).

¹¹⁵ COHA, "The Tonton Macoutes: The Central Nervous System of Haiti's Reign of Terror," accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.coha.org/tonton-macoutes/>.

¹¹⁶ "Is Haiti a Failing State?," accessed October 23, 2021, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/haiti-failing-state>.

¹¹⁷ Amélie Gauthier and Madalena Moita, "Vulnerability and Causes of Fragility in Haiti," 2010, 12.

¹¹⁸ "Haiti Overview: Development News, Research, Data | World Bank," accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview>.

¹¹⁹ "Haiti's Troubled Path to Development," Council on Foreign Relations, accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/haitis-troubled-path-development>.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

in the tectonic plates can cause devastating earthquakes. These natural disasters can be so damaging that entire villages and cities can be buried by soil or wiped away by the storms.¹²¹

While these vulnerabilities do make Haiti more susceptible to falling on the further end of the spectrum of fragile states, they do not necessitate it. For example, Cuba shares a very similar geographic location with Haiti, meaning that they are similarly prone to natural disasters.¹²² However, Cuba has managed to build up the necessary capabilities to face the storms and earthquakes which it is likely to experience. For example, Cuba has enabled ways for rapid evacuation of cities to occur and established a national communication network to be used in times of emergencies. These actions by the central government have enabled Cuba to be well-positioned and have less risk of becoming a more fragile state as a result of the natural disasters.¹²³

When considering what makes Haiti one of the few very fragile states in the region, there are three core factors that should be highlighted. First is underdevelopment, which as mentioned before is not synonymous with fragility but is typically correlated. Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and has around 76% of its population subsisting on less than 2 USD per day.¹²⁴ The state does not have the revenues to provide proper education and adequately respond to the needs of its citizens. The second factor is the country's lack of social mobility. The state cannot properly intervene in the "poverty cycle," which means that those stuck at the bottom of the proverbial socioeconomic totem pole have few opportunities to move up in society.¹²⁵ The third factor is the significant inequality that exists within the society. Haitian society has a deep divide between the poor and the wealthy, and the inequality grows wider with each year. As such, the poor have few

¹²¹ Dorte Verner and Alessandra Heinemann, "Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti : Breaking the Conflict-Poverty Trap" (Washington, DC: World Bank, September 2006), <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/10311>.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ "Weathering the Storm: Lessons in Risk Reduction from Haiti," accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.eird.org/isdr-biblio/PDF/Cuba%20Weathering.pdf>.

¹²⁴ "IFRC Country Acceleration Plan 2019 - Haiti - Haiti," ReliefWeb, accessed October 29, 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/ifrc-country-acceleration-plan-2019-haiti>.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

options to earn money for themselves and their family through legitimate economic activities, and consequently resort to illegal activities such as corruption, crime, and illegal trafficking.^{126,127}

Europe

The European Union, one of the most formidable and well-known examples of international cooperation, is not as quintessentially stable as many believe. To be sure, there have been extensive benefits from the European Union and it has fostered a great sense of engagement between the various European nations. On everything from common defense strategies to a single currency, the EU has managed to integrate its member countries and become a pillar for the liberal world order in the 20th and 21st century.

That being said, the European Union has faced its own form of fragility over the past several decades. The turbulence goes back to the beginning for the EU, when it was formed on February 7, 1992, through the Maastricht Treaty. Denmark, one of the most developed nations on the European Continent, held a referendum in 1992 with regards to the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty, and consequently the choice to join the EU, was rejected by 50.7% of voters with a turnout of 83.1%.¹²⁸ While it is easy to look at the slim margin of 0.7% by which the Treaty was rejected, it is more important to consider the fact that about 50% of the population felt that it was unnecessary and inappropriate for Denmark to be signing the Maastricht Treaty. While Denmark is now a key player in the European Union and a core member state, this rocky beginning did not serve to bolster the European confidence in this new international institution for cooperation.

Ever since the formation of the EU, and the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, there have been an accumulation of signals that the idea of the EU is an incredibly fragile concept. Since the Global Financial Crisis ("GFC") in 2008, the broad perception of the European Union, as measured by the EU Eurobarometer surveys, has been slow to recover. Only in 2021 have the levels of confidence

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ "Gini Coefficient: Wealth Inequality in Haiti," Statista, accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/983225/income-distribution-gini-coefficient-haiti/>.

¹²⁸ Sara Binzer Hobolt, "From No to Yes: The Danish and Irish Referendums on the Maastricht and Nice Treaties," in *Europe in Question* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199549948.003.0007>.

in the EU started to return to pre-GFC levels.¹²⁹ The election of multiple populist and xenophobic leaders as heads of state, along with constitutional crises and concerns over appropriate governance, have become widely present in many European states. There are even EU member states, such as Sweden, who are not willing to adopt the Euro as its currency.¹³⁰ This is all on top of the most recent event, Brexit, which saw the United Kingdom leave the European Union to pave its own path. While the EU remains a quintessential and revolutionary example of how states can work together, it is plagued with its own form of fragility which has been ever-present over the course of its existence.

¹²⁹ "Standard Eurobarometer 95 - Spring 2021 - September 2021 - Eurobarometer Survey," accessed October 29, 2021, <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2532>.

¹³⁰ "In a Referendum, Swedes Resoundingly Reject the Euro - The New York Times," accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/15/world/in-a-referendum-swedes-resoundingly-reject-the-euro.html>.

Past Actions

To understand some of the past actions taken with regards to state fragility, the case study method will be once again adopted. Using the case studies from the previous section (“History of the Problem”), multiple ideas, frameworks, and solutions will be presented. Furthermore, a brief description of the role of international economic actors, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), will be provided for the sake of completeness.

Sub-Saharan Africa

With regards to Sub-Saharan Africa, past actions for both Rwanda / Mozambique and the DRC / CAR will be considered. This will help demarcate what solutions might be more effective than others.

One of the core actions taken by these states to help build resilience and reduce fragility was to rebuild their economic capacity and institutions. In order to accomplish this, the governments needed to raise revenue. All four of the countries placed an emphasis on trying to mobilize and generate domestic revenue.¹³¹ While Mozambique, Rwanda, and the DRC were able to significantly increase the amount of revenue that they brought in, the CAR had a very difficult time achieving the same level of results.¹³² These funds were used to rebuild public financial management systems and to strengthen the central bank and the banking sector. Public financial management systems helped build financial transparency and accountability, as well as generate a secure and effective route for donor support to flow into the countries.¹³³ The central bank and banking sector were also focused on ensuring that there was appropriate monetary policy in place and that capital could flow throughout the economies.¹³⁴ Mozambique and Rwanda were most successful at rebuilding their

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Matthew Andrews, “How Far Have Public Financial Management Reforms Come in Africa?,” *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2010, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1724741>.

¹³⁴ Tito Tomas Siueia, Jianling Wang, and Tamakloe Geoffrey Deladem, “Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance: A Comparative Study in the Sub-Saharan Africa Banking Sector,” *Journal of Cleaner Production* 226 (July 20, 2019): 658–68, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.04.027>.

economic capacity. Rwanda in particular was able to reinstate their budget process by 1998 and had rebuilt its public financial management systems by the mid-2000s.¹³⁵

Another core step for these countries was to implement a comprehensive legal code that would hold citizens accountable for their actions. While it is difficult to immediately implement an exhaustive set of legislation in this regard, the first step was often to institute some form of a universal code of human rights.¹³⁶ This would ensure that human rights were valued above all else, increasing trust in the government, and that any subsequent constitutions and legal codes would have to honor these basic rights. One core obstacle to implementing a strict and all-encompassing legal code was the fact that every citizen needed to adhere. Countries like the CAR and DRC had rampant levels of corruption, meaning that there was significant pushback from the political elite, who were happy to keep the systems of corruption and nepotism.¹³⁷

One particular challenge for the DRC was the fact that it was such a fragile state while also being one of the most resource-rich countries in the region. The DRC holds an incredible store of precious metals such as diamonds and rare minerals, as well as fossil fuels. During periods of fragility, foreign companies and states would enter the region looking to extract these resources.¹³⁸ Oftentimes, these external actors cared very little for attempting to stabilize the region, so long as they had adequate access to these resources.¹³⁹ This system of profiteering was enabled through deeply entrenched systems of corruption by Congolese officials.¹⁴⁰ There was some attempt for international bodies to begin arbitrating these types of situations. This quickly became problematic

¹³⁵ "Rwanda Public Finance Management Reform Project - World Bank," accessed October 29, 2021, <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/913421530254061437/pdf/Project-Information-Documents-Integrated-Safeguards-Data-Sheet-Rwanda-Public-Finance-Management-Reform-Project-P164807.pdf>.

¹³⁶ Daniel Thürer, "The 'Failed State' and International Law - ICRC," *International Review of the Red Cross* (1, 00:00:00.0), <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jq6u.htm>.

¹³⁷ "Democracy, Corruption, and U.S. Policy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," *Brookings* (blog), December 11, 2020, <https://www.brookings.edu/events/democracy-and-corruption-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-two-years-into-the-tshisekedi-administration/>.

¹³⁸ "Violence Linked to Natural Resource Exploitation - United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights," accessed October 29, 2021, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/FS-5_Natural_Resources_FINAL.pdf.

¹³⁹ "Natural Resource Exploitation and Human Rights in the DRC, 1993-2003," *Global Witness*, accessed October 29, 2021, <https://en.archive/natural-resource-exploitation-and-human-rights-drc-1993-2003/>.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

due to concerns over sovereignty and infringing on the government's need to seem to hold control.¹⁴¹

Latin America / Caribbean

In Haiti, one of the most notable actions taken to help reduce the fragility of the country was the United Nations Mission in Haiti ("MINUSTAH"). The objective of MINUSTAH was to act as a UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, beginning in 2004, and it comprised 2,366 military personnel along with 2,533 police force members.¹⁴² The mandate from the UN Security Council ("UNSC") was to use its resources to restore and maintain the rule of law, public safety, and public order in Haiti.¹⁴³ The MINUSTAH personnel had a very difficult time fighting against the armed gangs for control and saw widespread violence across the country.¹⁴⁴ The mandate for MINUSTAH was extended and broadened after the initial few years did not yield significant success, as well as due to natural disasters such as the earthquake in October 2010. The mission officially ended in October 2017, per the UNSC's direction.

MINUSTAH, in addition to its lack of success over the course of its deployment, faced significant domestic and international criticism. From its first moments on the ground, it became heavily politicized and was subject to significant pressure from the conservative and liberal parties.¹⁴⁵ Beyond this, there have been numerous accusations of human rights abuses by MINUSTAH personnel, as well as civilian casualties.¹⁴⁶ One of the most dramatic instances of alleged civilian casualties was on July 6, 2005, where a Brazilian general carried out a raid on rebels. However, many people opposed to MINUSTAH believe that the raid targeted civilians, with casualties ranging between 10-80 civilians. This added fuel to the fire for those who did not support the MINUSTAH

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² "MINUSTAH Fact Sheet," United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed October 29, 2021, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minustah>.

¹⁴³ Jorge Heine and Andrew S. Thompson, eds., *Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and Beyond* (Tokyo ; New York: United Nations University Press, 2011).

¹⁴⁴ "United States Institute of Peace Special Report," accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr208.pdf>.

¹⁴⁵ Marta Fernández Moreno, Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga, and Máira Siman Gomes, "Trapped Between Many Worlds: A Post-Colonial Perspective on the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)," *International Peacekeeping* 19, no. 3 (June 1, 2012): 377–92, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2012.696389>.

¹⁴⁶ "A New Chapter for the Disastrous United Nations Mission in Haiti | The New Yorker," accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-new-chapter-for-the-disastrous-united-nations-mission-in-haiti>.

presence in the country.¹⁴⁷ Towards the end of MINUSTAH's mandate in Haiti, there were regular protests in the country with demonstrators chanting "Down with the occupation" and burning flags of countries who contributed personnel to the mission.¹⁴⁸ It is important for delegates to understand what happened in Haiti and the benefits and risks of intervening with military forces. That being said, the dais will not look favorably upon solutions leveraging the United Nations Peacekeepers. This is due to the controversy that surrounds historical UN peacekeeping missions, as well as the fact that the only UN body that has the power to mandate UN peacekeeping missions is the UNSC.¹⁴⁹

Europe

The European Project and the European Union have been working on proving their value to their member states. This has been done through three core areas: politics, economics, and defense. On the political front, a timely example is the centralized power and decision-making that the EU as an institution could bring to the Covid-19 pandemic. On the political side, the EU has been able to foster coordination across the various heads of states. While this caused tension during the more logistically difficult parts of the pandemic, such as with vaccine distribution while vaccines were very scarce, citizens of countries overall viewed this cooperation as beneficial.¹⁵⁰ The EU leaders were also able to ensure priority areas across the EU were defined and that adequate personal protective equipment ("PPE") was provided to ensure the safety of its member states' citizens.¹⁵¹ However, it is widely perceived that Germany was the driving factor of EU collaboration during this period. There is also broad perception that the EU actions during the pandemic exacerbated the North-South divide in the European continent.¹⁵² Please note that while the COVID-19 pandemic is a good example of

¹⁴⁷ "Soldiers Without a Cause: Why Are Thousands of UN Troops Still in Haiti?," *Center for Economic and Policy Research* (blog), April 1, 2012, <https://www.cepr.net/soldiers-without-a-cause-why-are-thousands-of-un-troops-still-in-haiti/>.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ "Deploying Peacekeepers," United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed October 29, 2021, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/deploying-peacekeepers>.

¹⁵⁰ "EU Defends Vaccine Distribution as Nations Complain It Is Uneven," *Reuters*, March 13, 2021, sec. Healthcare & Pharma, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-eu-austria-idUSKBN2B5oF5>.

¹⁵¹ "Regulation (EU) 2016/425 on Personal Protective Equipment | Safety and Health at Work EU-OSHA," accessed October 29, 2021, <https://osha.europa.eu/de/legislation/directive/regulation-eu-2016425-personal-protective-equipment>.

¹⁵² Iryna Sabat et al., "United but Divided: Policy Responses and People's Perceptions in the EU during the COVID-19 Outbreak," *Health Policy* 124, no. 9 (September 1, 2020): 909–18, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthpol.2020.06.009>.

how the EU can work together to prevent state fragility, **it will not be a topic of debate during this committee.**

On the economic front, the Covid-19 pandemic saw the European Union redirect EU funds to help its member states. For example, the EU directed 37 billion Euros from its structural funds to help EU countries fight against the outbreak.¹⁵³ In addition, the budget was amended at multiple points to deliver billions of Euros to its member states on a continual basis. Another major economic accomplishment was the establishment of the Euro itself – a single common currency across 19 countries. The Euro has accomplished its goal of achieving regional price stability and has been widely successful in the eyes of citizens of the member countries.¹⁵⁴ That being said, recent empirical studies by researchers at firms such as Bloomberg have noted that data on the benefit of the Euro remains inconclusive.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ "Covid-19: Parliament Approves €37 Billion Crisis Response | News | European Parliament," March 25, 2020, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/economy/20200323STO75617/covid-19-parliament-approves-EU37-billion-crisis-response>.

¹⁵⁴ Professor Karl Whelan, "The Euro at 20: Successes, Problems, Progress and Threats," n.d., 20.

¹⁵⁵ "Euro's 20th Anniversary: A Report Card on the Single Currency's Success," accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-euro-at-20/?sref=CgmlioJP>.




Figure 2: From Bloomberg's "Euro's 20th Anniversary: A Report Card on the Single Currency's Success"

Finally, on the defense front, the EU has implemented a Common Security and Defense Policy ("CSDP"). The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009, set up the initial framework for the EU's CSDP.¹⁵⁶ The CSDP includes strategies such as Permanent Structured Cooperation ("PESCO"), which involves long-term collaborative defense strategies across EU member states.¹⁵⁷ In addition, the European Defence Fund ("EDF") helps direct financial resources and manpower on an EU-level towards defense research and capability development.¹⁵⁸ These defense strategies, focused on

¹⁵⁶ "The Treaty of Lisbon | Fact Sheets on the European Union | European Parliament," accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/5/the-treaty-of-lisbon>.

¹⁵⁷ "PESCO: A Force for Positive Integration in EU Defence," CEPS (blog), September 14, 2021, <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/pesco-a-force-for-positive-integration-in-eu-defence/>.

¹⁵⁸ "The European Defence Fund (EDF)," accessed October 29, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/defence-industry-space/eu-defence-industry/european-defence-fund-edf_de.

common goals and collaboration, have been largely successful and well-received by EU member states.¹⁵⁹

World Bank / IMF

The World Bank (the “Bank”) is a global institution that was established in 1944 to initially help post-WWII Europe rebuild.¹⁶⁰ The Bank now acts as an international organization that works on combating poverty through developmental assistance to countries that are on the lower end of the development spectrum. This is largely done through giving loans and working with the private and public sectors to ensure that they are rapidly developing.¹⁶¹ The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), on the other hand, is an international organization focused on stabilizing the international monetary system and monitoring currencies across the globe. Core goals of the IMF are to secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, and promote high levels of employment.¹⁶²

With regards to fragile states, the World Bank has often deployed financial resources to help with reconstruction and development for countries that have higher levels of fragility.¹⁶³ For example, the International Development Association (“IDA”), which is the division of the Bank that focuses on the world’s least developed countries, announced \$26 billion of financing available for fragile states.¹⁶⁴ The World Bank also established a State and Peacebuilding Fund (“SPF”) in 2008, which is a large multi-donor trust fund that supports interventions in fragile states.¹⁶⁵ These funds will often be deployed for projects such as rebuilding economic capacity, developing infrastructure, facilitating FDI, generating new jobs for citizens, and helping deliver basic services like education to citizens.¹⁶⁶

¹⁵⁹ European Union Institute for Security Studies., *CSDP in Action: What Contribution to International Security?* (LU: Publications Office, 2015), <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2815/634719>.

¹⁶⁰ “History,” Text/HTML, World Bank, accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/history>.

¹⁶¹ “The World Bank: What It Is and How It Operates,” Bretton Woods Project, July 16, 2020, <https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2020/07/the-world-bank-what-is-it-and-how-it-works/>.

¹⁶² “About the IMF,” accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.imf.org/en/About>.

¹⁶³ “Fragility, Conflict & Violence,” Text/HTML, World Bank, October 15, 2021, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/overview>.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ “State and Peacebuilding Fund (SPF),” Text/HTML, World Bank, accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/state-and-peace-building-fund>.

¹⁶⁶ Nicole Ball and Mariska van Beijnum, “Review of the Peacebuilding Fund,” *Cligendael Institute*, June 4, 2009, 51.

The IMF engages fragile states through three key channels: surveillance, lending, and capacity development. Surveillance involves monitoring the situations of fragile states and keeping track of any developments for the broader international community.¹⁶⁷ The IMF only helps through its lending and capacity development practices at the request of the state itself.¹⁶⁸ The IMF offers multiple facilities, including the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility/Extended Credit Facility (“PRGF/ECF”)¹⁶⁹, the Rapid Credit Facility (“RCF”)¹⁷⁰, and Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (“EPCA”).¹⁷¹ These facilities are pools of capital that have been deployed in prior engagements with fragile states to aid in their development, especially after periods of violence and conflict. Delegates should note that, while the Bank and IMF can be valuable partners for fragile state solutions, they should by no means be relied upon as a consistent or endless source of capital and funding. Delegates should rather understand actions they have taken and understand how that might be emulated or improved upon.

¹⁶⁷ “Overview of the IMF’s Work on Fragile States,” n.d.

¹⁶⁸ “The IMF and Fragile States,” IMF, accessed October 29, 2021, <https://ieo.imf.org/en/our-work/Evaluations/Completed/2018-0403-the-imf-and-fragile-states>.

¹⁶⁹ “IMF Extended Credit Facility (ECF),” IMF, accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/02/21/04/Extended-Credit-Facility>.

¹⁷⁰ “IMF Rapid Credit Facility (RCF),” IMF, accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/02/21/08/Rapid-Credit-Facility>.

¹⁷¹ “IMF Emergency Assistance: Supporting Recovery from Natural Disasters and Armed Conflicts - World,” ReliefWeb, accessed October 29, 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/imf-emergency-assistance-supporting-recovery-natural-disasters-and-armed-conflicts>.

Possible Solutions

This section will provide delegates with a few ideas of what potential solutions could look like and what might make them particularly effective (or ineffective). Delegates should use this to understand potential starting points for their research or to stimulate ideation.

One major issue that is often overlooked is the lack of energy access that fragile states have. Over 800 million people worldwide have no access to electricity, with 86% (translating to 688 million people) living in countries that are classified as fragile by the OECD. Poor energy not only impedes development, but also perpetuates the vicious poverty cycle and creates structural circumstances that foster conflict and social, political, and economic instability.¹⁷² Overseas development assistance (“ODA”) has been partly directed towards this issue, but it has become skewed towards investments in non-fragile states.¹⁷³ Solutions such as distributed or off-grid energy are modular and disperse risk, which helps reduce the potential for a single issue to bring down the entire power grid. Distributed generation systems broadly are largely resilient during periods of conflict, while also being affordable and environmentally sustainable.¹⁷⁴ There is also no technological barrier, as all necessary technologies have already been developed for such types of distributed power systems.¹⁷⁵ The core obstacle to this type of solution is securing the appropriate financing and establishing the necessary partnerships between national governments and private and public actors to execute on this task. Through this solution, energy could be brought rapidly to regions and citizens that could immensely benefit from such access.

Another solution might be to look at the food systems that exist in fragile states and ensure that the agricultural systems and markets are effective. Fragile states have, on average, 43% of their population employed in the agriculture sector. This can be compared to non-fragile, non-high-

¹⁷² “Fragile States: Securing Development,” accessed October 29, 2021, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29774/124789-WP-Zoellick-9-12-2008-ENGLISH-Fragile-States-PUBLIC.pdf?sequence=1>.

¹⁷³ Qiang Wang, Jiaqi Guo, and Zequn Dong, “The Positive Impact of Official Development Assistance (ODA) on Renewable Energy Development: Evidence from 34 Sub-Saharan Africa Countries,” *Sustainable Production and Consumption* 28 (October 1, 2021): 532–42, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spc.2021.06.007>.

¹⁷⁴ “Scaling Energy Investments in Fragile States - Council on State Fragility,” accessed October 29, 2021, https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/scaling_energy_investments_in_fragile_states_council_on_state_fragility.pdf.

¹⁷⁵ OAR US EPA, “Distributed Generation of Electricity and Its Environmental Impacts,” Overviews and Factsheets, August 4, 2015, <https://www.epa.gov/energy/distributed-generation-electricity-and-its-environmental-impacts>.

income countries, which see only 27% of their population employed in the agriculture sector.¹⁷⁶ As such, there is a significant need to ensure that people can be fed and that livelihoods can be maintained in fragile countries through adequate agricultural systems. Farmers might need cash assistance, especially if regional banks and lenders have constraints due to economic downturns.¹⁷⁷ As such, data systems can be implemented to assess where there are distribution bottlenecks and financial issues, such that financial resources can be appropriately allocated.¹⁷⁸ Technology could also be leveraged to provide high-quality information to farmers about best practices, crop prices, and how to effectively bargain with suppliers.¹⁷⁹

The advent of technological innovation across all sectors could also be heavily utilized to ensure that basic services are provided to the citizens of countries. One of the largest driving factors of state fragility and stability of a populace is their access to adequate healthcare.¹⁸⁰ The government, alongside international support, can act as a major catalyst in innovating healthcare solutions. For example, in Rwanda, hospital waiting times for blood supplies were hovering around four hours in the most optimal conditions. This meant that oftentimes, blood supplies could not be delivered on-time, causing the risk of surgeries and other procedures to dramatically skyrocket. However, a system was developed wherein online ordering from hospitals and other healthcare providers was combined with drone-based delivery of blood supplies. This reduced the waiting time by over 75% to an average of 45 minutes.¹⁸¹

In general, solutions will protect fragile states by strengthening their weakest areas. For a state that is threatened by foreign or domestic violence, solutions must involve strengthening military and police forces. Meanwhile, many fragile states lack critical infrastructures; solutions for these nations will require developing water access, education, agriculture, health care, and more. A state must be able to stand on its own in order to become more stable. However, somewhat contrary to this idea of

¹⁷⁶ "Strengthening Food Systems in Fragile Contexts," accessed October 29, 2021, https://www.glopan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/10989%E2%80%A2Fragile-Context-Policy-Brief_3Aug.pdf.

¹⁷⁷ Clive A. Edwards, *Sustainable Agricultural Systems* (CRC Press, 2020).

¹⁷⁸ "A Roadmap for Food System Recovery in Fragile States and Territories," ICARDA, accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.icarda.org/media/blog/roadmap-food-system-recovery-fragile-states-and-territories>.

¹⁷⁹ "Timor-Leste's Drivers of Growth and Sectoral Transformation," n.d.

¹⁸⁰ Wendy A. Rogers and Mary J. Walker, "Fragility, Uncertainty, and Healthcare," *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics* 37, no. 1 (February 2016): 71–83, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-016-9350-3>.

¹⁸¹ "Drones Take Rwanda's National Blood Service to New Heights," accessed October 29, 2021, <https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/drones-take-rwandas-national-blood-service-to-new-heights>.

independently-driven stability, many solutions require the cooperation of multiple nations. Delegates must find solutions which utilize the resources of a globalized world to strengthen fragile, sovereign states.

Bloc Positions

While this discussion of state fragility has emphasized fragility in nations across the globe, there are areas of the world with a higher concentration of more-fragile states than others. Rather than approaching the potential bloc positions as a “savior and saved” dynamic between states with lower levels of fragility and states with higher levels of fragility, delegates should recognize the valuable insight that each nation can bring to the table. Those with higher levels of fragility can bring impactful insights into where assistance and preventative measures can have the largest impact, whereas those with lower levels of fragility can develop strategies that might have worked in their countries. This is not even to mention the various cultural and geographic differences that enable each delegation to bring an equally unique and valuable set of perspectives and solutions to this discussion.




Figure 3: From Statista <https://www.statista.com/chart/19070/results-of-the-fragile-states-index/>

Asia & Oceania

Asia and Oceania have countries with a very diverse set of experiences vis-à-vis state fragility. According to the FSI, New Zealand is currently the 4th-least fragile nation in the world, whereas Myanmar is the 23rd-most fragile nation in the world. As such, countries with stronger and weaker institutions interplay with one another within this geographic region. It should be noted that with major population and power-hubs within the region (China, India, and Australia), there are a variety of economic systems and trade networks which have allowed for unprecedented growth. That being said, the Asian and Oceanic regions are well-suited for collaboration which strengthens state stability, in the midst of economic growth, cultural shifts, and rapid urbanization.

Middle East

The Middle East has historically been home to a number of high-fragility states, including four out of five of the most-fragile states, as per the FSI. Middle Eastern nations have also experienced large amounts of violence from both domestic and international actors, contributing to the instability of the nations. On top of this, having a large number of fragile states within relative geographic proximity to one another compounds the problems of each state, causing a “cycle” of instability. However, there are also some countries in the region (such as Israel and Qatar) which are considered to be significantly less-fragile states. As such, these types of countries might be able to act as geographic partners to build a strong Middle Eastern coalition that prioritizes societal stability through economic development. Furthermore, delegates from this region should prioritize protecting fragile states from the military threats such as hostile non-state actors and foreign acts of aggression.

Africa

For the past few centuries, the African continent has been divided up arbitrarily and faced a significant number of domestic, regional, and international headwinds to set up effective institutions. In spite of these obstacles, many African nations have found some level of stability. However, in aggregate, Africa is home to many countries that rank quite poorly on the FSI. As such, delegations from Africa can leverage experiences (both successes and failures) from their countries

to help push the committee forward with innovative solutions and impact-oriented ideas. African nations should prioritize developing basic systems (such as infrastructure, healthcare, and agriculture), to ensure state stability. Many problems of state fragility in Africa were caused by foreign intervention, whether by governments or by private companies. As such, African nations need solutions which develop local industries and governing capabilities, while also preserving self-determination.

Europe

Many countries, especially within the European Union, rank as the least-fragile nations in the world according to the FSI. Nations such as Finland, Norway, and Switzerland consistently rank as some of the least-fragile states. Countries with these types of historical rankings can leverage their understanding of what types of institutions and processes have been most effective at home to stimulate brainstorming and ideas for committee. However, not all European nations have been very stable in the past. One must only consider the series of conflicts and insurgencies fought in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 to 2001 to see that European nations are not immune from high levels of state fragility. As such, delegations from Europe should ensure that they do not overlook the fact that they have also experienced such fragility “at home,” so to speak. For this committee, European delegations can focus on problems in other regions, but delegates should also know that stability in Europe is threatened by the rise of other antagonistic powers and the decline of allied support. Even after the Trump presidency, the United States has become increasingly isolationist. Meanwhile, Russia’s rejection of the west has manifested in a variety of economic and security concerns for European countries aligned with the EU and NATO.¹⁸² With these dual forces in mind, European countries can look for solutions which either strengthen international political and economic unions. Or, European nations can advocate for more independence in their decision-making process, so that states are less reliant on the European Union.

¹⁸² Niblett, Robin. “Fragility in Europe Is on the Rise, and We’re Not Doing Enough to Respond.” World Economic Forum. World Economic Forum, January 13, 2017. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/fragility-in-europe-is-on-the-rise-and-we-re-not-doing-enough-to-respond/>.

Latin America & South America

In Latin America and South America, there are a few countries (such as Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, etc.) that have historically had significant difficulty with state fragility. Coupled with the economic crises that many of these countries face, citizens of such nations are often very discontent. As such, one of the most common issues for countries in this region is the migration flows from more-fragile states to less-fragile states. This has placed a significant burden on the slightly-less fragile states and caused institutions to be rendered somewhat ineffective. This compounds issues within the region, causing states that were not having much difficulty to suddenly be unable to deliver basic services to their citizens. Delegations of this region should target the root causes of migration, and then also ensure that migration is not a severely destabilizing force.

North America

North America, particularly the United States and Canada, have historically been ranked lower on the FSI and have had less issues with state fragility. However, as mentioned multiple times in this discussion, the effects of fragile states are global issues with global ramifications. As such, North American nations should not be dissuaded from engaging with these issues. North American nations provide significant resources and know-how from their existing institutions to create ideas on how to prevent and mitigate state fragility.

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